THE DEOBAND SCHOOL AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN





ZIYA-UL-HASAN FARUQI

The Formation of Pakistan has overshadowed the existence of a trend of Muslim thought in Indian politics represented by the Deoband School which was at once nationalist and orthodox. Since Pakistan was, in the years just prior to Independence, the demand of the "majority" of Indian Muslims and since the Deoband School, which claims to stand for the cause of Islam and the welfare of the Muslim community, opposed this demand, its position deserves study and analysis. The present study is directed to explaining this position of the Deoband School, while giving at the same time a critical account of its traditional outlook in matters of religion and culture. The author further attempts to separate the various strands of the argument and provide a comprehensive background to set the politional developments in perspective.

THE DEOBAND SCHOOL AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN is a study of painstaking scholarship in a field which has not been adequately explored. It is a book of great interest as much to the general reader interested in pre-Independence developments as to the specialist in modern Indian Politics.

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Foreword

IN THE MUSLIM HISTORY of India the period 1707-1857 has been singularly lacking in clarity ; and even for the second half of the nineteenth century, specifically Islamic developments have been portrayed less adequately than one would wish. In English, at least, studies have been sparse except for work on Sir Sayyid Aḥmad K͟hāṇ and his movement. The present examination of the nineteenth-century development of the more traditional ("orthodox") Islamic currents is, accordingly, especially welcome. And it goes on to delineate these strands in their twentieth-century continuity. The importance of this subject is obviously major, for any understanding of the history of the Indo-Muslim community during the past century and more, and for the reverberating developments that led up to the partition of India and the establishment of Pakistan. Others as well as I, I am sure, will be indebted to Principal Faruqi for making available this careful analysis and valuable presentation. The work was done at McGill as a master's thesis ; and while it is unusual for thesis at that level to be published, this constitutes so significant a contribution to scholarly understanding of the period surveyed that one cannot but be grateful.

February 3, 1962 WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH

Preface

THE DEOBAND SCHOOL (India) has been, throughout its existence, an orthodox religious movement professing its loyalties, with some puritanical tinge, to the Ḥanafī school of Muslim ' fiqh '. Politically, till 1947 it upheld the tradition of being vehemently anti-British and has been "nationalist" through and through. Whatever it has done, it claims to have done it for the cause of Islam and the welfare of the Muslim community. Even in this spirit, it says, it opposed the Muslim League in its struggle for the establishment of Pakistan—a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent where, as claimed by the Muslim League, they could be free to carve out a future of their own in accordance with their religious and cultural traditions. This position sounds paradoxical since the Deoband School was founded with the expressed purpose of preserving the 'Sharī'ah' and the cultural traditions of the Indian Muslims ; and hence, apparently, it is Deoband who should have been in the forefront for the achievement of Pakistan. This thesis is an attempt to resolve this seemingly paradoxical position of Deoband and explain the genesis of its opposition to the demand of the Indian Muslims for Pakistan.

As the Deoband School has been traditionalist, it has been considered proper to give a detailed background in order to show the consistency in its anti-British attitude and its stand against all the forces in the country which it suspected as being pro-British. An attempt has also been made to give a critical account of its traditional outlook in matters of culture, religion and religious studies.

The system of transliteration is one in use at the Institute

of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal. The names of famous places and the current familiar words like Islam and others have, however, not been transliterated. As for the diphthongs, we have followed the same method as used at the Institute except in case of words like سلیمان شیخ طفیل حسین etc. In transliterating them we have used ai instead of ay as the former is the most accepted form in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

Thanks are due, and hereby expressed, to Dr. Faẓlur-Raḥmān, Professor of Islamic Studies at the Institute, but for whose kind assistance, thorough supervision and constructive suggestions this work would have been impossible.

System of Transliteration

CONSONANTS

From Arabic :
initial : unexpressed,
medial and final :

From Persian :
as from Arabic except
as follows :

From Urdū :
as from Persian except
as follows :

	Arabic	Persian	Urdū		Arabic	Persian	Urdū
ب	b			ص	ṣ		
پ		p		ض	ḍ	ẓ	
ت	t			ط	ṭ		
ٹ			ṭ	ظ	ẓ		
ث	th	s̱		ع	ʿ		
ج	j			غ	gh		g͟h
چ	ch			ف	f		
ح	ḥ			ق	q		
خ	kh		k͟h	ک	k		
د	d			گ		g	
ڈ			ḏ	ل	l		

From Arabic : initial : unexpressed, medial and final :	From Persian : as from Arabic except as follows :	From Urdu as from Persian except as follows :

	Arabic	Persian	Urdu		Arabic	Persian	Urdu
ذ	dh	ẓ		م	m		
ر	r			ن	n		
ز	z			ں			ṇ
ژ		zh		ه	h		
س	s			و	w	in words derived from Arabic and Persian : w…from Sanskrit : v	
ش	sh			ی	y		

VOWELS, DIPHTHONGS, ETC.

Vowels : Short : a, i, u

Long : Arabic : ā, ī, ū—Persian, Urdū : also ē, ō

ى (alif Maqṣūrah) : à

long with tashdīd : īya, ūwa…

Diphthongs : aw, ay

ة (tā' marbūṭah) : ah—in iḍāfah : at

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CHAPTER I

Muslim India (1800-1857) and the role of the 'Ulamā'

THE DAWN OF the nineteenth century saw the East India Company emerge as the major political power in India. Not only was the power of the Mughal Empire broken but also most of the independent principalities that had come into existence as a result of its dismemberment were subjugated by the British. In 1799 Ṭīpū Sulṭān (1750-99) was defeated and killed and his territory annexed. Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and a major part of the United Provinces had already passed into the control of the foreigners. Oudh was a British ally and Hyderabad was virtually ruled by a British resident. The Marathas, though divided and fighting among themselves, remained the only source of anxiety and danger ; but in the Second Maratha War (1803-5) the British authorities successfully manoeuvred to remove this obstacle in their way to aggrandizement. On their refusal to come into the fold of the Subsidiary Alliance on British conditions war was declared against them and they were defeated in various engagements and were forced to come to terms dictated by British interests. Of these battles, the crushing defeat of the Sindhiā of Gwāliar at the Battle of Delhi in 1803 was the most significant and had far-reaching consequences. It led to the British protection of the Mughal Emperor, Shāh 'Ālam, "now a miserable, blind old man of eighty-three, 'seated under a small tattered canopy.' "[1] The British forces marched into the city and by show of arms convinced the Imperial seat that from

[1] P. E. Roberts, ' History of British India ', Oxford University Press. London, 1952, p. 257.

Calcutta to Delhi they were the real rulers of India. In the North-West of the country the Sikh feudatories were getting exhausted by internecine wars to be united and ruled by a Sikh statesman, Ranjīt Singh (1780-1839), who concluded a peace treaty with the Company. On the whole the Muslim supremacy had come to an end.

Under these circumstances Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz (1746-1824), the illustrious son of Shāh Walīullāh Dihlawī (1703-62), issued the famous 'fatwà' in 1803 declaring that India had ceased to be a 'Dār al-Islām'.[1] This 'fatwà', from the religio-political point of view, is a landmark in the history of India in general and in that of Muslim India in particular. It amounted to a call to religiously conscientious Muslims to mobilize themselves, in the absence of any powerful Muslim warlord, under popular leadership and rise in defiance of the foreign power. The original 'fatwà' which is in Persian, says :

"...In this city (Delhi) the Imām al-Muslimīn wields no authority. The real power rests with Christian officers. There is no check on them ; and the promulgation of the commands of 'kufr' means that in administration and justice, in matters of law and order, in the domain of trade, finance and collection of revenues—everywhere the 'kuffār' (infidels) are in power. Yes, there are certain Islamic rituals, e.g., Friday and 'Id prayers, adhān and cow slaughter, with which they brook no interference ; but the very root of all these rituals is of no value to them. They demolish mosques without the least hesitation and no Muslim or any dhimmī can enter into the city or its suburbs but with their permission. It is in their own interests if they do not object to the travellers and traders to visit the city. On the other hand, distinguished persons like Shujā'ul-Mulk and Vilāyetī Begum cannot

[1] For an explanation of this term and that of Dār al-Ḥarb see the glossary.

dare visit the city without their permission. From here (Delhi) to Calcutta the Christians are in complete control. There is no doubt that in principalities like Hyderabad, Rampur, Lucknow, etc., they have left the administration in the hands of the local authorities; but it is because they have accepted their lordship and have submitted to their authority...."[1]

Thus, after analysing the existing situation and referring to the established legal position on the point and instances from the early period of Islamic history, Shāh Ṣāḥib gave his opinion that India was no more a land of peace and security both for the Muslims and dhimmīs. W. W. Hunter, perhaps, summarized this 'fatwà' in his own words when he quoted Shāh Ṣāḥib declaring:

"When Infidels get hold of a Muhammadan country... and it becomes impossible for the Musalmáns of the country, and of the people of the neighbouring districts, to drive them away or to retain reasonable hope of ever doing so; and the power of the infidels increases to such an extent that they can abolish or retain the ordinances of Islam according to their pleasure; and no one is strong enough to seize on the revenues of the country without the permission of the infidels; and the (Musalmán) inhabitants do no longer live so secure as before; such a country is politically a Country of the Enemy ('Dár-ul-Hurb')."[2]

With the gradual consolidation of the British power the "decisions of the Doctors became more and more distinct as to India being 'Dár-ul-Harb'."[3] Shāh Ṣāḥib and other

[1] Shàh 'Abdul 'Azīz, 'Fatāwà 'Azīzī', Maṭba' Mujtabā'ī, Delhi, 1311 A.H., p. 17.

[2] W. W. Hunter, 'The Indian Musalmans', The Comrade Publishers, Calcutta, 1945, p. 134. [3] *Ibid.*

'Ulamā' who gave their decisions to that effect, were the conscience of the Muslim community bewildered by the rapidity of the British expansion. It found the ground slipping from under its feet and in time of its bewilderment and distress it looked towards its religious leaders for guidance.

However, it is significant to note, but hard to understand, that during the period (1782-1803)[1] when the Maratha chiefs wielded suzerainty over Delhi and the Mughal Emperor, a mere figurehead, was under their protection, no 'fatwà' as to India being 'Dār al-Ḥarb' was given. Shāh Ṣāḥib was in Delhi and before his very eyes the non-Muslim Maratha soldiers were perpetrating all acts of highhandedness on the peaceful citizens of Delhi and its suburbs;[2] yet he did not come out with a declaration that India had ceased to be a 'Dār al-Islām' for the Muslims. One possible interpretation that can be put forward is that in spite of Shāh Ṣāḥib's bitter criticism of Marathas' ruthless behaviour and the general spread of chaos and confusion due to their tyrannical exaction of 'chawth'[3] from all who fell a victim to their greed and lust, he did not consider that Muslim supremacy had come to an end. He might have interpreted the rise of the Maratha power as a rebellion

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, ''Ulamā'-i-Hind Kā Shāndār Māẓī', vol. II Delhi, 1957, p. 88.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[3] 'Chawth' literally means one-fourth; but in the revenue system as built up by Shīvājī (1627-80) in the seventeenth century it came to be known as the one-fourth of the land-revenue that the Maratha ruler used to extract from his subjects and the feudal chiefs who accepted his suzerainty. The idea of this levy, as reported by the author of 'New History of the Marathas' (vol. I, Bombay, 1946, p. 200), G. S. Sārdesāī, was borrowed by him from the Rajas of Ramnagar. His successors developed and used it as a formidable instrument for their expansionist policy. Later in the eighteenth century it became a sort of plunder. The Maratha armies exacted 'chawth' from whosoever they fell on without incurring any responsibility to protect him from other plunderers.

and have thought that it was a temporary phase; perhaps he believed that some Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī would again appear and drive the unruly Mahārāshtrians out of Delhi. In his 'fatwā' he used the term 'dhimmī', not Hindu or non-Muslim, which indicates that he did not interpret the situation as tantamount to the final collapse of the Muslim administration in India. To him it still existed. It needed rejuvenation. The Marathas had, no doubt, weakened it, but they had not replaced or shown any desire to replace it by any new set-up. On the other hand, in the ascendancy of the East India Company he certainly saw the seed of the total disintegration of the Muslim society and the final decline of Muslim authority beyond any hope of recovery. He was a man of keen insight. He was also fully aware of the British doings in Mysore, Bengal, Oudh and the land of the Rūhilās. He fully realized the danger that lay in the new situation. Hence the 'fatwā' and the call for resistance.

Shāh Ṣāḥib was not content only with the pronouncement of the 'fatwā'. He went further and gave a lead in organizing the resistance movement. As he was too old to participate in it actively he asked his spiritual disciple, Sayyid Aḥmad Barelawī (1786-1831),[1] to go to the camp of Amīr 'Alī Khān in Rājpūtāna who, in

[1] It is beyond our scope to deal fully with the life, personality and activities of Sayyid Aḥmad Barelawī. Those interested in the 'Jamā'at' he organized and the Jihād he and his followers carried on for years against the Sikhs in the North-West Frontier, should read the comprehensive work of Ghulām Rasūl Mihr, 'Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd' (Urdū), Kitāb Manzil, Lahore, 1952. Also see his 'Jamā'at-e-Mujāhidīn' (Urdū), Lahore, 1955. W. W. Hunter's 'The Indian Musalmans' and Maḥmūd Ḥusain's article "Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd" in 'A History of the Freedom Movement', vol. I, Karachi, 1957, pp. 556-600. All these, however, should be studied with a critical mind as there is a growing tendency both in India and Pakistan, even among the scholars, to interpret the historical materials in a way

collaboration with Jaswant Rāo Holkar, a Maratha chieftain, was putting up a stubborn opposition to the British. Sayyid Aḥmad was a man of strong moral character, a perfect activist and a born leader of men. His mystic training had given him a unique spiritual position among the 'Ulamā' trained in Walīullāhī traditions. Shāh Ṣāḥib was so much impressed by his spiritual attainments that he commanded his whole family, relatives and friends to swear fealty to him and accept his leadership.

Sayyid Aḥmad lived in Rājpūtāna for seven years, preaching to the soldiers of Amīr 'Alī Khān, giving advice in organizational and strategical matters and even fighting with sword in hand against the British forces. W. W. Hunter, partly because of his ignorance and partly due to his prejudices, refers to his activities in Rājpūtāna in the following words : "He began life as a horse soldier in the service of a celebrated freebooter [Amīr 'Alī Khān], and for many a year harried the rich opium-growing villages of Malwa."[1]

However, in 1817 when Amīr 'Alī Khān[2] decided to sign a peace treaty with the British, Sayyid Aḥmad left his camp and came to Delhi where he was received by Shāh Ṣāḥib.[3] With the submission of Amīr 'Alī Khān to the enemy the last ray of hope for resistance under the banner of a warlord

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that suits their patriotic bias and in terms of nationalistic subjectivism. Note that W. W. Hunter betrayed his sheer ignorance about the life and personality of Sayyid Aḥmad Barelawī when he dubbed him as robber and bandit (cf. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 4). The works mentioned above expose the weakness of the position he took against the great 'mujāhid' and his followers.

[1] W. W. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[2] It is strange that Shāh Ṣāḥib ignored the dubious character of Amīr 'Alī Khān, for he was not that type of Muslim warlord who could be expected to carry the revolt against the British to its end, in order to win or be killed in the path of God. Perhaps he thought that the Amīr could be converted to the holy cause and be useful in the attempt to reinstate the Muslim supremacy in Hindustān.

[3] Mihr, 'Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd', pp. 112-13.

had vanished. Now the 'jihād' was to be continued through popular support. In order to popularize the cause and to enlist support in men and money Sayyid Aḥmad, with the blessings of Shāh Ṣāḥib, toured the country. His success was tremendous and within a short time he turned the land between Delhi and Calcutta into a rebellious camp. "In 1822 he made a religious journey to Mecca: ... and in 1824 made his appearance among the wild mountaineers of the Peshawar Frontier, preaching a holy war against the rich Sikh towns of the Punjab."[1]

Sayyid Aḥmad and his followers have often been dubbed as fanatics and Wahhābīs.[2] They have been charged with making a frantic endeavour to establish an Islamic state in India. It is said that they were revivalists and strove to bring back the vanished glory of pristine Islam. Recently their activities have been described as mainly anti-British.[3]

[1] Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 5. It is still a controversial point why, when the ultimate target of 'jihād' was the British power, Sayyid Aḥmad collided with the Sikhs. Recently an effort has been made to resolve the controversy, though not quite successfully, by the researches made by Mihr (*op. cit.*) Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī ('Naqsh-i-Ḥayāt', vol. II, Deoband, 1954) and Muḥammad Miyāṇ (*op. cit.*). For the fear of being off the point the writer hesitates to discuss this point. However, in order to understand the enormity and seriousness of the situation which the British authority in India had to face for at least fifty years he recommends the perusal of the second chapter of Hunter's 'The Indian Musalmans' where he explains (to quote his own words) "the treasonable organisation by which the Rebel Camp (drew) unfailing supplies of money and men from the interior districts of the Empire."

[2] Dr. K. M. Ashraf in his article, "Muslim Revivalists and the Revolt of 1857" in 'Rebellion 1857' (edited by P. C. Joshi, People's Publishing House, Delhi, 1957) has rightly remarked that "the term 'Wahabi' is certainly inaccurate inasmuch as the political objectives of the so-called Indian Wahabis and their social outlook in general were derived, not from the doctrines of Abdul Wahab of Nejd (d. 1787), but from the earlier teachings of Shah Waliullah of Delhi (d. 1762)."

[3] Among those who believe that Sayyid Aḥmad's main objective was to drive the British out of India, was the great religio-political leader

However, on the basis of the materials available, it can be argued that as the British domination in India, with vast resources at its command, posed a great danger to the hegemony of the Muslims in their country's life (and, indeed, a total break-up of their social and educational system seemed imminent), they reacted strongly and bitterly in order to reform and maintain what they had inherited from their predecessors. The old medieval order was crumbling and the cracks were becoming more visible day by day. It was a period of transition and the new order was still to appear on the scene. Nothing was clear and everywhere prevailed chaos and confusion which was worse confounded by an external phenomenon, i.e. the interests of a foreign power. The Muslims, as the ruling class, had been dominant for centuries. Hence the changes in the old order were affecting them most, or they were sensitive enough to realize the distresses caused by a disintegrating system. They felt the need for reform which must come from within the indigenous populace itself. They were not going to tolerate the impact of foreign forces. It, perhaps, injured their sense of pride. Probably it meant to them a surrender to forces under the command of infidels. Therefore, they acted, but, as they were not fully conscious

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of India, Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī (1879-1957), for long Principal of Dārul-'Ulūm Deoband. He has based his claim mainly on the letters Sayyid Aḥmad wrote to Rāja Hindū Rāo, at that time minister and brother-in-law of Dawlat Rāi Sindhiā of Gwāliar, and Ghulām Hyder Khān, then an officer in Sindhiā's administration. (cf. Madanī, 'Naqsh-i-Ḥayāt', vol. II, pp. 12-16). In his letters he says that his primary motive was to force the British to quit India. This object when realized, the governmental affairs of the country would go to the charge of those who wanted them. He was fighting only for the cause of the 'dīn' and the liberation of the country, not for the attainment of worldly riches and power. Hence the cause was noble and the Hindus and Muslims alike should support it.

To the best knowledge of the writer, it is not known what reply, if any, Sayyid Aḥmad received from Rāja Hindū Rāo and Ghulām Ḥyder Khān.

of social and economic factors, they acted primarily in the religious field, believing that religious reform would bring mundane glory in its train. Yet this religious consciousness also exhorted them to achieve the lost political power in order to maintain their social order, of course, in a reformed shape. This is, perhaps, why we find in this so-called Wahhābī movement an aspect of political resistance against the encroachment of the non-Muslim powers together with a conscious effort to reform and rejuvenate Muslim society in terms of purging "the religion of its accretions and corruptions."[1]

Sayyid Aḥmad was killed in the battle of Bālākōṭ in 1831. In his death the movement suffered a great set-back. His army got dispersed and division crept into the rank and file. However, the 'mujāhidīn', afterwards, established their headquarters at Sittāna in the Swāt valley in the Frontier from where they cotinued their fight with the help they received from Hindustān. The British Government connived at their activity, as will appear from the following extract from 'The Indian Musalmans', until the Punjab was conquered :

> "They perpetrated endless depredations and massacres upon their Hindu Neighbours before we annexed the Punjab, annually recruiting their camp with Muhammadan zealots from the British Districts. No precautions were taken to prevent our subjects flocking to a Fanatic Colony which spent its fury on the Sikhs.... On our annexation of the Punjab the fanatic fury...was transferred to their successors."[2]

It is beyond our scope to go into a detailed narration of the activities of the 'mujāhidīn' after 1831. It continued to smoulder in spite of internal confusion and division

[1] W. C. Smith, 'Modern Islam in India', London, 1946, p. 161.

[2] Hunter, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-13.

and external suppression, and its impetus was used in the Rebellion of 1857, which we shall discuss later.

The writer has, more than once, hinted at the breakdown of the old order that posed serious problems to the Indians in general and the Muslims in particular. We know that the Mughal Empire had ceased to exist long ago, even before the British arrived upon the scene. Yet the social order continued to be feudal to which the Muslims, in particular, kept on clinging even after 1857 when the last ray of hope of reviving the Delhi Empire was extinguished for good. The tide of time was rolling on; it could not afford to wait for the Muslims to be realistic. Bengal was the first to feel its effect in the form of the impact of a dynamic civilization on a static feudal society. It was not a healthy impact; nor were the changes that followed in the interests of the people. The British started in that region "with outright plunder, and a land revenue system which extracted the uttermost farthing not only from the living but also from the dead cultivators...[The] process was called trade...and trade was plunder."[1] The capitalists in England who had flourished with the progress of the Industrial Revolution, demanded a market which could supply raw materials and consume the finished goods manufactured in their factories. The demand was persistent and through legislation and Charters it was fulfilled at the expense of Indian industry and agriculture. As a result, the Indian textile industry was ruined and millions of weavers and artisans were thrown out of employment.

"Where were they to go? Their old profession was no longer open to them; the way to a new one was barred. They could die of course.... They did die in tens of millions. The English Governor General of India, Lord Bentinck, reported in 1834 that 'the misery hardly finds a parallel in the history of commerce. The bones

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'The Discovery of India'. London, 1951, p. 275.

of the cotton weavers are bleaching the plains of India.' "[1]

Those who survived took to land which, as already fully occupied, could not absorb them. They became a burden on the land ; poverty increased and the standard of living fell below the subsistence level. Such was the capitalistic exploitation. With the growth of the British power and territorial expansion it also moved from the eastern provinces to the north, west and central India. South was already feeling its rigours.

This atmosphere of loot and plunder was inimical to culture and education. The old traditional system of education went on declining and there was no system to replace it. On the contrary till 1833 there was a deliberate attempt to prevent the spread of education.

> "When the British seized power in Bengal there were a very large number of 'muafis', that is tax-free grants of land. Many of these were personal, but most were in the shape of endowments for educational institutions. A vast number of elementary schools of the old type subsisted on them, as well as some institutions for higher education. The East India Company was anxious to make money rapidly in order to pay dividends to its shareholders in England, and the demands of its directors were continuous and pressing. A deliberate policy was therefore adopted to resume and confiscate these 'muafi' lands. Strict proof was demanded of the original grant, but the old 'sanads' and papers had long been lost or eaten up by termites ; so the 'muafis' were resumed and the old holders were ejected, and the schools and colleges lost their endowments. Huge areas were involved in this way and many old families were ruined. The educational establishments which had been supported by these 'muafis', ceased to function, and a vast number of teachers

[1] Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

and others connected with them were thrown out of employment."[1]

The Muslims were undoubtedly the worst sufferers. To the horror of their economic dislocation was added the apprehension that under the new regime their educational institutions were going to be wiped out. Ironically enough W. W. Hunter, an apologist for the British rule in India, himself, in plain words, points out to this sad situation. He says :

"At an outlay of £800,000 upon Resumption Proceedings, an additional revenue of £300,000 a year was permanently gained by the State, representing a capital at five per cent of six millions sterling. A large part of this sum was derived from lands held rent free by Musalmáns or by Muhammadan foundations. The panic and hatred which ensued have stamped themselves for ever on the rural records. Hundreds of ancient families were ruined, and the educational system of the Musalmáns, which was almost entirely maintained by rent-free grants, received its death-blow. The scholastic classes of the Muhammadans emerged from the eighteen years of harrying, absolutely ruined."[2]

The vacuum created by the collapse of the Muslim educational system was filled up with frustration and indignation and a general dislike for the few new schools started with an altogether different aim. This whipped up the pace of unemployment followed by a general distrust of the new rulers. The activities of the missionaries[3] added insult to injury. To the Muslims not only

[1] Nehru, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-97. [2] Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[3] Sayyid Ṭufail Aḥmad in his book, 'Musalmānōṇ Kā Rawshan Mustaqbil' (Delhi, 1945, pp. 142-55), deals extensively with the activities of the missionaries and the zeal of some of the Company's directors

this-worldly but the other-worldly prospects also appeared gloomy. The Hindus, on the other hand, welcomed the new change and rushed to adjust themselves to the new situation. They took full advantage of the official encouragement, and in commerce, education and professions found new avenues to carve out a bright future for themselves. When the British governors deliberately implanted the English system of landlordism on the soil of India[1] it was mostly the Hindu monied and business class who made the full use of the opportunity and replaced the old Muslim landed gentry. It made the situation more complicated and, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, "created new problems and probably the beginnings of the new Hindu-Muslim problem can be traced to it.... Bengal became a province predominantly of Hindu landlords while their tenants, though both Hindu and Muslim, were chiefly the latter."[1]

The Muslims had sufficient cause for discontent. During the period under review they were deliberately being isolated from all places of position and prestige and constantly kept out of government services. The excuse was that Muslims themselves were responsible for this state of affairs,

and administrators for the propagation of the Chrisrian religion among the Indians. In the beginning the British authorities were not interested in this spiritual project, but after 1793 when Mr. William Carey arrived in Sirāmpūr (Bengal), a Dutch settlement, the activities of the missionaries increased and through their schools and literature they ventured upon their divine mission. It is said that Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General of India (1798-1805), patronized them. It was through his initiative that Mr. Carey was appointed as a professor of Sanskrit in the Fort William College, Calcutta. Whatever be the judgement of an impartial student of Indian history regarding the pious intentions of the Christian preachers, there is no doubt that the loss of the political power had made the Indians suspicious of and sensitive to all British moves in the field of education, commerce or politics.

[1] Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 282. [2] *Ibid.*

for they kept on clinging to the old type of education and refrained from joining the new schools. But this is an allegation without any foundation ; and if it be accepted, what treatment was meted out to them when they started learning English ? They also desired to enter the services of the Company, but they received only discrimination, sometimes mild, often ruthless, and the door was closed against them. Consequently, the number of Muslim employees went on decreasing and their economic condition deteriorated from bad to worse. In Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and later in the United Provinces, everywhere they were ignored and kept behind. The writer takes the liberty to give a long quotation from Hunter's 'The Indian Musalmans' which indicates the plight of the Muslims in the middle of the nineteenth century—of course, as a result of the discriminatory policy of the British against them during the preceding decades. He says :

> "I have seldom read anything more piteous than the private letters and newspaper articles of Bengal Musalmáns. The Calcutta Persian paper ['Dúrbín' of July 1869] some time ago wrote thus : 'All sorts of employment, great and small, are being gradually snatched away from the Muhammadans, and bestowed on men of other races, particularly the Hindus. The Government is bound to look upon all classes of its subjects with an equal eye, yet the time has now come when it publicly singles out the Muhammadans in its Gazettes for exclusion from official post. Recently, when several vacancies occurred in the office of the Sunderbans Commissioner, that official, in advertising them in the Government Gazette, stated that the appointments would be given to none but Hindus.[1]

[1] Giving a footnote to this statement of the paper Hunter says : "I have not at present the means of officially tracing and verifying this statement of the Persian journalist but it attracted some notice at that time, and was not, so far as I heard, contradicted."

In short, the Muhammadans have now sunk so low, that, even when qualified for Government employ, they are studiously kept out of it by Government notifications. Nobody takes notice of their helpless condition, and the higher authorities do not deign even to acknowledge their existence.'

"The following sentences are from a petition lately presented by the Orissa Muhammadans to the Commissioner. Their stilted Phraseology may perhaps raise a smile ; but the permanent impression produced by the spectacle of the ancient conquerors of the Province begging in broken English for bare bread, is, I think, one of sorrowful silence : 'As loyal subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, we have, we believe, an equal claim to all appointments in the administration of the country. Truly speaking, the Orissa Muhammadans have been levelled down and down, with no hopes of rising again. Born of noble parentage, poor by profession, and destitute of patrons, we find ourselves in the position of a fish out of water....The penniless and parsimonious condition which we are reduced to, consequent on the failure of our former Government service, has thrown us into such an everlasting despondency, that we speak from the very core of our hearts, that we would travel into the remotest corners of the earth, ascend the snowy peaks of the Himálaya, wander the forlorn regions of Siberia, could we be convinced that by so travelling we would be blessed with a Government appointment of ten shillings a week. ' "[1]

This long extract is, as a matter of fact, a barometer indicating the degree of the appalling misery and privation the Muslims of India were undergoing during those days. The total result of the various factors enumerated above was the absence of the growth of a Muslim middle class,

[1] Hunter, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-68.

while among the Hindus one was gradually rising and gaining shape. To a great extent, the future political and economic developments that were to take place in the Indian subcontinent, were due to this uneven and unbalanced development of its two major communities,[1] and, certainly, herein lies the complex socio-economic ground where the seeds of communalism were sprinkled and watered by religious and cultural bickerings to develop into a thorny bush which subsequently inflicated bleeding wounds on the unity of India and finally divided it into two parts.

1857 AND THE ROLE OF THE 'ULAMĀ'

"If one reads through the official and British records of 1857 one gathers the vague impression that Muslim revivalist groups and the Wahabi's in particular had something to do with it. There are casual references to calls for 'Jihad' (holy war) in almost all places, to 'fatwas' of Maulavis in big cities, to the display of the Green Flag in important rebel centres—all of which suggest a certain Muslim revivalist colouring to the events of 1857."[2]

Taking into consideration the events described and discussed in the preceding pages, the atmosphere of general discontent that prevailed in the first half of the nineteenth century and the policy of annexation and exploi-

[1] This aspect of the Hindu-Muslim question in pre-partition days of India has been very admirably discussed by Dr. W. C. Smith in his 'Modern Islam in India' (Part II, Chap. I. "An Introductory Essay on Communalism," pp. 157-94). It is an interesting topic to study. The present writer warns his readers not to overlook or simplify this very important strand in the constantly strained relations between the Hindus and the Muslims and in the events that ultimately forced the Muslims of India to demand a separate homeland for themselves.

[2] Ashraf, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

tation carried on by the British throughout that period, one can only conclude that the Rebellion of 1857 was a cumulative effect of various causes—political, social and economic. The presence of a foreign power which was considered, though with some exaggeration, responsible for all the upheavals awakened a sense of Indianness among the Hindus and Muslims both who, in turn, understood this feeling in terms of religion and culture; and in their respective spheres of influence both the Hindu and Muslim leaders mobilized the public opinion for anti-British resistance in the name of religion and culture to which the Indian masses are most sensitive.

As for the Muslims, the rising of Indian soldiers in Vellore (1806),[1] the revolt of the 'Farā'iḍīs' in 1804,[2] the

[1] This uprising was, in the words of General Briggs, "the first effort made by the discontented Muhammadans to effect the destruction of our power in the south." (Evans Bell, 'Memoirs of General Briggs', p. 24, quoted by Ashraf, *op. cit.*, p. 74.)

[2] The 'Farā'iḍīyah' movement was founded by Mawlawī Sharī'atullāh in 1804. He was born in Bahādurpūr (District Farīdpūr of Bengal). At the age of eighteen he went on pilgrimage to Mecca and stayed in Ḥijāz for twenty years, acquiring knowledge and meeting people. At Mecca he was, for some time, a student of Shaikh Ṭāhir as-Sumbul Makkī Shāfa'ī and learnt a lot from him (cf. Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, p. 154, and also Ṭufail Aḥmad, *op. cit.*, p. 104). It is difficult to say how much he came to know there about the Wahhābīs and their doctrines. When he came back to India in 1802, he started a religious reform movement and called it 'Farā'iḍīyah'. It was a protest against the religious decadence of the Muslims and at the same time a manifestation of the socio-economic unrest of the Bengal peasantry and craftsmen. It should be remembered that it followed in the wake of the Parmanent Settlement (1793) and the economic exploitation by the British which resulted in unspeakable misery and poverty of the agrarian and industrial classes of the local population of Bengal. Ashraf (*op. cit.*, p. 75) says that "the Faraizis openly preached the expropriation of landlords without compensation...Shariatullah of Faridpur...began by uniting the peasantry against the exactions of the new zamindars in the name of resuscitated faith. 'There was also a general feeling at that time that the real object of the Faraizis was

peasant riots organized by Dūdū Miyāṇ[1] in the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century, the movement led by Sayyid Aḥmad Barelawī and activities of the Mujāhidīn after him—all these and other happenings suggest the depth of suspicion, frustration and discontent among them whose leadership went mainly into the hands of the religious reformers. Therefore, we find a strong religious strand also in the final attempt in 1857 to drive the British out of India, and also a large body of 'Ulamā' who led the masses and at various places actually fought against the British forces. The traditions established by Sayyid Aḥmad and Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd (1781-1831),[2] of course with the blessings of Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz, were taken

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the expulsion of the alien rulers and the restoration of Muhammadan power.' "

[1] Dūdū Miyāṇ was the son and successor of Mawlawī Sharī'atullāh. He made Bahādurpūr (Bengal) his headquarters and worked among the peasants. He also worked in full collaboration with the 'Mujāhidīn' of Sayyid Aḥmad. "He went further than his father in openly advocating that 'no man has a right to levy taxes on God's earth....' The Faraizis were thus 'Red Republicans' in politics and 'broke into the houses of Hindu and Muslim landlords with perfect impartiality.' Dūdū Miyān thus inevitably came into conflict with the Hindu and Muslim landed aristocracy and the British planters in the districts of the Twenty-four Parganas...." He also organized the peasant riots in 1834, 1841, 1844 and 1846. "In 1857 when the news of the Delhi uprising arrived, he was arrested and taken into custody." (Ashraf, *op. cit.*, p. 76. Also cf. Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, p. 154 and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 161.)

[2] Mawlānā Muḥammad Ismā'īl, commonly known as Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd, was the son of Mawlānā 'Abdul Ghanī (d. 1812), the youngest brother of Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz. After Shāh Ṣāḥib he was the chief theoretician of the movement led by Sayyid Aḥmad. He was a firebrand 'mujāhid', a real "wahhābī" and a bold reformer. His book, 'Taqwīyatul-Īmān' (Urdu), on the subject of 'tawḥīd', created a storm of protests from many a responsible ''ālim' and is still a subject of great controversy. He remained attached to the cause of 'jihād' and was killed in 1831 in the battle of Bālākōt.

up and followed by their successors[1] and those who were religiously and politically oriented to them. In Delhi the famous 'fatwā' declaring 'jihād' against the infidel foreigners and signed by many an ''ālim' of repute and authority stirred a large number of people to fulfil the obligation enjoined therein. In 1858 at Lucknow the well-known trial of 'Allāmah Fazl-i-Ḥaqq Khairābādī (-1861),[2] a very learned ''ālim' educated at the feet of Shāh 'Abdul Qādir

[1] In 1824 when Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz died, the mantle of religious leadership fell on the shoulders of his daughter's son, Mawlānā Muḥammad Isḥāq (1778-1846). He sat on the 'masnad' of his grandfather in the 'Madrasah' at Delhi and started teaching and preaching in the usual fashion. He was a very learned and pious ''ālim' and, particularly, his knowledge of 'Ḥadīth' was unsurpassed. Shāh Ṣāḥib is reported to have repeatedly remarked : "My oratory has been inherited by Ismā'īl and piety by Isḥāq." (cf. Imām Khān Nawshahrawī, 'Tarājim', Delhi, 1938, p. 116.) 'Ubaidullāh Sindhī (1861-1944) is of the opinion that after the sad event of Bālākōt Mawlānā Muḥammad Isḥāq reorganized the movement and gave it a complete programme, purging it of Nejdī and Yamanī influences.

His programme was mainly based on the two principles: (1) a strict observance of 'Ḥanafī mazhab' and (2) an alliance with the Ottoman Sultanate of Turkey. In 1841 he, accompanied by his younger brother, Mawlānā Muḥammad Ya'qūb (d. 1867), went to Mecca in order to seek cooperation for his cause from the Ottomans. He died there in 1846. Before his departure he had set up a board in Delhi of four persons, Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī (d. 1850) as chairman and Mawlānā Quṭbuddīn Dihlawī (d. 1872), Mawlānā Muzaffar Ḥusain of Kāndhlah (d. 1866) and Mawlānā 'Abdul Ghanī Dihlawī as members, in order to propagate and implement the programme during the time of his absence from India. The founders of the Dārul-'Ulūm Deoband, particularly Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī and Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangōhī had been the pupils of Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī and had imbibed the spirit of the programme and the general *élan* of the traditions of the Walīullāhī school of thought. ('Ubaidullāh Sindhī, 'Ḥizb-i-Shāh Walīullāhī', Lahore, 1942, pp. 181-5; also see Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, *op. cit.*, p. 42.)

[2] For a detailed study of his life, achievements and his role in the event of 1857, see 'Abdushshāhid Khān Shirwānī, 'Bāghī Hindostān', Madīnah Preys, Bijnore, 1947.

(-1826), the younger brother of Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz, in connection with this 'fatwā', suggests the magnitude of influence a 'fatwā' could wield on the minds of the discontented Muslims. In Lucknow "the famous 'Maulavi of Fyzabad'...from all accounts can legitimately claim to be the brain and the hand of the conspiracy. It can be asserted with confidence that . . . he was working in closest cooperation with the group of Wahabis and the followers of Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi."[1] The "Wahhābī" sentiment had permeated the heart and mind of rugged soldiers like Bakht Khān who was "the dominating figure of the revolt and the leader of the central government at Delhi."[2] He "arrived in Delhi with a band of Wahabi organisers and appointed his spiritual guide Maulavi Sarfaraz Ali[3] as the 'Imam' of the contingent of 'religious warriors' ('Mujahids') numbering several thousands."[4]

Intiẓāmullāh Shahābī in his two treatises, 'Ghadar ke Chand 'Ulamā'' (Nayā Kitābghar, Delhi, n.d.) and 'Īst Indiyā Kampanī awr Bāghī 'Ulamā'' (Nayā Kitābghar, Delhi, n.d.) gives a list of some 'Ulamā' who were very active in the days of 1857 and played a prominent role in providing the Rebellion a consistent anti-British ideology together with a religious fervour which has, sometimes, led people to read a revivalist trend in the great uprising.

The founders of the Dārul-'Ulūm Deoband actively participated in the Rebellion, organized the masses outside Delhi and for a while were successful in ousting the British authority from the area they were working

[1] Ashraf, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Ashraf, on the authority of Kamāluddīn Ḥyder's 'Tārīkh-i-Awadh', vol. II, says that "Maulana Sarfaraz Ali was a disciple of Karamat Ali of Jaunpur, the famous Khalifa of Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi and a leading figure in the Wahabi movement." (Ashraf, *op. cit.*, p. 98.)

[4] Ashraf, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

in. The centre of their activity was Shāmlī, a small town in the present district of Muẓaffarnagar (U.P.), not far from Delhi. Ḥājī Imdādullāh (1817-99), who after the collapse of the uprising migrated to Mecca, was the 'Imām' or the 'Amīr' of the 'jihādīs' in Shāmlī and Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī (1832-80) and Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gaṇgōhī (1828-1905) acted respectively as the Commander of the forces and the 'Qāḍī'. Mawlānā Madanī in his 'Naqsh-i-Ḥayāt', (vol. II) gives an interesting and authentic report of their brave deeds during the days of the Rebellion and narrates the story of their fortunate escape from the clutches of the ruthless British vengeance that followed the suppression of the uprising.

CHAPTER II

Deoband : A Dārul-'Ulūm is founded

DEOBAND IS a small town in the district of Sahāranpūr (U.P.) at a distance of about ninety miles from Delhi. Here in 1867 a small "'Arabī maktab"[1] was raised to the status of a 'Dārul-'Ulūm' which soon began to attract the attention of students and lovers of Islamic learning from far and near.[2] Established within ten years after the unsuccessful uprising of 1857 when bitter frustration prevailed everywhere and the future seemed dark and appallingly discouraging, it was undoubtedly a bold venture. The

[1] The Maktab was started, shortly after 1857, in the Jāmi'Masjid of Deoband by Ḥāfiẓ Sayyid 'Ābid Ḥusain, Mawlānā Mahtāb 'Alī and Shaikh Nihāl Aḥmad. Sayyid 'Ābid Ḥusain, who was the chief of the Maktab, had never thought of erecting the grand edifice of a 'dārul-'ulūm' on its foundations. It is said that he strongly opposed the proposal of Mawlānā Nānawtawī to shift the Maktab out of the small and dark rooms of the Masjid and install it in a proposed grand building; but finally he succumbed before the determined persuasion of the Mawlānā. (cf. Muḥammad Miyāṇ, 'Ulamā'-i-Ḥaqq', vol. I, Kutub Khānah-'i-Fakhrīyah, Murādābād, 1947, pp. 69-6).

[2] Manāẓir Aḥsan Gīlānī, 'Sawāniḥ-i-Qāsimī', vol. II, Deoband, 1373 A.H., pp. 319-20.

Mawlānā Gīlānī, on the basis of the annual report of the Dārul-'Ulūm (1295 A.H./A.D. 1878), tells us that in 1295 A.H. there were two hundred students including one from Burma, three from Indian Archipelago and one from Tibet. Even Istanbul knew about the Dārul-'Ulūm. There a certain ''ālim' of good repute, Aḥmad Ḥamdī Effendi, had written a book with the title 'an-Nujūm ad-Darārī fī Irshād as-Sārī' which remained unpublished. He had four copies of the manuscript transcribed, two of which he presented to the Istanbul library, one he sent to Cairo (Azhar ?) and one to Deoband through the mediacy of the Turkish consulate in Bombay, accompanied by a letter addressed to the authorities at the Dārul-'Ulūm. The letter was in Persian and mentioned the name of the Mawlānā Nānawtawī with full traditional

guiding spirit of this venture was Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī who has been seen already in the battlefield of Shāmlī in 1857. The part played by the Dārul-'Ulūm in religious, social and political life of the Indian Muslims can be legitimately interpreted in terms of the aims and objectives that lay behind the actions of its founders during the days of the Rebellion. Shāmlī and Deoband are, as a matter of fact, the two sides of one and the same picture. The difference lies only in weapons. Now the sword and spear were replaced by the pen and the tongue. There, at Shāmlī, in order to secure political independence and freedom for religion and culture, resort was made to violence ; here at Deoband a start was made to achieve the same goal through peaceful means. There, for the cause of religio-political freedom individuals were used ; here for that purpose individuals were to be produced.[1] The roads, though diverging from each other, led towards the same destination.

Mawlānā Nānawtawī was not content with establishing a 'madrasah' at Deoband only ; he also exhorted the Muslims to start such 'madrasahs' at different places and, thanks to his initiative and untiring energy, a number of them were soon opend at Sahāranpūr, Murādābād, Nagīnah (Bijnore) and other places in western U.P. It seems he had planned to weave all such 'madrasahs' into an administrative and educational network with Deoband as its centre. Unfortunately, the idea was not realized and each 'madrasah' developed or went into oblivion on its own ; yet the spirit survived and Maẓāhirul-'Ulūm (Sahāranpūr), and Qāsi-

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respect, saying : جناب فضائل مآب، مولوی محمد قاسم صاحب!

مدرسۂ آنحضرت کہ منبع فیض عموم است فرستادہ آمد تا یادگار آن بزرگوار بر محل خود باشد۔

[1] Mawlānā Muḥammad Ṭayyib, 'Āzādī-'i-Hindōstāṉ Kā Khāmōsh Rahnumā, Dārul-'Ulūm Deoband', Deoband, 1957, p. 5.

mul-'Ulūm (Murādābād), for example, which developed and prospered, have always looked towards Deoband for inspiration. Besides, a large number of 'maktabs' and 'madrasahs' which sprang up, in course of time, in villages and small provincial towns and which considered Deoband as their mother-institution, still maintain their direct or indirect connection with it. It was undoubtedly a great achievement and remarkable was the vitality and enthusiasm of the Muslims who, within a short span of time after the fateful days of 1857 and under the most discouraging circumstances, were able to start afresh to devise ways and means for the safeguarding of their religion and culture threatened, as they saw, by the British official educational system.

The founders of the Dārul-'Ulūm Deoband represented the rebellious spirit of the disgruntled Muslims who, since the days of the 'Farā'iḍīyah' movement, had been manifesting their uneasiness and dissatisfaction, in one way or another, with the state of affairs created by the establishment and perpetuation of a foreign rule in India. They were not going to surrender before the resultant sufferings after their failure in 1857 and recoil into a fatal inactivity. They were fully conscious of the fact that the British rule, now more powerful than before, was not going to help them in their efforts to live up to the standards of their religious and cultural heritage. Nor did they believe in a policy of compromise and appeasement. Yet they were to march; and they marched forward independently, rejecting all official interference and depending entirely on Divine assistance and the sincere religiosity of their brethren.

In the first chapter the present writer has hinted at the programme of Mawlānā Muḥammad Isḥāq, which consisted of two main points: (1) strict observance of the 'Ḥanafī' school of 'fiqh' and (2) some sort of *liaison* with the Ottoman sulṭāns (see Chapter I, p. 19 footnote 1). Through Mawlānā Mamlūk 'Alī, who was made responsible to carry

it out when its originator migrated to Mecca, the programme reached the great trio (Ḥājī Imdādullāh, Mawlānā Nānawtawī and Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gaṇgōhī) and was adopted by the Dārul-'Ulūm when founded. Thus it can be concluded with confidence that in the very bases of the Dārul-'Ulūm lies a tradition of loyalty to the 'Ḥanafī Maẓhab' and disloyalty to the British rule. Throughout its existence it has proved itself worthy of this tradition which, it claims, is in perfect harmony with Walīullāhī traditions.

As stated above, Mawlānā Nānawtawī was the guiding soul of this religio-political venture. He laid down eight principles which were to form the core of the constitution of the 'Madrasah' (Dārul-'Ulūm). They are:

"The most important thing is that the authorities of the Madrasah should always take utmost interest in raising more and more funds from the public. Others also should be exhorted to make efforts for constant increase in public donations. The well-wishers of the Madrasah should never forget this obligation of theirs.

"Constant and serious endeavours are to be made toward a permanent and decent boarding arrangement for the students.

"The body of councillors ('Shūrā') responsible for the management of the Madrasah should be devoted to its cause. Rigidity of views is undesirable. One should never try to manoeuvre in order to impose his opinion upon others. God forbid! the foundations of the Madrasah will be shaken when its councillors cease to be tolerant of each other's views. The 'Muhtamim' (the highest administrative authority) is bound to seek counsel in all advisable matters. Outsiders, also, who entertain a feeling of goodwill toward the Madrasah and have experience and intelligence, should be given an opportunity for constructive suggestions.

"It is essential that the teachers of the Madrasah be

like-minded. Like the worldly-minded 'ulamā', they should not be conceited and disrespectful to others. It will be a bad day for the Madrasah when such a situation arises.

"The curriculum and the method of instruction, as already proposed or afterwards agreed upon by mutual consultations, should be strictly followed; otherwise this Madrasah will not flourish and if it does flourish it will not serve the purpose.

"So long as the Madrasah does not have any regular and definite source of income, it will continue to exist—Inshā' Allāh, provided there is an honest reliance on and faith in His mercy and compassion; and when it comes to possess a definite source of income, e.g., some substantial property in the form of land or factory or a promise of permanent donation from some rich person of honest intentions, then it appears the Madrasah will be divested of the feelings of fear and hope—a perennial source of submission to the will of Allāh—and, with this, will be deprived of the 'hidden' source of unfailing assistance; and its workers will start quarrelling amongst themselves. Therefore, in matters of income and constructions there should always remain a certain lack of certainty of means.

"The participation of government and rich persons is also harmful.

"The donations of persons who want to remain unknown, I believe, is a source of 'barakah'. Their sincerity seems a more permanent means of income."[1]

A critical perusal of these "principles" gives the reader an idea of the independent and democratic spirit embodied therein. The 'Madrasah' was to be based on public co-operation. It had to be run by the method of 'shūrā' and not by arbitrary decisions of a person or a group of perons. It rejected all possibilities of governmental inter-

[1] Mawlana Muḥammad Tabyyib, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11.

ference. This independent attitude together with more and more emphasis on mass contact has been, throughout its existence, a chief characteristic of the Dārul-'Ulūm. The other 'madrasahs' started and maintained on public support were also to be patterned on the same basis. It seems that the Mawlānā had visualized the possibility of the spread of a network of 'madrasahs' of identical views and the birth of a body of people dedicated to a common objective in life. Perhaps, he hoped that these 'madrasahs' would be able to release a tremendous revitalizing force giving a new impetus to his despondent co-religionists in building up a future worthy of Islamic traditions. The events, in subsequent years, proved the soundness of his dreams ; Dārul-'Ulūm and other 'madrashas' did produce a large group of people devoted to the cause of Islam and the freedom of the country.

CURRICULUM AND DEPARTMENTS

The current curriculum of the Dārul-'Ulūm is patterned after the famous system of Muslim religious education in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent known as 'Dars-i-Niẓāmīyah '.[1] However, in the light of materials available,

[1] It is a mistake to associate it with the Niẓāmīyah of Baghdad. Its originator was Mullā Niẓāmuddīn (d. 1748). He was the son of a famous 'ālim ', Mullā Quṭbuddīn (d. 1691) of Sihālī, a village thirty-two miles from Lucknow. In 1691 he was mercilessly killed in his house by a rival faction in the village. On the report of the sad incident, Aurangzēb (regd. 1658-1707) "issued a ' farmān ', instituting an inquiry and punishing the guilty and allotting to the bereaved family a spacious house (known as Farangī Maḥal) in Lucknow, as they did not like to stay at Sihālī." Mullā Niẓāmuddīn was only fourteen at that time, and was studying the ' Sharḥ-i-Jāmī '. After he completed his education at the feet of different teachers of repute he settled down at Farangī Maḥal and "began his career as a teacher, his first pupils being his own three nephews. Soon his fame grew and he attracted pupils from far and near." Thus, thanks to the attractive method of his teaching, the fame of Farangī Maḥal

it seems that there has been a gradual drift, in regard to different courses, from the ideas that the founders had in mind. The Dārul-'Ulūm was founded in 1867.' In 1869, on the recommendations of a syllabus committee, the period

reached far and wide and it soon became a centre of Islamic learning. It produced a galaxy of great 'Ulamā' of universal repute, e.g., Mullā Baḥr-ul-'Ulūm (d. 1819), Mawlānā 'Abdur-Rab, Mawlānā 'Abdul-Ḥayy and Mawlānā 'Abdul-Bārī. It still exists but has lost its former position. Farangī Maḥal has been known for its specialization in 'fiqh' and ''usūl-i-fiqh' rather than in 'ḥadīth' or 'tafsīr'.

Those who are interested in knowing more about the 'dars', its originator and his family should read Mawlānā Shiblī's two articles, "Mullā Niẓāmuddīn, Bānī-'i-Dars-i-Niẓāmīyah" and "Dars-i-Niẓāmīyah" in 'Maqālāt-i-Shiblī' (Urdū), vol. III, Maṭba' Ma'ārif, Azamgarh, 1932, pp. 91-125. G.M.D. Ṣūfī's 'Al-Minhāj' (English) is also recommended.

Mawlānā Shiblī, however, holds that Mullā Niẓāmuddīn popularized the 'dars' his father used to teach his students in Sihālī and, in course of time, because of the fame of the Mullā, it came to be known as the 'Dars-i-Niẓāmīyah'. He also maintains that in the beginning it was a simple course of study and a large portion of the present syllabus known as 'Dars-i-Niẓāmīyah' has nothing to do with the original.

In recent times almost all the Muslim religious reformers in India have felt the need of a radical reform in the curriculum of the 'madāris-i-'Arabīyah' and many of them have recorded their criticism of the so-called 'Dars-i-Niẓāmīyah' with indignation and anger. The present writer, however, thinks it sufficient to lay down the balanced comment of Mawlānā Shiblī followed by a general outline of the 'dars' itself as given by Ṣūfī in his 'Al-Minhāj' (Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1941, p. 75.)

Mawlānā Shiblī says :

1. In this course of study there are only a few books on those sciences whose acquisition is the chief aim of the students, while books on sciences indirectly connected to the former abound in number, e.g., treatises on 'Naḥw' and 'Ṣarf'. The purpose is to acquire proficiency in Arabic language and literature ; but too much time is given to 'Naḥw' and 'Ṣarf' while literature as such is neglected. Similar is the case with other branches of knowledge.
2. The total number of books on 'tafsīr', 'ḥadīth', 'fiqh' and ''uṣūl-i-fiqh' is far smaller than that of those on logic and philosophy.
3. Some of the books are confusing, in so far as their subject matter is concerned. For example, 'Ḥamdullāh', 'Mīr Zāhid', 'Mullā

of study was reduced from ten years to six.[1] Mawlānā Gīlānī explains this reduction of time-limit for graduation as

Ḥasan', 'Qāḍī' and others are on logic but contain a great deal of admixture of philosophical problems; as a result, students are unable to grasp the art of logic.

4. 'Tafsīr' is an important and magnificent branch of Islamic learning; but only 'Baiḍāwī' and 'Jalālain' are included in the course. 'Jalālain' are so brief that the number of words used in them equals the number of words in the Qur'ān.
5. 'Kalām' is also a very important branch, but in this field an ordinary work, 'Sharḥ-i-'Aqā'id-i-Nasafī', is taught. As for 'Sharḥ-i-Mawāqif', only the portion dealing with ''umūr-i-'āmmah', having no relation to 'kalām', is a part of the syllabus.
6. Most books lack in clarity and lucidity in the treatment of the subject matter they deal with. The discussion, therein, is confusing and the style pedantic.
7. The course is devoid of books on modern sciences.
8. English has got no place in the curriculum.

(See Sulaimān Nadwī's 'Ḥayāt-i-Shiblī', Dārul-Muṣannifīn, Azamgarh, 1943, pp. 413-14.)

'DARS-I-NIZĀMĪYAH'

Grammar: Etymology and Syntax:	'Mīzān, Munsha'ib, Ṣarf-i-Mīr, Panjganj, Zubdah, Fuṣūl-i-Akbarī, Shāfīyah, Kāfīyah, Naḥw-i-Mīr, Sharḥ-i-Mi'at 'Āmil, Hidāyah an-Naḥw, Sharḥ-i-Jāmī'.
Rhetoric:	'Mukhtaṣar al-Ma'ānī, Muṭawwal'.
Logic:	'Sharḥ ash-Shamsīyah, Sullam, Risālah Mīr Zāhid, Mullā Jalāl, Ṣughrà, Kubrà, Īsāghūjī, Tahdhīb, Quṭbī, Sharḥ-i-Tahdhīb, Mīr Quṭbī'.
Philosophy:	'Maibudhī, Shams-i-Bāzighah, Ṣadrā'.
Mathematics and Astronomy:	'Khulāsah al-Ḥisāb, Euclid, Tashrīḥ al-Aflāk, Qaushjīyah Sharḥ-i-Chighminī'.
Dogmatic Theology:	'Sharḥ-i-Mawāqif, Sharḥ-i-'Aqā'id-i-Nasafī'.
Fiqh:	'Sharḥ-i-Waqāyah, Hidāyah'.
'Uṣūl-i-Fiqh:	'Nūr al-Anwār, Tawḍīḥ-i-Talwīḥ, Musallam ath-Thubūt'.
Ḥadīth:	'Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ'.
Tafsīr:	Jalālain, Baiḍāwī.

[1] Manāẓir Aḥsan Gīlānī, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

a measure to provide the graduates sufficient time to learn modern sciences, if they wished, before they were too old to join official secular institutions. His interpretation is based mainly on a speech of Mawlānā Nānawtawī which he delivered on the occasion of the first convocation[1] of the Dārul-'Ulūm in 1874 and in which he is reported to have said :

> "It is known to informed persons that the ancient disciplines never, not even in the former days of the sulṭāns, enjoyed, on such a large scale, the generous patronage modern sciences are receiving through the increasing number of government institutions....
>
> "There is no doubt that the Islamic sciences have declined tremendously....
>
> "In such circumstances common people thought it unwise to set up institutions of modern learning....
>
> "It was considered proper and essential to pay attention mainly to ''Ulūm-i-Naqlī' (Traditional Sciences) together with those aspects of training which are helpful in acquiring ability to learn current sciences....
>
> "It is harmful and beyond the capacity of students to be trained simultaneously in too diversified and too many a discipline...."[2]

These scattered sentences quoted by the author of 'Sawāniḥ-i-Qāsimī', while indicating the main purpose behind the shortening of the period of study, also throw light on the fact that Mawlānā Nānawtawī was an enlightened ''ālim'

[1] In the terminology of the 'Arabī madāris' in India and Pakistan convocation is called 'jalsah-'i-dastārbandi'. It is, however, not held regularly at the end of every academic year. Generally, the graduates are awarded certificates in which the books and the subjects they specialize in are mentioned, together with an 'ijāzat' (permission) to teach the curriculum.

[2] Gīlānī, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-83.

and in no way opposed to the acquisition of modern sciences by the ''ulamā''. What he stood for was the preservation and propagation of ''Ulūm-i-Naqlīyah'. He was certain that six years of study were sufficient to read all important books of 'tafsīr'. 'ḥadīth', 'fiqh', 'uṣūl-i-fiqh' and 'farā'iḍ' necessary for an adequate understanding of Islamic disciplines.[1] Although himself well-versed in traditional logic, philosophy and dogmatic theology, he aimed at toning down the emphasis in the course on Aristotelian logic and philosophy. His main interest lay in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. In this respect his life-long colleague, Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gaṇgōhī, was more uncompromising. It is said that when he became the chief spokesman of the Dārul-'Ulūm in 1880 there appeared a trend in favour of total exclusion of philosophical treatises from the curriculum. The following extract from one of his letters he wrote to a certain Mawlānā Ṣiddīq Aḥmad is a true representative of this anti-'falsafah' trend :

> "I think that 'falsafah' is a useless discipline. No substantial benefit is derived from it, except that three or four years are wasted on it. It is misleading and its students are ignorant of 'dīnīyāt'. It mars the proper understanding of the 'Sharī'ah' and, under its sordid influence, men are led to express heretical views and are lost in the dark and swarthy world of 'falāsifah'. This devilish art, therefore, has been banished from the Madrasah and for the last one year no instruction in it has been imparted ; but there are teachers and students who are in favour of this 'fan' and, perhaps, it is being taught in secret."[2]

This is rather an extremist point of view. Philosophy

[1] Gīlānī, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 292-93. Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gaṇgōhī wrote this letter in 1301 A.H./1883 A.D.

as such is essential for creative thinking. It is, as Jamālud-dīn Afghānī says, "the means of sallying forth from the dark alleys of abject animalism towards the wider horizons of humanity, of destruction of bestial superstitions through the natural light of intellect, the metamorphosis of (mental) blindness into vision and perception, (and) deliverance from horror, ignorance (and) stupidity by gaining entry into the city of knowledge and wisdom."[1] Afghānī further declares that "among all the branches of learning, it is 'the integrating soul, the strong guardian and has the capacity to keep others in existence.'"[2] The present writer has deliberately quoted the views of Afghānī on philosophy to show that he, himself educated in the old school, considered the revival of philosophical studies essential for the regeneration of Muslim society. It was unfortunate that, in spite of the pure intellectual endeavours of Muslim philosophers, no tradition of philosophical thinking was established and the triumph of orthodoxy over 'falāsifah' resulted in a sort of intellectual stagnation that sapped the creative faculty of the Muslim intelligentsia. It is true that books like 'Mullā Sadrā' and 'Shams-i-Bāzighah' were incapable of creating in readers a genuine thirst for rational thinking; but it is also true that a complete banishment of 'falsafah' from the Dārul-'Ulūm, instead of replacing the out-moded philosophical treatises by original works of, at least, Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sīnā, Fārābī and Ibn Rushd, was a reactionary step towards a virtual closing of the door of 'ijtihād'. The interest in 'falsafah', nonetheless, persisted and it soon regained its traditional position at the Dārul-'Ulūm, thanks to the intrinsic rigidity of 'taqlīd'. Again there was no gesture of healthy innovation; all the traditional books on logic and 'falsafah' included in the 'Dars-i-

[1] Sharīf al-Mujāhid, 'Sayyid Jamāl Al-Dīn Al-Afghānī, His Role in the Nineteenth Century Muslim Awakening', A Master's thesis submitted to McGill University, Montreal, 1954, p. 73.

[2] *Ibid.*

Niẓāmīyah ' were introduced in the syllabus. One is really shocked when one finds that even today the Dārul-'Ulūm curriculum does not include works like 'Tahāfut al-Falāsifah' of Imām Ghazālī (1058-1111) and 'Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah' of Shāh Waliullāh.

We have seen that Mawlānā Nānawtawī was in favour of learning modern sciences ; the people at Deoband are still not opposed to it. But the problem is that they are not willing to create a proper atmosphere within the walls of the Dārul-'Ulūm to encourage their students towards the acquisition of modern knowledge. On the contrary, they are led to feel that by acquiring religious knowledge they are spiritually superior to their counterparts in secular institutions. Mawlānā Nānawtawī spoke of "those aspects of training which are helpful in acquiring ability to leran current sciences" ; but he failed to see that the most important of "those aspects" was an adequate arrangement for the teaching of the English language, a necessary pre-requisite to pursue any intellectual attempt in the field of modern learning. This drawback in the curriculum of the Arabic ' madrasahs ' was keenly felt by Shiblī who had to overcome the stubborn opposition of his conservative colleagues in introducing English as a compulsory subject at the Nadwat-ul-'Ulamā' (Lucknow) in 1908.[1]

BOOKS AND SUBJECTS STUDIED AT THE DĀRUL-'ULŪM

SYLLABUS IN ISLAMIC STUDIES

Grammar, Etymology and Syntax :	' Mīzān aṣ-Ṣarf, Ṣarf-i-Mīr, Naḥw-i-Mīr, Munsha'ib, Ilm aṣ-Ṣīgha, Panj-ganj, Kāfīyah, Sharḥ Mi'at 'Āmil, Hidāyat an-Naḥw, Ibn-i-'Aqīl, Sharḥ-

[1] Sayyid Sulaimān Nadwī, ' Ḥayāt-i-Shiblī ', Dārul-Muṣannifīn, Azamgarh, 1943, p. 418.

	i-jāmī, Mufīd aṭ-Ṭālibīn, Fuṣūl-i-Akbarī ’.
Prosody :	‘ ‘Arūḍ al-Miftāḥ ’.
Rhetoric :	‘ Mukhtaṣar al-Ma‘ānī, Muṭawwal, Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ ’.
Arabic Literature :	‘ Maqāmāt-i-Ḥarīrī, Dīwān-i-Mutanabbī, Ḥamāsah, Sab‘ah Mu‘allaqāt, Nafḥah al-yaman, Nafḥah al-‘Arab ’.
History :	‘ Durūs at-Tārīkh, Tārīkh-i-Abī al-Fidā’ ’.
Sīrah :	‘ Risālah as-Sīrah ’ (by ‘Imāduddīn).
Munāẓarah :	‘ Rashīdīyah ’.
Logic :	‘ Kubrà, Īsāghūjī, Sullam al-‘Ulūm, Mirqāt, Mīr Zāhid, (Risālah), Mīr Zāhid (Mullā Jalāl), Mullā Ḥasan, Ḥamdullāh, Qāḍī Mubārak, Quṭbī, Sharḥ-i-Tahdhīb ’.
Philosophy :	‘ Ṣadrā, Shams-i-Bāzighah, Maibudhī, ‘Umūr-i-‘Āmmah ’.
Arithmetic and Astronomy :	‘ Taṣrīḥ, Sharḥ-i-Chighminī, Bist Bāb, Uqlaidis ’.
Ṭib (Medicine) :	‘ Sharḥ-i-Asbāb, Nafīsī, Qānūnchah, Mūjaz, Ḥummīyāt-i-Qānūn ’.
Dogmatic Theology :	‘Sharḥ-i-‘Aqā’id-i-Nasafī, Musāmarah, Sharḥ-i-‘Aqā’id-i-Jalālī ’.
Fiqh :	‘ Hidāyah, Qudūrī, Nūr al-Iḍāḥ, Sharḥ-i-Waqāyah, Kanz ad-Daqā’iq ’.
’Uṣūl-i-Fiqh :	‘ Nūr al-Anwār, Ḥusāmī, ’Uṣūl-ash-Shāshī, Tawḍīḥ-i-Talwīḥ, Musallam ath-Thubūt ’.
Fara’iḍ :	‘ Sirājī ’.
Ḥadīth :	‘ Bukhārī, Muslim, Tirmidhī, Abū Dā’ūd, Nasā’ī, Shamā’il-i-Tirmidhi, Ṭaḥāwī, Ibn Mājaḥ, Muwaṭṭā Imām Mālik, Muwaṭṭā Imām Muḥammad, Mishkāt ’.

'Uṣūl-i-Ḥadīth :	'Nuzhah an-Naẓar ma' Nukhbah al-Fikar'.
Tafsīr :	'Ibn Kathīr, Baiḍāwī, Jalālain'.
'Uṣūl-i-Tafsīr :	'Al-Fawz al-Kabīr'.

(N.B. There is also an optional course in 'tajwīd'—the art of the recitation of the Qur'ān—in all the seven 'qir'ah's' divided in several parts according to the ability of the students.)

There is also an arrangement for primary and secondary education at the Dārul-'Ulūm, which, in its terminology, has been divided into 'ibtidā'ī darajāt' and 'darajāt-i-Fārisī' (Primary and Persian classes) starting from the reading of the Qur'ān together with instruction in the alphabet up to 'Mathnawī-'i-Mawlānā-'i-Rūm'. The primary courses include the Qur'ān ('nāẓirah' as it is called), elementary 'dīnīyāt' Urdū language, Arithmetic (Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication and Division), Hindī, elementary books on 'sīrah' and the geography of the district.

In the secondary classes emphasis is on Persian. In a way, they make the Persian Department of the Dārul-'Ulūm. The syllabus is arranged as below :

1st year. 'Ta'līm-ul-Islām' (Qā'idah, parts I and II—Urdū) 'Karīmā' (Persian), 'Mufīdnāmah' (P.), 'Āmad-nāmah' (P.), 'Tārīkh-ul-Islām', part I, (U).

2nd year. 'Guftugūnāmah' (P.), 'Gulzār-i-Dabistān' (P.), 'Risālah Nādir' (P.), 'Maktūb-i-Aḥmadī' (U.), 'Urdū kī Tīsrī Kitāb, Ta'līm-ul-Islām', part III, 'Risālah Qawā'id-i-Urdū, Tārīkh-ul-Islām' (first half of part II).

3rd year. 'Gulistān' (P.—four chapters without the preface), 'Inshā'-i-Fārigh' (P.), 'Pandnāmah-'i-'Aṭṭār (P.), 'Aḥsan-ul-Qawā'id' (P.—chapter I) 'Tārīkh ul-Islām' (second half of part II).

4th year. 'Būstān' (P.—four chapters with preface),

Ruqqa'āt-i-'Ālamgīrī' (P.—32 pages), 'Mā Lā Bud Minhu' (up to 'Kitāb ul-Ḥajj'), 'Aḥsan ul-Qawā'id' (from p. 28 to p. 42), Tārīkh ul-Islām (part III).

5th year. 'Mathnawi-'i-Mawlānā-'i-Rūm' (first half of the first 'daftar'), 'Sikandarnāmah' (P.), Anwār Suhailī (P.—2 chapters), 'Ruqqa'at-i-Amunullāh Ḥusainī' (P.), 'Aḥsan ul-Qawā'id' (from p. 42 to p. 72).

(N. B. Besides these books students are required to do exercises in Urdū and Persian composition, dictation, translation from Urdū into Persian and vice versa and letter-writing in Persian and Urdū. Persian MSS. reading also forms a part of practical work. In Mathematics instruction is given in Fractions, Ratio and Proportion, Square Root, Decimal Fractions, Averages, Time and Distance, Profit and Loss and Mensuration. Geography courses deal with India in particular together with general information about Asian countries.)

The syllabus in Arabic and religion is spread over a period of nine years. Memorization of the Qur'ān ('ḥāfiẓah') is not, like Azhar, a compulsory prerequisite for admission to the department of Arabic and religious studies. The medium of instruction is Urdū loaded with Arabic and Persian words and easily understandable only by the teachers and students of Arabic 'madrasahs'. It is, however, an acknowledged fact that in their particular field Deoband and other 'madrasahs' have done a great service to Urdū in which a great deal of Muslim religious literature is found today. They have popularized Urdū in the remotest corners of the Indo-Pak sub-continent and, in this way also, have laid a great responsibility on the Indian Muslims to struggle for the preservation and progress of Urdū.

The curriculum provides a sort of physical training for all students. In the beginning it consisted of some quasi-

military exercises which led people to remark sarcastically that the Dārul-'Ulūm was a 'madrasah-'i-ḥarbīyah' (Military School) instead of a 'madrasah-'i-'Arabīyah' (Arabic School). Mawlānā Nānawtawī was ready for the retort and explained the measure in terms of its worldly usefulness and 'shar'ī' validity for an active social life.[1] But it seems that later it ceased to attract the attention of the management and gradually became a neglected optional aspect of the Dārul-'Ulūm life.

Mawlānā Nānawtawī had also set up a 'Maḥkamah-'i-Qaḍā'' (court of justice) at the Dārul-'Ulūm for those who were, directly or indirectly, related to it. In this court he himself was the Chief Qāḍī, used to settle the disputes according to the 'Sharī'ah' and heard the disputes between the two Muslim parties only. This 'maḥkamah' flourished to such an extent that the 'munṣifī' of the Deoband Taḥṣīl with a substantial Muslim population had a real rival in it.[2] With the elapse of time it also went into oblivion ; but it shows the spirit of non-co-operation that the founders of the Dārul-'Ulūm entertained against the established alien authority.

The founders knew fully well that under the changed circumstances the curriculum of the Dārul-'Ulūm could not provide any avenue for government employment. They were conscious of the fact that their graduates would have to face tremendous difficulties in active life. So it was incumbent upon them to find some way out ; but, unfortunately, they could not shake off their traditional mode of thinking. They were not mentally prepared for any radical 'ijtihād'. They had their own limitations and could not go as far as to steal a march over Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān[3] and establish in the Dārul-'Ulūm a faculty of

[1] Mawlānā Muḥammad Ṭayyib, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[3] The present writer does not want to go off the point in dealing with the manifold reform movement launched by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān

modern sciences without incurring any suspicion of alignment with the British on their part. They could have really served the cause of religion and Muslim culture by bringing the new sciences witin the walls of the Dārul-'Ulūm. May be there could have emerged, in course of time, a synthesis of the old and the new. It was certainly a big task ; but it might have been attempted. This did not happen with tragic consequences for Indian Islam. However, in view of the seriousness of the problem the Dārul-'Ulūm graduates had to face in earning their livelihood, they could only open a department of small handicraft

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(1817-98). So far as his activities in the field of education are concerned, it should always be kept in mind that the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (Aligarh) was only a partial realization of his dream of western-oriented system of Muslim education in India. Although himself entirely educated in the old school, he differed completely from his counterpart at Deoband in points of ' taqlīd ' and the general approach towards the changing pattern of life in the sub-continent. He opposed the Revolt of 1857 while Mawlānā Nānawtawī had actively participated in it. Unlike the Mawlānā, he advocated and worked for a pro-British Muslim attitude. He repeatedly asked the Muslims to keep away from the Indian National Congress while the Deobandī leadership was in favour of full co-operation with it. He, however, was a man of strong moral character and could not be purchased by the British Administration ; whatever he did he did in the interest of the Muslim community in particular and for the whole country in general.

At Aligarh Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān had planned to establish a ' madrasatul-'ulūm ' consisting of three separate ' madrasahs ', or faculties as one may call them, of different nature which, he thought, would fulfil all the requirements of higher education Muslim India needed at that time. According to the plan one of the ' madrasahs ' was to be an English ' madrasah ' where English, and through the medium of English, all modern sciences were to be taught. The second was to be an Urdū ' madrasah ' on the same pattern. The third one was meant exclusively for Arabic and Persian. (cf. Dr. Sayyid 'Ābid Ḥusain's article "Sayyid Kā Khwāb Awr Us Kī Ta'bir" in 'Aligarh Magazine ', Aligarh Number ' (Urdū), 1955, pp. 12-13.)

In view of the plan it can be asserted that Sir Sayyid was sincere

industries.[1] It was thought that after having been trained in it, the students would be able to earn enough money to live independently. The soundness of the project cannot be challenged; but it was never carried out with the interest and ingenuity it demanded and, though still in existence, it is, in no way, worthy of a great institution ninety-five years old. The reason for the failure of so important a department is not known; yet a few guesses can be made. Perhaps the academic side of the curriculum, loaded with a large number of books in a foreign language, kept the students too occupied to enable them to give attention to other activities. Perhaps the management was unable to run it efficiently with an acumen of business administration and it became a burden on the Dārul-'Ulūm budget. Perhaps the scant, deficient and half-hearted training could not impart sufficient skill to the trainees to compete in the open market. Probably experience had shown that in a country like India where religion could be used for diversified purposes, it was easy, without any hard manual labour, to live on the religious susceptibilities of the poor and ignorant masses who have always worked

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and serious when he said that "Philosophy will be in our right hand, Natural Sciences in the left and the crown of 'Lā Ilāh Illallāh Muḥammad ar-Rasūl-al-lāh' on our head." It was unfortunate that in his advocacy of western civilization and his radical approach towards a modern interpretation of the Qur'ān he went too far and alienated his supporters from his plan of religious reform. There grew a storm of opposition both from amongst his colleagues and outsiders and in the interest of the College he had to make certain compromises which ultimately led to the abandonment of two-thirds of his original plan. Moreover, the group of people (mainly feudal landlords) with whose monetary support he had launched the M.A.O. College and who controlled the Board of Trustees, was interested only in the English 'madrasah' where their children could get modern education and, through that, government posts and privileged positions. It was really harmful for the Muslim society that, in the long run, Aligarh turned out to be mainly an educational "factory" which manufactured graduates to run the British administration.

[1] Mawlānā Muḥammad Ṭayyib, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

for the *élite* in the society.[1] And one may also point out that the main reason lay in a mystical indifference to the material aspect of life.

Another difficult problem the founders had to face was the collection of Arabic books included in the curriculum and the building up of a library worthy of an important centre of Islamic learning. Since its inception free distribution of course books among its students has been one of the chief characteristics of the Dārul-'Ulūm. It was bound to do that because, under the prevailing circumstances and in view of the bright prospects the official education could offer, it could attract, in most cases, only those students who could not afford to bear the expenses of modern education. They came mainly from the starving Muslim peasantry and the working and lower middle classes. They could not pay even the nominal charges for boarding and lodging. How could they buy books of their own ?

Moreover, the required books were not easily available and some of them were out of print for years. The profession of 'warrāq' (book-sellers) and 'nassākh' (transcribers) was for long in decline and the new publishers were not willing to publish Arabic books whose demand was negli-

[1] It is true that a substantial number of Deoband graduates has been successfully absorbed in independent professions such as business, journalism (Urdū), 'ṭib' and teaching in hundreds of 'madrasahs' and 'maktabs' all over the country. Yet it is equally true that a great many have always sought the easier and surer method of livelihood ; that is, that they have spread in villages and towns and in the name of the spiritual guidance of the common man have lived on his blood and sweat. There they have also fought religious wars against their counterparts of other schools like 'Barelawīs' and 'Ahl-i-Ḥadīth'. Moreover, their purely religious training has kept them aloof and isolated and intellectually estranged from the people educated in secular schools and colleges. This situation has made the confusion worse confounded and has led, as in other Muslim countries, to the rise of two types of intelligentsia, strange to each other and dividing the society into compartments of conflicting interests.

gible. The authorities at Deoband were fully aware of this situation and from the very beginning gave full attention to this knotty problem. In 1868 an appeal was made to publishers and book-sellers to publish and supply the books needed by the ' 'Arabī madāris '. They were also requested to gain the worldly as well as the other-worldly happiness by donating the needed treatises to the Dārul-'Ulūm as presents.[1] And also, there were ancient Muslim families who possessed good collections of classics and traditional Arabic and Persian books ; they were exhorted to lend a hand in solving the problem by transferring them to Deoband, by way of 'hibah' or ' waqf ', where they could be protected from termites and used by the seekers of knowledge.[2] These measures proved unexpectedly successful and within a short period the Dārul-'Ulūm was able to build up a library[3] that could fulfil the needs of its students and teachers.

Beside a number of administrative departments, one of the most significant and useful departments of the Dārul-'Ulūm is its ' Dār-ul-Iftā' ' (centre for religious verdicts).

[1] Among the publishers who gave an enthusiastic response to this appeal of the Dārul-'Ulūm authorities, Maṭba' Mujtabā'ī (Delhi) and Navalkishore Press (Lucknow) were outstanding. They presented a large number of their publications to the Dārul-'Ulūm and in this way helped a lot in building up its library. Munshī Navalkishōr, the owner of the Press at Lucknow, was a broad-minded Hindu and did a great service to the cause of preservation of Arabic and Persian classics in India. He also published hundreds of Urdū books and made them accessible to the Urdū reading public. In several of the annual reports of the Dārul-'Ulūm his services were recognized and his patronage acknowledged with a feeling of sincere gratitude. There were Hindus who also accorded monetary support to the Dārul-'Ulūm which accepted it. This gesture of its Hindu friends and the attitude of its authorities to their contributions are significant in view of the total rejection of any official support. (See Gīlānī, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-17.)

[2] Gīlānī, *op. cit.*, pp. 310-13.

[3] Today the library has more than 40,000 books plus course books of almost equal number. Among its collections there are some very rare and ancient manuscripts not available anywhere else in the world.

Before it was formally set up in 1893, responsible individual teachers used to be entrusted with the task of issuing 'fatāwā' on demand. As the demand increased and the burden became too heavy to handle by a single individual, a separate department was organized and put under the charge of Muftī 'Azīzur-Raḥmān, a 'muftī' and 'faqīh' of high calibre with a deep sense of responsibility and acknowledged piety, under whose direction it soon became popular and won general recognition. The stupendousness of the task can be realized by the fact that during a period of forty years (1911-51) 1,47,850 'fatāwā' were issued by the 'Dār-ul-Iftā''.[1]

DEOBAND (1880-1920)

Mawlānā Nānawtawī died on 15 April, 1880, and in him the Dārul-'Ulūm lost its founder, philosopher, patron and, on the whole, its guiding spirit. It was a catastrophic loss to an institution only thirteen years old. Muslim India acutely felt this tragic loss and deeply mourned it.[2] It

[1] Sayyid Maḥbūb Riẓwī, 'Tārīkh-i-Deoband', Deoband, 1954, p. 131.

[2] A number of obituaries, in prose and poetry, written on the sad demise of Mawlānā Nānawtawī shows the depth of sorrow and grief of Muslim India on that occasion. Even Sir Sayyid who differed from the late Mawlānā on several significant points, wrote in the 'Aligarh Institute Gazette' (24 April, 1880) a long obituary praising his character, personality and valuable services to the Muslim community. Beside comparing him to Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz and Mawlānā Muḥammad Isḥāq in points of religious knowledge, righteousness, piety and simplicity of manners. he declares :

> "He worked for the welfare of the Muslim community and it was due to his efforts that a very useful 'madrasah' for religious education was founded at Deoband.... His endeavours also led to the establishment of a number of "Muslim" 'madrasahs' at different places. He had no desire to become a 'pīr' or 'murshid', but there were thousands of people in India, particularly in the north-west districts, who had faith in him and considered him their leader and guide....
>
> "The 'madrasah' at Deoband is a living monument of his services,

decided to take care of the Mawlānā's young child, the Dārul-'Ulūm, and brought it up with the utmost interest and concern. This was the only way to pay a sincere homage to his services to Islam and the Muslim community.

As has been stated before, Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gaŋgōhī succeeded Mawlānā Nānawtawī as the chief patron and spokesman of the Dārul-'Ulūm. He was a great 'ṣūfī' and as an ''ālim' his chief interest lay in 'Ḥadīth' and 'fiqh'. He lived in Gaŋgōh (his hometown in the district of Sahāranpūr), but he came down to Deoband for occasional visits and guidance. The graduates of the Dārul-'Ulūm who wished to acquire more proficiency in 'Ḥadīth' and 'fiqh' had to go to Gaŋgōh where he gave his 'dars' and initiated the aspirants in the four mystic orders prevalent in India, the 'Chishtīyah', the 'Qādirīyah', the 'Naqshbandīyah' and the 'Suhrawardīyah', in accordance with the practices of his 'murṣhid' (spiritual guide), Ḥājī Imdādullāh, who had migrated and settled down in Mecca after the Revolt of 1857.

We have seen Mawlānā Gaŋgōhī crusading against the teaching of 'falsafah' at Deoband. At the practical level, he favoured no ijtihād : he was a traditionalist through and through ; but it is worth our noticing that in the field of politics he showed progressive tendencies and gave a 'fatwà' declaring that in worldly matters co-operation with the Hindus was permissible provided it did not violate any basic principle of Islam.[1] The occasion for this 'fatwà' arose with the establishment of the Indian National Congress

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and it is incumbent on all to see that this 'madrasah' continues and flourishes."

(cf. Sayyid Maḥbūb Riẓwī, "Mawlānā Nānawtawī, Sar Sayyid Kī Naẓar Mēŋ" in 'Burhān', XVII/2, 1946, pp. 120-23.)

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāŋ, ''Ulamā'-i-Ḥaqq', vol. 1, Kutubkhānah-'i-Fakhrīyah, Murādābād, 1946, pp. 100-1.

in 1885 and Sir Sayyid's vigorous stand against it.[1] This was a crucial point and it augmented the political conflict between the traditionalist Deoband and the modern Aligarh. It has been pointed out before that in principle the founders of the Dārul-'Ulūm were not opposed to the acquisition of

[1] In view of the early resolutions of the Congress one is really at a loss to understand the anti-Congress policy of Sir Sayyid who had said on several occasions that "no nation can acquire honour and respect so long as it does not attain equality with the ruling race and does not participate in the government of its own country. Other nations can have no respect for Musalmans and Hindus for their holding the position of clerks or other similar petty posts," and "the word nation (Qaum) applies to people who inhabit a country.... Remember that Hindu and Musalman are religious words ; otherwise, Hindus and Musalmans and even Christians who inhabit this country—all constitute, on this account, one nation ...Now the time is gone when only on account of difference in religion the inhabitants of a country should be regarded as of two different nations." (See Rājendra Prasād, ' India Divided ', Hind Kitābs Ltd., Bombay, 1947, pp. 98-9 ; and also Sayyid Ṭufail Aḥmad, ' Musalmānōṇ Kā Rawshan Mustaqbil ', Delhi, 1945, pp. 268-70.)

Sir Sayyid, however, opposed the Congress and in order to counteract its activities founded the United India Patriotic Association in 1888 in which both Hindus and Muslims paticipated. Its objects were :

1. To inform the members of Parliament and people of England through newspapers and tracts that all the communities of India, the aristrocracy and the princes, were not with the Congress and to contradict its statements.
2. To keep the Parliament and people of England informed about the opinions of Hindu and Muslim organizations which were opposed to the Congress.
3. To help in the maintenance of law and order and the strengthening of the British rule in India and to wean away people from the Congress.

This association continued to oppose the Congress till 1893 when a separate Muslim organization under the name of Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India was founded in whose objectives emphasis was on the protection of Muslim political rights and the prevention of political agitation from spreading among the Muslims. Mawlānā Gaṇgōhī in his ' fatwà ' warned the Muslims not

modern education by the Muslims and, though unhappy[1] with the religious views of Sir Sayyid, they never indulged

to associate themselves with the activities of Sir Sayyid.

Now the question is: why did Sir Sayyid depart from his earlier position which was quite in conformity with the demands of the Congress in the beginning? Its answer may include three possible explanations:

1. The Congress, in its very nature, was a political organization and Sir Sayyid honestly thought that any political move at that time would divert the attention of the Muslims from purely educational activities, which, in turn, would prove fatal to the development and welfare of the Muslim community.
2. The activities of the Hindu reactionaries of U. P. and Mahārāshtra in connection with their demands for ban on cow-slaughter and for Hindī as the official vernacular, bewildered him and he came to the conclusion that Hindu-Muslim unity was an impossible task; therefore co-operation with the Congress with a predominantly Hindu membership would prove of no avail to the Muslim community.
3. There was a conservative group among the Englishmen which did not like the growing popularity of the Congress and was apprehensive about the possibility of the birth of an Indian nation whose interests were bound to come into clash with those of the British. They considered the policy of "divide and rule" as the most practical means to safeguard the interests of Imperial England. The critics of Sir Sayyid's political policy hold that one Mr. Beck, a personification of British conservatism and the Principal of the Aligarh College (1883-93), served as an imperial agent and succeeded in weaning him away from his earlier broad-mindedness to a level of narrow communalism.

[1] Sir Sayyid once wrote to one of his friends, Munshī Muḥammad 'Ārif, saying: "If Janāb Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim comes to see me, I will regard this visit as a blessing to me. I shall be proud of receiving him with all humility." This friendly gesture of Sir Sayyid when conveyed to Mawlānā Nānawtawī exacted an immediate response from him and he wrote to 'Ārif:

> "Yes, it will be fair on my part if, on the basis of what I have heard of Sayyid Ṣāhib's determined efforts for the general welfare of the Muslims, I express my feelings of friendship and love for him; but I am also equally hurt and dissatisfied with whatever I have been told about his views on Islamic beliefs."

(Sayyid Maḥbūb Riẓwī, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-21.)

in any controversy relating to his ultra-modern ideas about the nature of ravelation, the very basis of Islam. Perhaps they had realized that, whatever be the personal religious views of Sir Sayyid, the Faculty of Theology was then in the charge of a Mawlawī of the Deoband School, and that Sir Sayyid's own colleagues would not allow his views to corrupt the mind of the students. But in politics they found almost the whole of Aligarh in support of his policy and so here they had to take a stand.

Sir Sayyid's "ardent and sustained pro-British policy" had convinced the Deoband leadership that in its approach to Indian politics it differed fundamentally from its counterpart at Aligarh. It was shocked when Sir Sayyid behaved likewise with regard to the Egyptian Revolt of 1881 and the Turko-Greek War of 1897. He "contributed articles to the 'Aligarh Institute Gazette' denying the pretensions of Sultan Abdul Hamid to the Khilafate, and preaching loyalty to the British rulers of India, even if they 'were compelled to pursue an unfriendly policy towards Turkey,'"[1] while Deoband was consistent, since the very beginning, in its policy of friendship and alliance with the Sulṭāns of Turkey. Deoband still considered India as 'Dār-al-Ḥarb', but Aligarh saw no sense in it. The gulf between the two Muslim institutions continued to exist and widen, and divided the Muslim India into two hostile blocks.

Mawlānā Gangōhī died in 1905 and the mantle of Deoband leadership fell on the shoulders of Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan Deobandī, commonly known as Shaikh-ul-Hind. Born in 1851 he was educated at Deoband. It is said that he was the first student who joined the Dārul-'Ulūm in 1867. He had been very close to Mawlānā Nānawtawī and had drunk deep in the spirit and the ideas

[1] W. C. Smith, 'Modern Islam in India', London, 1946, p. 24, quoting from K. B. Krishna, 'The Problem of Minorities', or 'Communal Representation in India', London, 1939, p. 95, with reference to Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, 'The Truth about the Khilafat' (2nd ed.), Lahore, 1916. p. 5.

underlying the foundation of the Dārul-'Ulūm. After his graduation in 1873 he joined its staff and in 1890 became its Ṣadr Mudarris (Principal).[1] Although a scholar and author of several treatises and a translator of the Qur'ān, he did not like the philosopher's ivory tower. He was a man of action. He trained and produced a number of great men of learning who were also active in the political and social life of India.

The period between 1905 when he became the sole leader of the Deobandī party and 1915 when he left India for Ḥijāz, was an eventful one both from the viewpoint of national and international developments. These developments had a tremendous influence on the minds of the Muslims and, therefore, it is necessary to stop a while and try to understand them. Even as early as 1900 the old Hindī-Urdū controversy had been revived and used by the Governor of U. P. to create bad blood between the two major communities. Nawāb Moḥsin-ul-Mulk (1837-1907), the then Secretary of the Aligarh College, was leading the agitation, as the Secretary of the newly founded Central Urdu Defence Association, against the decision of the Government of the United Provinces sanctioning the use of Hindī in Devnāgrī script as the official vernacular. He had to give up his activities in this regard because of the displeasure of the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Anthony Macdonell, and his threat to stop the government subsidy to the College.[2] This role of a partisan on behalf of the government towards which they were taught to have an attitude of unconditional loyalty, was terribly shocking to the Muslims as a whole ; particularly the younger generation at Aligarh was completely disillusioned and became suspicious of the British professions of friendship for them. For the first time there appeared cracks in the

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[2] Shaikh Muḥammad Ikrām, ' Mawj-i-Kawthar ' (2nd ed.), Firoz Sons, Karachi, n.d., p. 111.

edifice of the Muslim loyalty to His Majesty's Government, which Sir Sayyid had built up so carefully and magnificently.[1] In 1903 Lord Curzon's proposed scheme for the partition of Bengal created the sign of a new but more powerful storm on the political horizon of the country. In 1906 the scheme was enacted but in 1911, after having flared up flames of communalism, it was annulled. This again proved a rude shock to the Muslims ; they felt once again betrayed. The Hindus had forced the government to abolish the partition and led the Muslims to think that without organization, sufferings and sacrifice nothing could be achieved from the government. Blind loyalty was nothing but weakness. In the meantime in 1906 a Muslim political organization, the Muslim League, had come into existence and through an historic masterstroke of British diplomacy the Indian Muslims had succeeded to achieve separate electorates for themselves in the Minto-Morley Reforms (1909).[2] However, the critics of the Muslim League should always remember that there was sufficient ground for the dissatisfaction of the Muslim middle class whom the foreign rulers utilized to check the growing strength of the national movement. The crux of the Muslim dissatisfaction lay in the gradual strengthening of a Hindu strand in the Congress. The partition of Bengal which resulted in the Hindu-Muslim issue aggravated the situation and was partly responsible for the birth of the League.

[1] Shaikh Muḥammad Ikrām, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[2] Much has been written for and against the Simla Deputation (1906) led by the Āghā Khān and the establishment of the Muslim League the same year at Dacca. There is no doubt that the British-engineered Deputation was reactionary in nature. The address presented by the Āghā Khān to the Viceroy was signed by "nobles, ministers of various states, great landowners, lawyers, merchants, and ... many other of His Majesty's Mohammedan subjects." The All-India Muslim League founded in the wake of this deputation, also represented a negative reaction to the aspirations of the Hindu revolutionaries and reaction-

The younger generation at Aligarah, as we have seen, had been mistrusting their Alma Mater's position for years. Modern ideas had awakened a new spirit in them. They felt a sort of guilty conscience because of their failure to contribute anything to the glory of Islam and the general welfare of their community. Slowly and gradually they were realizing that all was not good in the pro-British policy of the Muslims; in order to live with honour and prestige one had to depend upon one's own spiritual and moral resources. Their past was glorious; their forefathers had contributed a good deal to the progress of human civilization; but their present passive attitude was not worthy of their splendid heritage. The man largely responsible for the formation of this attitude was Mawlānā Shiblī (1857-1914). Unlike Ḥālī (1837-1914) he was not only interested in referring to the glorious past of Islam but he worked out a programme of displaying it. "He resuscitated and praised the great men of Muslim history and their times. A whole

aries. It is curious to note that the Hindu Mahāsabhā was also established in the same year. However, the Muslim League neglected by the progressive Muslim group in the beginning had to change its constitution and broaden its base in 1913 when the Indian Muslims, including the younger generation of Aligarh itself, were reaching an anti-British stage. In its Lucknow session of 1913 it defined its object "among other matters to be the attainment under the aegis of the British Crown of a system of self-government suitable to India, through constitutional means by bringing about, amongst others, a steady reform of the existing system of administration, by promoting national unity, by fostering public spirit among the people of India, and by cooperating with other communities for the said purpose. The object of the League was thus brought in line with that of the Indian National Congress and paved the way for communal unity and common action." (See Rājendra Prasād, *op. cit.*, p. 118.)

During the First World War the Congress and the League held their annual sessions simultaneously at the same place and worked for common objectives. In 1916 at Lucknow on the occasion of their annual sessions the two parties made an agreement, known as the Lucknow Pact, by which the Congress accepted separate electorates for the Muslims and "allowed them representation much in excess of their proportion of population in the provinces except in the Punjab and Bengal."

series of influential biographies, of the Prophet, of great men of the early days of Islām and the flourishing 'Abbāsī' Empire, of great theologians, and of the Iranian poets, reminded Muslims unforgettably of their great heritage."[1] He came to Aligarh, stayed there for sixteen years and lectured in Arabic and Persian. His influence over his students was remarkable. Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī (1878-1931) in his 'My Life : A Fragment', after lamenting the sad plight of religious education at Aligarh, says : "Aligarh itself presented one bright spot in all this cimmerian darkness and I must not omit to mention it. This was no other than a college Professor of rare charms and of entirely new literary outlook whom Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan had been able to attract to Aligarh. He was Shibli Nu'mani, Professor of Arabic and Persian, an ardent lover of poetry and Islamic history."[2]

Shiblī was not happy with the religious and political views of Sir Sayyid. In spirit he was a democrat and a man of independent views. In 1912 he wrote to one of his friends that he was independent by nature ; he stayed with Sir Sayyid for sixteen years and always differed from him on political matters. He was a supporter of the Congress and argued with Sir Sayyid about it.[3] He never liked the Muslim League politics and wrote a criticism of the League in the 'Muslim Gazette' of Lucknow in 1912, remarking : "A tree is judged by the fruit it gives. If our politics had been serious politics they would have evoked a zest for struggle and a readiness to suffer and sacrifice for an ideal."[4] He was, however, not active in politics and

[1] W. C. Smith, *op. cit.*, London, 1946, p. 43.

[2] Muḥammad 'Alī, 'My Life : A Fragment', edited by Afẓal Iqbāl (2nd ed.), Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1944, p. 25.

[3] Sayyid Sulaimān Nadwī, 'Ḥayāt-i-Shiblī', Dārul-Musannifīn, Azamgarh, 1943, p. 297.

[4] Sayyid Ṭufail Aḥmad, 'Musalmānōṉ Kā Rawshan Mustaqbil', Delhi, 1945 p. 380.

never joined any political party. His field of activity lay in literature, history and theology and above all in Muslim religious education. In theology he was neither a radical nor a rationalist ; but he "certainly aimed at reviving the *rationalizing* dialectic of the classical Muslim theology. His theology presents an advance over that of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's in that it was not negative. Being a theologian trained in the traditional way, he saw the necessity of continuity and therefore attempted to come to terms with the late nineteenth-century scientific world-views. But at the same time it is clear that his restatement was *adaptative, not creative*. [Italics ours.] However, even this much of adaptation proved too much for his fellow-' 'ulamā' ' who branded him as a free-thinker."[1] Consequently, he could not come closer to Deoband line of thinking which was strictly traditional ; but in politics their views were almost identical.

Against this background it is not surprising to find a number of anti-loyalist journals coming into existence between 1906 and 1912. In 1906 Mawlānā Ḥasrat Mōhānī founded the ' Urdū-'i-Mu'allā ' at Aligarh. After four years Mawlānā Waḥīduddīn Salīm started the ' Muslim Gazette ' (Lucknow), and Mawlānā Ẓafar 'Alī Khān, the ' Zamīndār ' (Lahore). The year 1911 saw the publication of the first issue of the ' Comrade ', an English weekly, founded and edited by Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī at Calcutta with the motto "Comrade of all, partisan of none." In 1912 Muḥammad 'Alī's ' Hamdard ' and Abul-Kalām Āzād's ' al-Hilāl ' opened a new chapter in the history of Urdū journalism, giving it new content and a vigorous style unfamiliar hitherto.[2] It was a radical departure from the traditional

[1] F. Raḥmān, "Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent" in ' BSOAS ', 1958, xxi/1, p. 85.

[2] In this respect ' al-Hilāl ' was more unique. Its founder and editor Mawlānā Abul-Kalām Āzād (1888-1958) "spoke in a new language" different in thought, approach and even its texture. His "style was

position of Aligarh in politics, national and international both. Except 'al-Hilāl' all of these journals were founded by the old boys of Aligarh and all of them were directly or indirectly influenced by Shiblī's romanticism. Abul-Kalām Āzād, though not a graduate of Aligarh College, was more influenced by Shiblī through his association with Nadwatul-

tense and virile.... He used new phrases for new ideas" and contributed a lot to the Urdū language, giving it a definite shape. He joined the Muslim League at its first session in 1906, but soon became disillusioned and came under the influence of Mawlānā Shiblī. In the beginning his theme was Islamic and anti-British and he expressed in powerful language the ideals of patriotism, freedom and sacrifice unsurpassed by any Muslim leader during those days. His writings had a tremendous influence on the mind of the young Muslims but there were people of older generation also who approved of his ideas and Shaikh-ul-Hind is reported to have said, "We were sleeping, Āzād has roused us from our slumber."

Mawlānā Āzād was never against modernism and western education, and when he criticized Aligarh he did it because of its conservatism and anti-nationalism. Once he said, "From the beginning of my political life I was convinced that the Indian Muslims must participate in the movement for emancipation and work towards that end through the National Congress. It was inevitable that I should criticise the political lead which the late Sir Sayyid had given and which represented the policy of Aligarh party. I therefore came into a clash with this party on the political issue. This was, however, regarded by its members as opposition not only to the founder's political policy but to the institution itself....Nothing was, however, farther from the truth." (cf. 'Speeches of Mawlana Azad', Publications Division, Government of India, 1956, p. 75.)

It should, however, be remembered that Mawlānā Āzād's nationalism passed through various changing phases. In the beginning it represented a mixture of Islamic romanticism and anti-Britishism. He participated with full heart in the Khilāfat movement; but it is significant to note that while the whole of Muslim India was shocked at the abolition of Khilāfat by Kamāl Atāturk and Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī reacted strongly and indignantly against it, he did not say even a single word against the Kemalist Revolution. Thenceforward we begin to find a positive content in his nationalism and an attempt on his part to show that there was no conflict between Islam and Indian nationalism.

'Ulamā' (Lucknow) and its organ 'an-Nadwah'. 'Al-Hilāl' popularized the Islamic romanticism which in Shiblī's writings was dealt with in an academic style. The reasons for this anti-loyalist attitude of the young Muslims with a strong flavour of Islamic romanticism may be summarized in terms of mixed reactions to the following events :

(1) The Hindu reform movements in Gujrāt, Mahārāshtra, Bengal and the Punjab.

> "One of the most notable reform movements was started in the second half of the nineteenth century by a Gujrati, Swami Dayanand Saraswati, but it took root among the Hindus of the Punjab. This was the Arya Samaj and its slogan was 'Back to the Vedas'.... The Arya Samaj was a reaction to the influence of Islam and Christianity, more specially the former.... It introduced proselytization into Hinduism and thus tended to come into conflict with other proselytizing religions.... [It posed itself as] a defender of everything Hindu, against what it considered as the encroachments of other faiths."[1]

About the same period Shrī Rāmakrishna Parmahansa started his reform activities among the Bengālī Hindus. His chief disciple, Swāmī Vivekānand, carried his message far and wide and founded the Ramakrishna Mission. This movement, in its genesis, was progressive but because of its emphasis on the philosophy of Vedānta could appeal to the Hindus only. In Mahārāshtra the "Shivājī cult" was revived and represented a militant stand against the foreigners ; but it also revived the memory of Shivājī's conflict with Aurangzēb with unfortunate consequences in regard to Hindu-Muslim relations. In nature it was a purely Hindu revivalist movement.

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'The Discovery of India', Meridian Books Ltd., London, 1951, pp. 313-14.

2. In connection with the partition of Bengal the Hindus throughout India sympathized with the Bengālī Hindus, agitated against it by organizing demonstrations and terrorist activities and demanded with one voice its annulment.[1] This violent gesture of unanimity of the Hindus forced the government to abolish the partition.

3. The British policy towards Turkey during the Tripoli and Balkan Wars convinced the Muslims of the Machiavellian trait in British diplomacy and they were led to feel that the British professions of friendship were insincere. They thought that the Christian Powers of Europe were bent upon destroying the last vestige of the past Islamic glory, the Ottoman Empire and the ' Khilāfat '.

4. The national movements in Persia and Turkey also encouraged the Indian Muslims to stand against the authoritarian regime at home.

The political unrest among the western-educated Muslims expressed itself, at first, mildly in the wake of the Hindī-Urdū controversy and culminated with a nostalgic vigour in virulent pro-Turkish and anti-British moves in 1912 when the "Red Crescent" medical mission was organized under Dr. M. A. Anṣārī and sent to Turkey. From the purely national point of view this Muslim phenomenon in anti-British politics of India is interesting as well as puzzling.

> It "was, of course, not only idealistic but utterly romantic for at the time when it occurred the Muslim situation outside India represented local separatist tendencies within the Arab world which in turn proved decisive for the growth of nationalism in Turkey, the centre of Ottoman Empire. This fact itself reveals the fundamental weakness in the movement—it had little intellectual content : it was primarily an immense emotional outburst of a deep-seated and profound Islamic sentiment against

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-13.

the oppressive foreigner both in *Muslim* India and the Muslim Middle East. *Further, it was perhaps more semi-consciously, a bid for finding Muslim security in a future independent India over against a non-Muslim majority.*"[1] [Italics ours.]

It is also worth noticing that in this period of Muslim unrest the Muslim middle class was in the forefront. The Muslim proletariat under the leadership of the ''ulamā'' had been in revolt for long. Now for the first time Aligarh, the citadel of Muslim middle class, was coming closer to Deoband, the centre of proletarian dissatisfaction, in so far as the anti-British attitude is concerned. Shaikh-ul-Hind Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan welcomed this change of heart on the part of Aligarh and, as we shall see presently, made an effort to effect a *rapprochement* between Aligarh and Deoband.

Such was the political situation at home and abroad when Shaikh-ul-Hind decided to launch his programme to oust the foreigners from India. (Here it is significant to note that before the advent of Gāndhījī on the political scene, the Indian terrorists and revolutionaries believed not only in violent methods but were also convinced that India could not be freed without the support of a foreign government.) His programme consisted of bringing the governments of Afghanistan and Iran closer to each other on some workable point of view and seeking the military support of Turkey to attack India through Iran and Afghanistan.[2] The rebel colony of the 'mujāhidīn' in the North-West Frontier organized in the early nineteenth century still had its remnants there and a section of Indian Muslims had been in contact with them throughout the years before and after 1857. It is also noteworthy that Deoband, ideologically closer to the 'jihād' movement of Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd,

[1]. F. Raḥmān, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[2] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyān, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

had been attracting students from that area and during the period of the principalship of Shaikh-ul-Hind the contact between Deoband and the tribal areas became more intense and widespread. Hundreds of students who came to Deoband and studied under him carried with them a new spirit of struggle and sacrifice. He was fully aware of the strategic position of the tribal frontier and knew that the North-West Frontier could be roused up easily against the British, provided the sturdy people of the area were organized for a common cause. The success of his programme also demanded a well-knit organization of the Muslims in India. It was a dangerous game and, as the Government of India kept a watchful eye on Deoband, the whole activity was to be carried on with caution and in secret.

Shaikh-ul-Hind was also convinced of the necessity of bridging the gulf that existed between Aligarh and Deoband and had a desire to see the ' 'ulamā' ' and the western-educated Muslim intelligentsia on the same platform. By recognizing the ability of Mawlānā Āzād and Mawlānā Muḥmmad 'Alī he showed the willingness of the Deobandī party to accept the lead of the non-Deobandī elements. And, as he was not working only for the freedom of the Muslims but also of the country, he went forward and made a *liaison* with the Hindu revolutionaries.[1]

In 1909 Shaikh-ul-Hind organized the ' Jam'īyat-ul-Anṣār ', an association of the old boys of Deoband and deputed Mawlānā 'Ubaidullāh Sindhī (1872-1944),[2] one of his most

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[2] 'Ubaidullāh Sindhī was born of a Sikh parentage in a village of the Punjab. Whilst yet a boy, he rebelled against his family religion and accepted Islam. According to his own accounts two books, ' Tuḥfat-ul-Hind ' of another Muslim convert, 'Ubaidullāh, after whom Sindhī named himself and ' Taqwīyat-ul-Īmān ' of Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd, had a revolutionizing influence upon his young mind and encouraged him to renounce Sikhism. He left his home at the age of fifteen, reached Bharchondi (Sindh), got access to the circle of a ṣūfī, Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad

trusted and bold students, to carry on its organizational functions. It is strange that the actual programme of the 'Jam'īyat-ul-Anṣār' is still unknown. Mawlānā Sindhī and Mawlānā Madanī who are considered the most authentic reporters about the movement led by Shaikh-ul-Hind, make only casual references to it and do not throw any light on the aims and objects of this organization. It seems, however, that the idea was to lay the foundation of an organization composed of the graduates of the Dārul-'Ulūm who could be mobilized in time of need. Mawlānā

Ṣiddīq, and became his 'murīd'. After a short stay with his 'pīr' he proceeded to Bahawalpur where he studied a few elementary Arabic books. It was here that he was informed of the Dārul-'Ulūm Deoband. He at once left Bahawalpur and came to Deoband (1889). At Deoband he remained very close to Shaikh-ul-Hind who acquainted him with the writings of Shāh Walīullāh and Mawlānā Nānawtawī. He was also initiated in the politico-religious spirit underlying the Dārul-'Ulūm. After his graduation he went back to Sindh and started his career as a teacher. In 1908 he was called back to Deoband and was entrusted with the programme of Jam'īyat-ul-Anṣār. He left India in 1915 on a special mission and was forced to lead a life of exile for more than twenty years. During the years of his banishment he lived in Afghanistan, U.S.S.R., Geneva, Turkey and Ḥijāz and studied the situation abroad with an open eye. In the U.S.S.R. he saw a new world emerging from the ruins of Tsardom and in Turkey he found the old order giving place to the new. The Arab Revolt of 1916 and the Arab nationalist aspirations afterwards gave a rude shock to his Islamism and when he returned to India in 1939 his approach to Indian politics was nationalist-secularist rather than Islamist. He had left India as a firebrand agitator and an organizer of revolutionary activities; he came back as a thinker. During the last phase of his life he attempted to philosophize his nationalism in terms of "a special Muslim social theory...derived from Shah Waliullah of Delhi." He was a supporter of the Indian National Congress in so far as it represented the Indian nationalism, but he was very critical of "Gandhism" and lamented the misfortune of India that Gāndhījī, besides being a political leader, was a religious leader also.

For a detailed study of 'Ubaidullāh Sindhī's political and social ideas, see Muḥammad Sarwar's 'Mawlānā 'Ubaidullāh Sindhī' (Sindh Sāgar Akādamī, Lahore, n.d.).

Muḥammad Miyān in his ' 'Ulamā'-i-Ḥaqq ', (vol. 1) holds that because of the watchful vigilance of the government, everything was kept shrouded in mystery. He further says that in order to popularize the programme of the ' Jam'īyat-ul-Anṣār ' Shaikh-ul-Hind, instead of convening a conference on political level, persuaded his colleagues in the administration of the Dārul-'Ulūm to hold the famous ' Jalsah-'i-Dastārbandī ' in 1910 which was attended by more than thirty thousand Muslims of different shades of opinion.[1] The ' Jalsah ' was a great success and for the first time an Aligarh delegation led by Ṣāḥibzādah Āftāb Aḥmad Khān had an opportunity to talk heart to heart to the Deobandī party. In one of its meetings the Ṣāḥibzādah put forward a proposal of exchange of students between Deoband and Aligarh. It was a momentous event and the proposal,[2] if it had been implemented, could have made history in the political and intellectual life of the Indian Muslims.

The ' Jalsah ' at Deoband was followed by a session of the ' Jam'īyat-ul-Anṣār ' at Murādābād in 1911 where its president, Mawlānā Aḥmad Ḥasan Amrōhawī, is reported to have remarked : " ' Jam'īyat-ul-Anṣār ' is not an imitation of any other association ; nor is it an embodiment of any one's personal and worldly ambitions. Its purpose includes all the necessary and important objectives whose achievement is urgently needed."[3] This is all we find in regard to the actual ims and objects of the ' Jam'īyat-ul-Anṣār '. Taking all the circumstantial evidence into account we can conclude that the "necessary and important objectives" of the ' Jam'īyat ' could not be other than the motives underlying the programme of Shaikh-ul-Hind.

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyān, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-31.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 131. (The proposal of Āftāb Aḥmad Khān was heartily accepted by the Deoband authorities but unfortunately its very first experiment proved a bitter experience. The first batch of the two Aligarh students who came to Deoband to study Islam, turned out to be a British team of secret agents.)

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

In 1913 Mawlānā 'Ubaidullāh Sindhī was asked to move to Delhi and work in the ' Niẓārat-ul-Ma'ārif '.[1] In 1915 he was commanded by his teacher and guide to proceed to Afghanistan where he found a number of people, disorganized and without a common programme, ready to rise and strike against the British.[2] The same year Shaikh-ul-Hind left India for Ḥijāz in order to avoid his expected arrest by the Indian Government and to make a direct contact with the Turkish Government to seek material help for his programme. The writer does not want to go into the details of 'Ubaidullāh Sindhī's activities in Afghanistan where he worked for almost seven years and was associated, directly or indirectly, with all the events of national and international import. At Kabul he succeeded in establishing a Provisional Government of India composed of several

[1] ' Niẓārat-ul-Ma'ārif ' (Academy of Quranic Learning) was founded in 1913 with Shaikh-ul-Hind, Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān and Nawāb Wiqār-ul-Mulk of Aligarh College as its chief patrons. Its main object was to instruct the western-educated Muslim youth in the Quranic teachings in a way that would enable them to shake off their ill-founded scepticism about the Islamic beliefs. (cf. Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, ' Naqsh-i-Ḥayāt ', vol. II, Deoband, 1954, pp. 138-39.)

Mawlānā Madanī is of the opinion (*op. cit.*, p. 144) that the reason for Mawlānā Sindhī's transfer from Deoband to Delhi was the dislike of the Dārul-'Ulūm administration for his political activities ; and also a difference of opinion on some religious points between him and a group of teachers made the atmosphere more uncongenial for his stay at Deoband. The administration also suggested to Shaikh-ul-Hind to keep away from politics, who ignored the suggestion and said : "Did our revered teacher (Mawlānā Nānawtawī) found this Madrasah only for educational purposes ? It was founded in my presence and, as far as I know, one of its main objects was to compensate for the losses in 1857. Those interested only in education are free to do as they like. I do not want to be an obstacle in their way ; but I stand for those objects which the founder of the Dārul-'Ulūm had in view and for whose achievement he worked hard." (cf. Manāẓir Aḥsan Gīlānī, *op. cit.*, p. 226.)

[2] Ḥasain Aḥmad Madanī, ' Naqsh-i-Ḥayāt ', vol. II, Deoband, 1954, p. 146.

associates of the 'Ghadr' movement;[1] he also organized a branch of the Indian National Congress with himself as its president, which, in turn, was affiliated to the mother organization in India in 1922. During the regime of Amīr Ḥabībullāh Afghanistan, though in sympathy with the programme of the Indian revolutionaries, maintained its neutral policy and was able to avoid any clash with the British; but when after his assassination followed by a civil war Amīr Amānullāh came to power, there were some unsuccessful military operations against the British on the North-West Frontier. 'Ubaidullāh and his party had closest possible relations with the Amīr.[2]

[1] The founder and organizer of this movement was one Hardayāl, a Hindu graduate of the Punjab University. In 1905 he proceeded to England on government scholarship for higher education; but later he changed his mind, returned the scholarship and went to America where he organized the Indian students and started a newspaper, 'Ghadr', in 1913. It was a "revolutionary conspiracy of all communities" with its branches in America, Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Hongkong, Egypt, Turkey, Afghanistan and Germany. During the war its propagandists stirred a vain hope in India, particularly in the Punjab, that Germany's imminent attack on England, if it coincided with a general uprising in India, would give a golden opportunity to Indians to free themselves from the foreign yoke. Rāja Mahendra Pratāp and Mawlavī Barkatullāh who had joined 'Ubaidullah's Provisional Government at Kabul, were the prominent leaders of the movement.

[2] Madanī, *op. cit.*, p. 176. For a detailed study of Mawlānā Sindhī's activities at Kabul three important sources are recommended: (1) 'Ubaidullāh Sindhī, 'Ẓātī Dā'irī', (2) Madanī, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-81, and (3) 'Rowlatt Sedition Committee Report' (1918). The last one, however, should be read with caution and care as there is a lot of misrepresentation of facts in it; but it gives the official British point of view and from that angle is interesting and useful.

It is also significant to note that on the death of Shaikh-ul-Hind in 1920 Amīr Amānullāh held a condolence meeting and in his speech made the following remark:

مولانا محمودالحسن [محمود حسن] یک کار را شروع کردند من اورا پورا [؟] کنم۔

(Madanī, *op. cit.*, p. 180, quoting from Mawlānā Sindhī's 'Ẓātī Dā'irī', p. 133.)

Shaikh-ul-Hind reached Ḥijāz in 1916. He wanted to proceed to Istanbul to present his programme to the Turkish Government. Ghālib Pāshā, the then Turkish Governor at Madīnah Munawwarah, had made all the necessary arrangements for his travel to the Ottoman capital; but in the meantime Anwar Pāshā, the Turkish War Minister, himself arrived there and met him. He appreciated the programme of Shaikh-ul-Hind and promised to help him in his endeavours to attack India through the Khyber Pass. He also gave a message[1] addressed to the tribal people of the Indian North-West Frontier assuring them of all possible aid in their anti-British venture. This note was sent to India and through different sources its photographic copies were passed across the Indo-Afghan border into the hands of 'Ubaidullāh and his colleagues. Similarly 'Ubaidullāh also corresponded with Shaikh-ul-Hind through letters on pieces of cloth. This correspondence has been mentioned by Rowlatt in his Report as the "Silken Letters Conspiracy."

[1] This message is generally known as 'Ghālibnāmah' because of the signature and seal of Ghālib Pāshā, the Turkish Governor in Ḥijāz, on it. The Rowlatt Committee Report gives the following extracts from it:

> "The Muslims of Asia, Africa and Europe, equipped with all sorts of weapons, have started a 'jihād' in the path of God. Thanks to Him Who is Omnipotent and Eternal, the Turkish armies and 'mujāhidīn' have succeeded in subduing the enemies of Islam. Therefore, O Muslims, attack the tyrannical Christian regime which has kept you enslaved for years.
>
> "Devote all your efforts with determination to kill the enemy, expressing your hatred and enmity towards him.
>
> "You should know that Mawlawī Maḥmūd Effendi, formerly a teacher at Deoband (India), came here and consulted with us. We have supported his programme and issued necessary instructions. Have full confidence in him when he comes to you and help him with men and money and whatever he asks for."

It is, however, uncertain whether these extracts are from the actual letter of Ghālib Pāshā or are based on fictitious investigations of the Government of India. (See Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, p. 170.)

After having been assured of Turkish support Shaikh-ul-Hind wanted to reach the Indian border to revive the 'sunnah' of Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd; but the war was in full swing and all land routes were unsafe because of the presence of the British and Russian armies in Iran and sea voyage was also fraught with danger. In the meantime in December 1916 the Arabs under Sharīf Ḥusain revolted against the Turks and, through him, the British succeeded in arresting Shaikh-ul-Hind and a few of his co-workers at Mecca from where they were sent to Malta for internment. It is a long and thrilling story and the writer suggests the perusal of Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī's 'Safarnāmah-'i-Shaikh-ul-Hind' (Delhi, 194?) for the dramatic accounts of his arrest, deportation from Ḥijāz, a short sojourn in Cairo dotted with various cross-questionings by the British officials and the hard life at Malta.

At home in India the atmosphere was no less gloomy. Almost all the prominent leaders were put behind the bars or interned in some isolated corners. India was being ruled by the Defence of India Act which had gagged the press and had strangled all liberty. Her starving peasants and workers were suffering because of the high prices of essential commodities; unemployment was the order of the day and the educated youth was undergoing utmost frustration and misery. The war ended but the sufferings increased. The Royal Proclamation (1917) promising self-government for India could not give the starving people food and shelter. The Chelmsford-Montague Reforms (1919) were unable to satisfy the political aspirations of the nationalists who were agitating against the Rowlatt Bills whose aim was "to perpetuate in a modified form some of the obnoxious provisions of the Defence of India Act which was to cease after the war."[1] It was in the wake of agitations against the Rowlatt Bills that the Jallian-

[1] Rājendra Prasād, 'India Divided', Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay, 947, p. 121.

walah Bagh tragedy was enacted by General Dyer ; the hand of suppression fell heavily once again and Martial Law was promulgated throughout the Punjab.

As for the Muslims, they were more embittered because the peace proposals after the end of war in 1918 had falsified the assurances given to them about Turkey and the Khilāfat. They were also worried about the Holy Places in Ḥijāz which, it seemed to them, would go under the control of non-Muslims. Alarmed at this dark situation they started organizing the Khilāfat movement with its branches throughout India. It is not necessary to go into the details of this movement. All that concerns us here is the role of the 'Ulamā' in it, the establishment of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind, the Non-co-operation movement launched by the Congress and the Khilāfat Committee under the leadership of Gāndhījī and the attitude of Deoband towards it.

The Khilāfat question brought the 'Ulamā' of all shades of opinion on a common platform and for the first time they felt the need of organizing themselves in order to give lead to the Muslims in religious and political matters. (We will discuss the Jam'īyat in a separate chapter.) At this juncture of Muslim politics the Muslim League, though in the control of progressive Muslims like Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān, Dr. Anṣārī and the 'Alī Brothers, was swept aside by the Khilāfat Committee and the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' whose leaders were bent upon undergoing all sorts of sufferings and sacrifices in order to achieve their goal. This was a period of the hegemony of the 'Ulamā' to the extent that Mr. Muḥammad 'Alī became Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī. The Congress had full sympathy with the Muslims and when after the Jallianwalah Bagh tragedy it planned to launch a mass movement, "a common line of action was decided upon and non-violent non-cooperation became the joint programme. The Jamait-ul-Ulema issued the Fatwa which was signed by 925 eminent Muslim divines

and sanctioned the programme of non-violent non-coopera-tion. Many of the Ulema were lodged in jails. The feeling was so strong that a large number of Muslims took to ' Hijrat ' and suffered indescribable miseries."[1]

Shaikh-ul-Hind was brought to Bombay in the summer of 1920 and was told by the Government that he was free. He was also advised not to take any part in politics and was persuaded to avoid the Khilāfatists in Bombay. But he ignored these official suggestions.[2] The Khilāfat Committee accorded him a hearty reception, presented an address and awarded the title of Shaikh-ul-Hind in re-cognition and appreciation of his services to the cause of freedom. Gāndhījī came down from Aḥmadābād, met and briefed him about the political situation at home. Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī of Farangī Maḥal (Lucknow) who was in Bombay to receive him explained to him the joint Khilāfat-Congress programme to which he gave his support; after a few days he issued his 'fatwā' giving religious sanction to the non-violent non-cooperation movement. (This is the 'fatwā' which has been referred to by Rājendra Prasād and which was published and circulated on behalf of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'.) He also made a tour of the United Provinces exhorting the Muslims to follow the lead of the Khilāfat-Congress leaders and work for the success of the Non-cooperation movement. He did it in spite of his serious illness and against the wishes of his well-wishers. He died the same year in Delhi and was buried in Deoband by the side of Mawlānā Nānawtawī. During his last days when the icy hand of death was fast appro-aching towards him and due to excessive weakness he could hardly move, he laid the foundation of the Jāmi'ah Millīyah Islāmīyah[3] at Aligarh and presided over the

[1] Rājendra Prasād, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

[2] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-10.

[3] For somewhat detailed information about the Jāmi'ah, the circums-tances in which it came into existence and its programme of national

second annual session of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind in Delhi. At Aligarh inaugurating the foundation of the Jāmi'ah he spoke the following historic sentences :

> "I have come here at your call in the hope of rediscovering one of my lost treasures. There are pious people whose faces are lit up with the glow of intense worship, but their hearts start sinking when they are asked to rise and save the 'ummah' from the hands of the 'kuffār'; their fear is not the fear of God but it is a few individuals and their military weapons that they fear most....
>
> "Comrades, I, with a few of my friends, took a step forward towards Aligarh when I felt that I shall find sympathisers in my grief (which has been consuming my bones), not in 'madrasahs' and 'khānqāhs' (monasteries) but in schools and colleges ; thus we have been able to establish intimate relations between two historic centres of learning in India, Deoband and Aligarh.
>
> "The informed ones among you know that my elders never issued a 'fatwā' (of 'kufr') prohibiting the learning of any foreign language or the sciences of other peoples. Yes, they did say that the ultimate result of English education, as has been generally seen, was that its acquirers were dyed deep in the ways of the Christians, were in the habit of showering blasphemous remarks over their religion and co-religionists or turned out to be the worshippers of the government of the day. Hence they considered it better to remain ignorant than to acquire knowledge in such fashions.
>
> "The great leaders of our nation have, as a matter of fact, realized the basic need of the 'ummat-i-Islāmīyah'. If the students of the Muslim institutions where modern

education, see Dr. W. C. Smith's "A Note on the Jāmi'ah Millīyah Islāmīyah" in his 'Modern Islam in India', London, 1946, pp. 128-31 ; and Shaikh Muḥammad Ikrām's 'Mauj-i-Kawthar' (2nd ed.), Firoz Sons, Karachi, n.d. pp. 148-62.

sciences are taught, are kept ignorant of their religion, thereby forgetting their Islamic and national duties, then such institutions become instrumental in weakening the prestige of the Muslims. Therefore, it has been announced that there will be laid the foundation of an independent university which has nothing to do with government subsidy and interference and whose organization is based on Islamic principles and national aspirations."[1]

[1] Madanī, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

CHAPTER III

Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind

WE HAVE SEEN that the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind[1] was founded in the wake of the Khilāfat movement in 1919. This movement was unique in many respects ; but it was more unique in that, for the first time, it brought the 'ulamā' of all shades of opinion on a common platform and induced them to organize themselves into a religio-political body to guide the Muslims of India in their religious and political matters. As indicated in the previous chapter, it was a period of *rapprochement* between the 'ulamā' and the western-educated Muslim intelligentsia and a time of unity of purpose between the Muslim proletariate and bourgeoisie : but this *rapprochement* had no intellectual content. It had no sound basis for permanent adjustments of diversified and, in some cases, conflicting interests. Islam was, no doubt, an integrating force, but even in this field there were irreconcilable differences as we shall study presently. Similarly, the Hindu-Muslim unity as manifested in the anti-British Non-co-operation movement was devoid of anything positive. The whole attitude of both the Hindus and Muslims was negative—an anti-Britishness which had two divergent frames of reference, Islamism and Indianism. Consequently, with the collapse of the Non-co-operation and the Khilāfat movements this artificial unity between the Hindus and the Muslims and within the Muslim community be-

[1] The Jam'īyat started as a body of Muslim religious leaders belonging to different schools ; but after the collapse of the Non-co-operation movement and the Khilāfat agitation when the Hindu-Muslim question assumed a burning importance, it generally came to be dominated by the Deobandī 'ulamā'. There has always been in it, however, a number of non-Deobandī elements influential in their respective spheres.

tween the 'ulamā' and the western-educated intelligentsia, started showing its inherent weakness and in course of time it completely disappeared. Even the 'ulamā' of different schools, in most cases, said good-bye to each other and parted to go their own way. The following lines are an attempt to elaborate this interesting phenomenon in India's political life between 1920-40 which should always be studied with careful reference to the former period.

The Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind was organized with the exclusive purpose of safeguarding the 'Sharī'ah' and giving the Muslim community religious and political guidance according to Islamic principles and commandments.[1] Its aims and objects, as laid down in its constitution, were :

1. To guide the followers of Islam in their political and non-political matters from a religious point of view.
2. To defend, on 'shar'ī' grounds, Islam, centres of Islam (the Jazīrat-ul-'Arab and the seat of the Khilāfat), Islamic rituals and customs and Islamic nationalism against all odds injurious to them.
3. To achieve and protect the general religious and national rights of the Muslims.
4. To organize the 'Ulamā' on a common platform.
5. To organize the Muslim community and launch a programme for its moral and social reform.
6. To establish good and friendly relations with the non-Muslims of the country to the extent permitted by the 'Sharī'at-i-Islāmīyah'.
7. To fight for the freedom of the country and religion according to the 'shar'ī' objectives.
8. To establish 'maḥākim-i-Shar'īyah' (religious courts) to meet the religious needs of the community.
9. To propagate Islam, by way of missionary activities, in India and foreign lands.

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, 'Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' Kiyā Hay', part 1, Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā', U. P. (Publication Division), n.d. p. 9.

10. To maintain and strengthen the bond of unity and fraternal relations (as ordained by Islam) with the Muslims of other countries.[1]

These aims and objects of the Jam'īyat, when analysed, reveal its dual loyalty to Islam and Islamic countries on the one hand and to India on the other. They also indicate the utmost emphasis on the ' Sharī'ah '[2] and its preservation and promulgation in the Indian sub-continent. The country was to be freed from the foreign yoke not only because of democratic rights of a nascent India but also because of the religious duty of the Muslims to fight for the freedom of their homeland. The whole programme of the Jam'īyat had to revolve around a single pivot, i.e. the ' Sharī'ah ' which was unchangeable and which could be correctly understood

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

In 1939 the provisions 2, 7, 8 and 9 were amended in view of the changed situation at home and abroad and were phrased as follows :

2. To protect Islam, centre of Islam (Ḥijāz and Jazīrat-ul 'Arab) and Islamic rites and usages, and defend Islamic nationalism against all odds injurious to it.
7. Complete independence for the nation and the country according to Shar'ī objectives.
8. To organize the ' Millat-i-Islamīyah ' into a ' Shar'ī ' body and establish ' maḥākim-i-shar'īyah '.
9. To work for the religious, educational, moral, social and economic reforms of the Muslims, and to propagate Islam by way of missionary activities, in India to their best ability.

(See Muḥammad Miyān, *op. cit.*, p. 10.)

[2] By the emphasis on the preservation of the ' Sharī'ah ' it should not be understood that the Jam'īyat aspired to build up an Islamic state. What it meant was to work for the application of that part of the Islamic law which concerns the personal life of the Muslims, e.g., marriage, divorce and inheritance, etc. In the objective provisions of the Jam'īyat constitution two words, ' maẓhabī ' and ' Shar'ī ', have been used vaguely. In most cases, however, their implied meaning is " religious ". And by " religious (' shar'ī ') " they meant (Ḥanafī) Law primarily.

and interpreted only by the 'Ulamā' who considered themselves its custodian ; and, therefore, the correct lead for the Muslims could come only from them. This rigid and orthodox stand of theirs was bound to create a rift, as it actually did, in the communal life of the Muslims, who, in course of time, were led to depend more upon the leadership of their western-educated intelligentsia. This rift was sharpened by the communal attitude of the Hindus who being in an overwhelming majority were considered by the Muslims, chiefly by the Muslim middle class, a threatening force for their legitimate rights in an independent India. The 'Ulamā' were in favour of unconditional co-operation with the Congress so far as the cause of freedom was concerned. Although as much anxious as any other Muslim organization about the achievement of the religious and political rights of the Muslims,[1] they claimed that once the British regime was dissolved the Hindus would come to terms with the Muslims who formed a strong minority and could not be deprived of their legitimate rights. They also believed that it was the British Government which was chiefly responsible for the bitter communal bickerings and for creating a sort of fear-complex in the minds of the Muslims. Hence its very existence in India was the cause of all ills in the Indian body-politic and it must come to an end. Moreover, their loyalty to Islam and Islamic countries also demanded the immediate end of the British rule in India. They thought, and perhaps quite correctly, that the Imperial England in order to keep its hold on a rich country like India, had to have its domination over the Muslim countries in the Middle East. The enslavement of India was the cause of the British supremacy over all lands and seas through which the strategic line of Imperial

[1] Even as early as 1920 Shaikh-ul-Hind, in the second annual session of the Jam'iyat at Delhi, had advised the Hindu and Muslim leaders to pay due respects to the legitimate rights of each community. He is reported to have said :

communications passed. The independence of India meant the liberation of a vast Muslim area.[1]

With these aims and objects the Jam'īyat, in collaboration with the Khilāfat Committee, participated in the Non-co-operation movement under the leadership of Gāndhījī who had promised 'Swarāj' in one year. It was a period of "intense activity and unprecedented co-operation between all communities...Thousands of men and women belonging

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"There is no doubt that Allāh has been compassionate enough to you in that He has induced a spirit of co-operation in the hearts of your fellow-countrymen who form an overwhelming majority, to help you in the achievement of your noble cause. I regard this unity and co-operation very useful....For I know that any other situation will be extremely harmful to the cause of independence and the British bureaucracy will be more ruthless in perpetuating its iron hold on the Indian soil; and if there is any dim imprint of Islamic hegemony left in this land it will be erased for ever.... Yes, I have already said and I say it again that if you are interested in perpetuating good and friendly relations between various communities, then their limits should be comprehended fully well and they are the same as laid down by God; they should be, in no case, transgressed. There should be no interference in any community's religious affairs; nor in worldly affairs there should be any effort, on behalf of any group, to harm and antagonize the other group. I regret to say that at many places the situation is the reverse. There are people who in excitement go far ahead in the field of co-operation so far as the religious affairs are concerned, but in government offices and other fields of economic activity one does not hesitate to injure the interests of the other.

"Today I am not addressing the masses. My addressees are the leaders of both the communities and I ask them not to be deceived by the number of hands raised in support of resolutions in conferences. They should try to take full stock of the personal relations of the Hindus and Muslims and understand their prejudiced rivalries in government offices."

(cf. Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Naqsh-i-Ḥayāt', vol. II, Deoband, 1954, pp. 260-61).

[1] 'Allāmah Shāh Mu'īnuddīn Ajmerī, in his presidential address of the ninth session of the Jam'īyat in 1930, declared:

to all communities were imprisoned even before a scheme of civil disobedience and non-payment of taxes was adopted."[1] In the meantime there were serious riots at Chauri Chaura and the movement was called off. Gāndhījī and other prominent leaders were arrested and in the political atmosphere of the country a vacuum was created. One is really at a loss to understand the mysterious decision of Gāndhījī to call off the movement at its peak. The non-co-operators had been peaceful throughout. The Chauri Chaura riots were a solitary incident where the use of violence was made. This was understandable as it was the first experiment India was making to resist force with non-violent methods; but it did not mean that as a penance the triumphant movement should have been withdrawn. It was shocking and the whole of india was petrified. Nobody could challenge the wisdom of the "Mahatma"; the die was cast and the tragic consequences that followed were to be borne by the ignorant masses whose roused passions were exploited by the religious demagogues to further their communal ends. We find that the withdrawal of the movement was followed by the 'Shuddhī'[2]

"Our greatest enemy is Great Britain who, having India and her vast recources under her tyrannical occupation is the main cause for our degeneration and destruction in India and for the untold misery and ruin in Islamic countries outside India. It is crystal clear that we will remain subjugated and downtrodden as long as India is under the British occupation. This is why the Indian Muslims have only one object regarding the independence of India and that is that India must win complete freedom at all costs."

(See Shāh Mu'īnuddīn, Khuṭbah-'i-Ṣadārat delivered at the ninth session of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' at Amroha, May, 1930, Al-Jam'īyat Press, Delhi, n.d., p. 25.)

[1] Rājendra Prasād, 'India Divided' Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay, 1947, p. 121.

[2] This movement was started by Swāmī Shraddhānand, an Āriyah Samājī leader, to convert non-Hindus to Hinduism. As a principle

and 'Sanghatan'[1] movements and the Hindu-Muslim riots in Multan and other places. The exaggerated reports about the Moplah uprising[2] aggravated the situation and the happy days of the commmual harmony were over. Attempts were made to ward off the tide of communalism but proved ineffectual. There can be no doubt that there were forces working behind the scene and these forces

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all religious communities have got the right to preach their faith. But proselytizing activities have got their own etiquette and gentle methods which should be strictly followed. Swāmījī started his proselytizing mission at a time when it was most inopportune and was bound to create suspicion and tension between the various communities. Unfortunately, the methods and the tone of the mission were aggressive, particularly towards the Muslims who could not, at any cost, tolerate the scurrilous attacks on their Prophet by the Āriyah Samājī writers. It is still a mystery to be solved why the Swāmī embarked upon such a dangerous path just after his release in 1922.

[1] The leader of the 'Saṇghaṭan' movement was Madan Mōhan Mālavī, the founder of the Banaras Hindu University. It aimed at organizing the Hindus for social reforms and for the purpose of maintaining a sort of solidarity in moments of need and emergency.

As a reaction to these Hindu movements, the Muslims under the guidance of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' started a programme of 'tablīgh' and 'tanẓīm'. (These two words correspond, in their meanings, to the two Hindi words, 'Shuddhī' and 'Saṇghaṭan'.) The Jam'īyat succeeded in meeting the challenge of the Hindu zealots and its efforts not only brought back more than 11,000 apostates into the fold of Islam but also resulted in the conversion of more than 2,000 non-Muslims who accepted Islam and became part of the Indian Muslim community. (cf. Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.)

From the viewpoint of a nationalist, however, it was a very unhappy state of affairs and deepened the already existing antagonism between the two communities.

[2] The Moplahs are a group of Muslim peasants in the Malabar region of South India. Economically poor and socially backward, they have always been in a mood to resent their misery and poverty. Having a long tradition of revolt and protest, they participated with full vigour in the Khilāfat agitation and for a short while were successful in ousting the British authority from their area. They were not trained in the lessons of non-violence and their agitation took a violent form

were utilized by the British Government to sow the seed of bitterness and hatred between the various communities ; but the foreign element was only partially responsible for this unhappy situation. The basic cause of the communal tangle lay in the uneven development of the two major communities, the absence of a common secular national outlook and in the stubborn opposition of the Hindu vested interests to acknowledge the legitimate rights of the comparatively backward Muslims who were in minority ; and it is a fact that the psychology of a minority is always one of fear and suspicion. It was the duty of the majority community to have a just, if not benevolent, attitude towards their demands. Unfortunately this did not happen and led to disastrous results for the country as a whole. Moreover, and again unfortunately, the India National Congress under Gāndhījī's leadership never became an exclusively secular-nationalist organization in the real sense of the term. He "was essentially a man of religion, a Hindu to the innermost depths of his being."[1] There was nothing wrong in his being a Hindu or even an eclectic

not only against the British but also against the non-Muslim landlords and money-lenders "whom they suspected of having gone over to the government side or at least not being on their side. Forcible conversions to Islam were alleged. All this created bitterness amongst the Hindus, even in Northern India, who were influenced by reports of incidents which were undoubtedly exaggerated." (Rājendra Prasād, *op. cit.*, p. 123.) However, the hand of suppression fell heavily on the poor Moplahs and they were once more reduced to abject submission. In this connection Jawaharlal Nehru's remark is worth noticing. He says, "The Moplah rising and its extraordinary cruel suppression—what a horrible thing was the baking to death of the Moplah prisoners in the closed railway vans !—had already given a handle to those who stirred the water of communal discord. It is just possible that if civil resistance had not been stopped and the movement had been crushed by Government, there would have been less communal bitterness and less superfluous energy left for the subsequent communal riots." (Jawaharlal Nehru, ' Toward Freedom ', The John Day Company, New York, 1942, p. 83.)

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, ' The Discovery of India ', London, 1951, p. 340.

as he sometimes posed to be; but it was certainly wrong and harmful to talk with a Hindu frame of reference which the other communities, particularly the Muslims, could not understand and appreciate.[1] "Congress was dominated by Gandhi"[2] but his "traditional concept of Hindu tolerance" made the Congress a hotch-potch organization of all sorts of interests—capitalists, socialists, reactionaries, progressives, communalists and so on and so forth. Patel and Nehru both were acceptable to him. Azād and Tandon both could be accommodated in the Congress. This amalgam of variety of trends was bound to create problems as it did, not only before 1946 but even after.

The Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā', as has been stated before, co-operated with the Congress but never lost its identity. The Muslim League, in the twenties still an exclusive organization representing the interests of the Muslim middle class, did not have the support of the Muslim masses.

[1] Nehru has expressed his embarrassment about the religious emphasis Gāndhījī placed on the Freedom Movement in the following words:

"Gandhiji was continually laying stress on the religious and spiritual side of the movement. His religion was not dogmatic, but it did mean a definitely religious outlook on life, and the whole movement was strongly influenced by this and took on a revivalist character so far as the masses are concerned. The great majority of Congress workers naturally tried to model themselves after the leader and even repeated his language....

"I used to be troubled sometimes at the growth of this religious element in our politics, both on the Hindu and the Muslim side. I did not like it at all. Much that Maulvies and Maulanas and Swamis and the like said in their public addresses seemed to me most unfortunate. Their history and sociology and economics appeared to me all wrong and the religious twist that was given to everything prevented all clear thinking. Even some of Gandhiji's phrases sometimes jarred upon me—thus his frequent reference to *Rama Raj* as a golden age which was to return." (Nehru, 'Toward Freedom', pp. 71-72.)

[2] Nehru, 'The Discovery of India', p. 342.

It was largely concerned with the political and economic demands of the Muslim bourgeoisie *vis-á-vis* its Hindu counterpart. It is interesting to note that the Jam'īyat and the League were united at this point but did not trust each other's leadership. The 'Ulamā' were not prepared to follow the western-oriented Muslim intelligentsia whom they suspected to be the representatives of a different culture. They were still medieval in their outlook and were enthusiastically interested in preserving the old Muslim culture. They never recognized the new western influences that were affecting the cultural and intellectual life of the Indian Muslims; and here lay the point of estrangement between the two types of the Muslim intelligentsia. This point can be well illustrated by the official position of the Jam'īyat represented in the following extracts from Muḥammad Miyāṇ's 'Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' Kiyā Hay'. He says:

> "The situation is this that in matters of daily behaviour and culture the western-educated class, both Hindu and Muslim, has accepted a new culture and have discarded their old cultural norms. This new culture is so uniform that hardly any distinction can be made between the Hindus and the Muslims. As for the masses, their culture varies from place to place in accordance with the general culture of the majority in the area. In the Punjab and other Muslim provinces a Hindu looks like a Musalmān while in provinces with a Hindu majority the situation is the reverse.
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> "Now there remains a group of religious Musalmāns committed to a culture which they consider Islamic; their lead is in the hands of the 'ulamā' who are accused of being the followers and agents of the Hindus."[1]

These extracts are really an oversimplification of the

[1] Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

problem of culture and point out only its external manifestations as such; but, at the same time, they give an idea of the Jam'īyat's attitude toward and its deep-rooted distrust of the westernized Muslims and clarify, to some extent, the nature of their constant refusal to accept their leadership. We have just seen that the 'ulamā' were greatly concerned with the preservation of the 'Sharī'ah'. During the period under review, and even before, there arose occasions when several bills regarding civil marriage, child marriages, annulment of marriages and endowments, etc., were introduced in the mixed legislatures composed of members of various communities and controlled by a non-Muslim foreign power. The bills were meant to bring about certain changes in the prevailing laws concerned and in several cases even some Muslim members who mainly came from the landed gentry and the westernized intelligentsia, were in favour of these changes. But this was a situation which the 'ulamā' could not tolerate. They protested, agitated and organized campaigns against this unjust encroachment of the Government and the "misguided"[1] Muslim legislators on the provisions of the Islamic

[1] Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī represented the true sentiments of the 'ulamā' about the official tampering with the 'Sharī'ah', when in his statement, presented to the Viceroy on behalf of the Muslim Deputation which waited on him on the 9th of November, 1929, he said:

> "With the Sarda Act placed on the Statute Book as a precedent before the Indian Legislature, there is no knowing what other Islamic laws will not be assailed next; and since it is not only the British element in the Indian Legislature that seems to be determined to throw Islamic as well as Hindu Law into the melting pot of man-made legislation, but also the Indian element that claims to be nationalist ... the question has assumed all the more gravity. In fact, one Muslim member sought to differentiate sociology from religion, and when the majority of the Indian Legislature takes such a narrow view of Religion, and even a few members returned by separate Muslim electorates—no doubt born in Muslim families, but certainly not believing in Islam as a perfect and complete faith needing no reform ... it

law. This further served as one of the causes of the alienation of the 'ulamā' from the modern Muslims.

The western-educated intelligentsia, particularly the League leadership, in turn, believed that the 'ulamā' were not capable of giving a correct lead in politics to the Muslims. The plea was that the 'ulamā', because of their exclusively traditional education and complete ignorance of the complexities of modern life, did not understand the nature of politics as such in the twentieth century; their sphere of activity was religion and to that they were expected to confine themselves. This attitude of the Muslim League leadership is well represented by Muḥammad Nu'mān in his 'Muslim India'. Speaking of the Muslim leadership in the days of the Khilāfat movement he declares:

> "Strictly speaking the activities of the Mussalmans were mainly guided by Khilafat organisations and the leaders were mostly from the Jamiatul-Ulama which had also organised itself into a body and had started holding regular sessions every year. These Ulamas for the first time realised what political leadership meant. The Khilafat was presented before the Mussalmans as a purely religious question and as such their help was necessary.

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requires no special perspicuity or power of prophecy to foretell what fate is in reserve for the personal law of Muslims at the hands of a legislature foreshadowed in the constitution framed by these so-called Nationalists."

(See Muḥammad 'Ali, 'Selected Writings and Speeches of Maulana Muhammad Ali' compiled and edited by Afẓal Iqbāl, Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1944, p. 452.) Again, the 'ulamā' could not trust the leadership of Mr. Jinnāḥ, the founder of Pakistan, on the same grounds. His stand in favour of certain amendments proposed by Bhopendranāth Bāsū in 1912 in the Civil Marriage Act, and on the Sharī'at Bill of 1937 had made them suspicious of his claim to lead the Muslims on the right path. (For a detailed account of the Jam'īyat's criticism of the Muslim League leadership, see Muḥammad Miyāṇ, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-74.)

But they did not cease to function after that but began to assert themselves in the body politic of the country as a factor to be counted and even its president claimed the superiority of the Jamiat over all other Muslim organizations or Conferences in India and declared that in times to come it would represent a unique position in the world so as to lead Muslim opinion in religious matters, but as politics and religion were inseparable in Islam, the Jamiat was also willing to give a lead on political issues. *This notion of religion and politics is today the cause of many of our troubles.*"[1] [Italics are ours.]

It has been hinted before that the Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā' stood for unconditional co-operation with the Indian National Congress—a position which the Muslim League, more concerned with championing the cause of the rights of the Muslim community than the freedom of the country at first, could not support and dubbed the Jam'iyat as traitor and the camp-follower of the Congress. Mr. Jinnāḥ is reported to have said at Aligarh in 1937 :

> "What the League has done is to set you free from the reactionary elements of Muslims and to create the opinion that those who play their selfish game are traitors. It has certainiy freed you from that undesirable element of Maulvis and Maulanas. I am not speaking of Maulvis as a whole class. There are some of them who are as patriotic and sincere as any other ; but there is a section of them which is undesirable." [2]

It was really unfortunate that the 'Ulamā' in general and the Dārul-'Ulūm Deoband in particular understood Islam

[1] Muḥammad Nu'mān, ' Muslim India, Rise and Growth of the All-India Muslim League ', written by Mohammad Noman, Kitabistan, Allahabad, 1942. pp. 213-14.

[2] Muḥammad Nu'mān, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

primarily in a legal form. Their medieval conception of the 'Sharī'ah' remained unchanged, orthodox and traditional *in toto* and they accepted it as finished goods manufactured centuries ago by men like Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf. Their scholasticism, couched in the old categories of thought, barred them from creative thinking and properly understanding the problems, social or philosophical, confronting the Muslim society in a post-feudal era. They were intellectually ill-equipped to comprehend the crisis Islam had to face in the twentieth century. In short, they were incapable of giving a new interpretation to Islam. In the domain of legal code they were mentally unprepared to scrutinize the provisions of 'Hidāyah' and lay down new legal norms as the basis of Islamic law. They were not even true to the traditions of Shāh Walīullāh in so far as his principle of 'taṭbīq' is concerned. This rigid orthodoxy of theirs could not win the support of the western-educated Muslims who were trained in an entirely new set of traditions. It was equally unfortunate that the latter, too, while being quite ignorant of their religious traditions, were not in a position to present a synthesis of the old and the new; none of them was intellectually fit to take up the job of a new interpretation of Islam started by Sir Sayyid and "Islamize" it in the modern frame of reference. As a result, they also failed to produce an Islamic ideology capable of attracting people of all shades of opinion.

Thus we see that there was no meeting ground where the Jam'īyat and the League could be united. Both quite sincerely desired the welfare of the Muslim community, but had their own terms of reference. They approached the common problem from different viewpoints. Sometimes they joined hands to fight for the legitimate demands of the Muslims as in the case of the Nehru Report; but often they disagreed and blamed each other for serving Hindu and British interests. There was always a state of suspicion and distrust that governed their relations. This

situation continued till 1940 when the Pakistan Resolution was passed by the League and since when the two principal Muslim parties never agreed on anything.

The Pakistan Resolution was the culminating point of the communal problem which assumed greater significance after the suspension of the Non-co-operation movement in 1922. The present writer will not venture into a detailed study of the causes that lay behind the Hindu-Muslim question in India. They were manifold—social, religious, political, economic and psychological—and had their roots deep down into the past history. There is, however, no doubt that it was there and its solution was not attempted with that amount of sincerity and practical-mindedness that it demanded. There were leaders like Gāndhījī and Mr. Jinnāḥ and a few others who tried their utmost to solve it but failed and the situation became so gloomy that a man of Mr. Jinnāḥ's stature, once an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity, was swept away to a level of narrow communalism. The British Government was fully aware of the fact that the communalists, both Hindu and Muslim, represented the interests of their respective bourgeoisie and were extremely jealous to safeguard them. Being in a position from where it could command the situation, the Government had the initiative in the process of the constitutional development of the country and used to play one group against the other. The Congress in which "many a Congressman was a communalist under his national cloak"[1] genuinely aspired to be a national organization but at the crossroad of every constitutional dealing with the Muslims and the Government was pulled back and influenced by the Hindu communal elements inside as well as outside. Consequently, the Muslims influenced, in turn, by the constant and clever manoeuvrings of their communal elements, lost faith in the Congress as a national

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Toward Freedom', The John Day Company, New York, 1942, p. 114.

organization and began to feel that they were really an entity separate from others in the country. This separatist feeling of theirs was provided with an emotional vigour and intellectual content by the poet-philosopher Muḥammad Iqbāl (1876-1938) who has undoubtedly wielded a tremendous influence in moulding the destiny of India in general and that of the Indian Muslims in particular. In spite of some obvious contradictions in his thinking there is no doubt that he was "a deep, courageous and original thinker, like whom [Muslim India] had not known any one since the days of....Shah Wali Ullah of Delhi."[1] He represented several conflicting forces and "advanced Muslim socialists as well as reactionaries of the deepest dye can find verses in his works to support their conflicting ideologies."[2] He, however, through his powerful and eloquent poetry, inculcated a dynamic spirit in the younger generation of the educated Muslims and led them to believe that "the final act is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and re-made by continuous action."[3]

Iqbāl started as a nationalist and pantheist and ended his poetic-intellectual career as a pan-Islamist and a puritan religious reformer. It is not easy to account for the actual factors constituting his personal experiences that brought about this fundamental change in his thinking; but from his writings, both prose and poetry, it can be gathered that his stay in Europe (1905-08) in connection with his studies had a revolutionizing influence on his mind. In Europe he saw "nationalism" being worshipped as a god in

[1] A. H. Albiruni, 'Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India', Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1950, p. 182. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[3] Muḥammad Iqbāl, 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam', Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1951, p. 198.

whose name all sorts of inhuman values were pursued and the western civilization which, with all its brilliance of material achievements and exuberant dynamism, he thought devoid of moral force and spiritual integrity. He "noticed the severe and damning limitations to which European life, in spite of all its promise, was subject. The soul-destroying frustration of most individual lives in even a prospering capitalist society, and worse than bestial competition between fellow-men, and, more obviously destructive, between nation and nation, turned [him] away from Europe in disgust.... European life could never be a model for perfection."[1] He was completely disillusioned with nationalism, capitalism and westernism in general and returned home with a firm belief in Islam as a socio-politico-moral force which did not distinguish between the *spirit* and the *matter* and presented a harmonious blending of both for the salvation of mankind. The following ghazal written in March, 1907, represents the change he was experiencing in Europe :

"The time of unveiling has come, the beloved will be seen by all,
The secret which was veiled by silence shall now become manifest.

"That cycle, cup-bearer, has gone when the lovers of wine drank in hiding,
The whole world will now be a tavern, and all will drink in the open.

"For, the silence of Mecca has proclaimed to the expectant ear at last,
That the compact made with the desert-dwellers shall be enforced again.

"That lion which emerged out of the wilderness and upset the Empire of Rome,

[1] W. C. Smith, ' Modern Islam in India ', London, 1946, p. 102.

I hear from the angels, shall awaken once more.

"O dwellers of Western lands, God's world is not a shop,
That which you consider good coin shall prove to be counterfeit.

"Your civilization will kill itself with its own dagger ;
A nest built on a slender bough will not last for ever."[1]

On the Indian scene we find the first expression of Iqbāl's anti-national sentiments in 1909 when "he was invited to Amritsar to attend a meeting of Minerva Lodge, which was a cosmopolitan organization with membership open to the Hindus and the Muslims. [He] politely declined the invitation and in the course of the correspondence, which ensued, he wrote on the 28th March, 1909 :

'I have myself been of the view that religious differences should disappear from this country, and even now, act on this principle, in my private life. But now I think that the preservation of their national entities is desirable for both the Hindus and the Muslims. The vision of a common nationhood for India is a beautiful ideal, and has a poetic appeal, but looking to the present conditions and the unconscious trends of the two communities, appears incapable of fulfilment.' "[2]

Iqbāl refers to "the unconscious trends of the two communities." These trends were, no doubt, the fundamental cause of dividing the Indian people into " two nations ". Besides the economic and political factors which concerned the day-to-day life of the people, there was one basic factor forming the basis of division in the Indian society.

[1] Muḥammad Iqbāl, 'Bāng-i-Darā' (13th ed.), Lahore, 1949, pp. 149-50. The translation has been quoted from Albiruni's 'Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India', pp. 172-73.

[2] Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

It is a sheer oversimplification to say, as has been generally believed, that the term "communalism" connoted only communal demands for jobs and special and additional seats in the legislatures. There was something more which formed the very basis of the problem. Iqbāl had perhaps realized that the neo-Hinduism—a product of the Hindu Renaissance in the modern period—was an intellectual as well as a political revolt not only against westernism but also against the Indo-Muslim culture, and its roots lay, bypassing the centuries of Muslim rule, far back in the ancient past of India. Perhaps he had sensed that this neo-Hinduism was a mixture of aspirations for political supremacy and religious revival. His sensitive mind reacted against this Hindu trend and launched itself to crystallize the out-of-date Islamic romanticism of Shiblī and Azād into an Islamic ideology as a symbol of neo-Islam. Unfortunately, he faltered in his intellectual journey and failed to free his new interpretation of Islam from the influences of romanticism which had already met its Waterloo in Turkey. He also failed to understand the true nature of the onward march of history, particularly on the Asian scene where the era of nationalism was still in its infancy and had to become a budding force whose tide no romanticism of Iqbāl's brand could ward off.

However, as he was opposed to nationalism, he, in no way, could tolerate the Indian nationalism which, it seems, he interpreted as a cloak of neo-Hinduism. Hence a new ideology and a new path to tread on. The present writer thinks that the 'ulamā' missed this basic point. They failed to understand the genesis of the Hindu Renaissance and never tried to comprehend the modern Islam which in 1930's, under the poetic inspiration of Iqbāl, became an ideological force for whose glory the Muslim youth was led to live and die. Thus intellectually they were isolated and in moments of final decisions were constantly ignored.

Iqbal's presidential address at the annual session of the

All-India Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930, is a landmark in the history of Muslim India in so far as it contains the first germs of the two-nation theory and the demand for a separate homeland of the Indian Muslims. The following extracts from it are truly representative of his idea of Islam and his deep concern to imprint it on the minds of his co-religionists :

"It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity—by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal—has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups and finally transform them into a well-defined people.

"To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations, who believes that religion is the power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as states, and finally who believes that Islam is itself a destiny and will not suffer a destiny.

"Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe ? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national politics, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part ? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority....The religious ideal of Islam...is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means the displacement

of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India."[1]

Quoting Renan on the subject of "nation" as an embodiment of "a moral consciousness" Iqbāl says:

"The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and cooperation of the many....It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps in the higher interests of mutual cooperation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism outwardly stimulating [simulating ?] a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps we are unwilling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions.

"The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified....*I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Beluchistan amalgamated into a single state self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire; the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian*

[1] Muḥammad Iqbāl, 'Speeches and Statements of Iqbāl', compiled by Shamloo, Al-Manar Academy, Lahore, 1948, pp. 3-9.

Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."[1]

It should, however, be kept in mind that Iqbāl's assertion regarding a distinct destiny of Indian Islam did not signify a distinct Indian Muslim nation, but only a part of the whole Muslim nation comprising all Muslim peoples in different parts of the world which in the Quranic terminology means 'ummah'. He was, as we have seen, vehemently against nationalism *per se* and it is still fresh in the memory of the Indo-Pak Muslims how strongly he had reacted in 1938 against the reported statement of Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī that in modern times nations were formed by lands and the Indian Muslims should accept this view,[2] and how he had, once again, in reply to Mawlānā's statement, reaffirmed his previous position, saying :

"I am opposed to nationalism as it is understood in Europe, not because, if it is allowed to develop in India, it is likely to bring less material gain to Muslims. I am opposed to it because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity. Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of man. Yet that which really matters is a man's faith, his culture, his historical tradition. These are the things which, in

[1] Muḥammad Iqbāl, 'Speeches and Statements', pp. 9-36.

[2] cf. the poem "Ḥusain Aḥmad" in Muḥammad Iqbāl's 'Armughān-i-Ḥijāz' (Lahore, 1951, p. 278). It started a heated controversy in which the nationalists and the adherents of Islamic nationalism (Millatism) both participated with equal frenzy. There was also an exchange of ideas between the two porsonalities concerned through the Lahore daily 'Iḥsān' and one Ḥaẓrat Ṭālūt who later edited those letters and statements and published them under the title 'Naẓarīyah-'i-Qawmīyat : Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad Ṣāḥib Madanī wa 'Allāmah Iqbāl, Dera Ghazi Khan, n d.

my eyes, are worth living for and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated."[1]

This "poetic dream" of Iqbāl caught the imagination of the Muslims of India who under the leadership of Mr. Jinnāḥ embarked upon giving it a concrete shape.

By the end of the period under review the Hindu-Muslim tension had reached a point where no compromise on the subject of a "United Indian nationalism" was possible. The Muslim mass contact organized by the Congress and supported by the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' in order to achieve the support of the Muslim masses for the national ideals, had failed. In the provincial elections of 1937 held under the Act of 1935, the Congress had swept the polls, quite contrary to the official calculations, in all the provinces with a Hindu majority and in the North-West Frontier, a predominantly Muslim province. The Congress formed ministries in these provinces, but, quite undiplomatically, ignored the demand of the Muslim League to have the Muslim ministers from amongst its own elected members. It gave the League sufficient ground for resentment. A further insult was added to injury when Jawaharlal Nehru made an unrealistic claim declaring that "there were only two parties in the country—the British and the Congress."[2] This approach of the Congress towards the communal problem, even as late as 1937, was interpreted by the League High Command as a challenge to the Muslim community. Mr. Jinnāḥ, a keen mind and a shrewd politician as he was, exploited this situation to reorganize the Muslim League and accepted the challenge in a defiant

[1] Muḥammad Iqbāl, "Presidential Address delivered at the annual session of the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore on the 21st March 1932", in 'Speeches and Statements of Iqbal', compiled by Shamloo, Al-Manar Academy, Lahore, 1948, p. 38.

[2] Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

mood at its historic Lucknow session in 1937. In 1939 came the Second World War and when, because of certain basic differences with the Government on the question of India's participation in it on behalf of the Allies, the Congress ministries went out of office a "Day of Deliverance"[1] was observed by the League and its followers. Taking full advantage of this psychological moment, Mr. Jinnāḥ busied himself with the task of reorganizing the League, weaning away the Muslim masses from the Congress and the Muslim nationalist organizations and determining the League objective for the future and final fight with the Congress. Earlier, in 1938 the Sindh Provincial Muslim Conference had passed a resolution "suggesting to the All-India Muslim League, that it should review the entire

[1] The Congress formed ministries in the provinces where it was elected as a majority party, about the middle of July, 1937. On March 20, 1938, a committee was appointed by the Council of the All-India Muslim League to investigate into the alleged atrocities perpetrated on the Muslims of the Congress-ruled provinces. The chairman of the committee was Rāja Sayyid Muḥammad Mahdī of Pīrpūr, a Muslim landlord of Oudh, who submitted his report on the 15th November, 1938. This report is known as the Pirpur Report and served as the official charge-sheet of the Muslim League against the Congress regarding its treatment of the Muslim minority and supposedly justifying the claim of the League that in an united independent India with an overwhelming Hindu majority Muslims and all that was Islamic would be annihilated. The Report was one-sided and mainly meant for a propaganda stunt against the Congress. "An outsider who read the report would wish to hear the other side of the case. But no doubt an inflammable partisan was goaded, particularly by the implicit insinuations and the screaming, heavy-type headlines, to resentment and fury. The report repeatedly stated explicitly that the Muslims were in a worse case under the Congress than under the British." (Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 262.) It was unfortunate that the report was never put to the test of an impartial investigation. The League made much out of it and on the resignation of the Congress ministries in December, 1939, very tactlessly celebrated the Day of Deliverance. It is an irony of history that the partition of India left the Muslims of the Hindu majority provinces again at the mercy of the Hindus from whose domination no "Deliverance" can be foretold even in the distant future.

question of the future constitution for India, and suggest something which would secure the honourable status due to the Muslims. 'Sindh resolution also suggested that Hindus and Muslims were separate nations.' "[1] The cumulative result of all these happenings was the historic resolution adopted by the League at its Lahore session in 1940, putting forward its demand for separate independent homelands for the Muslims of India.

[1] Albiruni, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

CHAPTER IV

The Demand for Pakistan

ON MARCH 23, 1940, Nationalist India was shocked at the proposal of the partition of the country, as propounded by the Muslim League at its Lahore Session. On that day it passed the following resolution:

1. "While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939 and 3rd of February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.
2. "It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in as far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered *de novo* and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.
3. "Resolved that it is the considered view of this

Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

4. "That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them ; and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

5. "This Session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communication, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary."

The proposal for the partition of India as adumbrated in the Resolution was based on the theory that there were two major nations in the Indian sub-continent and that

each nation had a right to a homeland of its own for its free and unhampered development. When challenged on this point by Gāndhījī, Mr. Jinnāḥ said :

"We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions ; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation."[1]

It is remarkable that Mr. Jinnāḥ, perhaps deliberately, avoided to mention religion in his definition ; nevertheless, the determining force behind it, which he, most probably, had in his mind, was certainly religion which has been responsible for many a distinctive feature of Muslim life all over the world. The Muslim League chief also abstained from mentioning the test of 'waṭan' (homeland) as the basis of a nationhood, which the nationalist Muslims, including the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā', regarded as being the very core of their conception of Indian nationalism. In other words, Mr. Jinnāḥ's nation, at this stage, was homeless and was striving to have a homeland whereas the Jam'īyat's nation had a home which was under foreign domination from which it was struggling to free itself. However, Mr. Jinnāḥ's definition was quite logical in so far as his whole strategy for the demand of a separate homeland for the Muslims was concerned ; and,

[1] Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, 'Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah', vol. II, collected and edited by Jamiluddīn Aḥmad, Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1947, pp. 180-81.

no doubt, he represented quite faithfully the sentiments of the Muslim middle class which, being in a backward position, was frightened at the idea of a free competition with its Hindu counterpart in an independent India. The fact is that the demand was the product of a mixed feeling of fear and pride—fear of all sorts and the pride of being once the unquestioned rulers of the great sub-continent. It will be out of place to discuss this psychological factor in detail. The preceding chapters, particularly the third one, are an attempt to deal with the main trends that led the Muslim League to demand Pakistan; and when the demand was presented in terms of religious and cultural freedom along with the cry of "Islam in danger", the Muslim masses also joined the League and it became a common goal of the "majority" of the Indian Muslims to be achieved at any cost.[1] Here, however, the term "majority" should be read with caution. It has been stated before (Chapter III) that originally the Muslim League was an exclusive organization representing the interests of the Muslim bourgeoisie. But, later when the Hindu-Muslim question became acute and the untiring efforts of the nationalist leaders to solve it failed, the League leadership, through its persistent appeals to the prejudices of the masses and demagogic slogans, succeeded, to a great extent, in influencing the mind of the common man incapable of understanding the basic issues involved. The Deoband leadership, on the other hand, more popular among the Muslim peasantry and other backward classes, was aware of the inherent danger of the League ideology and stood for the undivided interests of the Muslim

[1] For the study of this development the writer suggests the perusal of "Islamic Nationalism : The Muslim League" in W. C. Smith's 'Modern Islam in India', London, 1946, pp. 246-69, "Muslim Case for Pakistan" in B. R. Ambedkar's 'Pakistan or the Partition of India', Bombay, 1946, pp. 3-32, and "The Muslim Reaction" in R. Coupland's 'The Constitutional Problem in India', Oxford University Press, London, 1945, pp. 179-207.

community as a whole. Furthermore, its patriotism embraced the whole of India and could not tolerate any idea of the division of the country based on political or economic considerations. Sometimes, it also made religious appeals but only to the effect that it was the religious duty of every Musalman to fight for the freedom of the country. As a result of this rift in the Muslim intelligentsia whose members preached conflicting ideas and contrary ideologies, the ignorant masses were confused. In the elections of 1946 which were held on the basis of a restricted franchise as provided in the Act of 1935 and with the purpose of ascertaining the validity of the League's claim that it was the sole representative of the Muslims of India and its demand for Pakistan was that of the whole Muslim India, a large section of the Muslim population was, as a matter of fact, debarred from expressing its opinion about the determination of its future destiny ; even then, the League failed to have the votes cast in its favour in an overwhelming majority and in North-West Frontier Province, a predominantly Muslim area, it was badly defeated.

However, the first reaction that the Lahore Resolution provoked in the circle of the non-League Muslim organizations was represented in the resolutions of the Āzād Muslim Conference convened on behalf of the Jam-'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' and other organizations in April, 1940, at Delhi.[1] This Conference voiced its opposition to the division of India although at the same time reiterated its deep concern for the religious and cultural safeguards of the Muslim community in any future constitutional set-up of the country. Among the resolutions passed the following three are relevant to the issue in question :

"This Conference, representative of Indian Muslims

[1] Sayyid Ṭufail Aḥmad, ' Rūḥ-i-Rawshan Mustaqbil ', Niẓāmī Press, Badaun, 1946, pp. 140-41.

who desire to secure the fullest freedom of the country, consisting of delegates and representatives from every province, after having given its fullest and more careful consideration to all the vital questions affecting the interests of the Muslim community and the country as a whole declares the following :

1. "India will have geographical and political boundaries of an individual whole and as such is the common homeland of all the citizens irrespective of race or religion who are joint owners of its resources. All nooks and corners of the country are hearths and homes of Muslims who cherish the historic eminence of their religion and culture which are dearer to them than their lives. From the national point of view every Muslim is an Indian. The common rights of all residents of the country and their responsibilities, in every walk of life and in every sphere of human activity are the same. The Indian Muslim, by virtue of these rights and responsibilities, is unquestionably an Indian national and in every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of every Indian national in every sphere of governmental, economic and other national activites and in public services. For that very reason Muslims own equal responsibilities with other Indians for striving and making sacrifices to achieve the country's independence. This is a self-evident proposition, the truth of which no right-thinking Muslim will question. This Conference declares unequivocally and with all emphasis at its command that the goal of Indian Muslims is complete independence along with protection of their religion and communal rights, and that they are anxious to attain this goal as early as possible. Inspired by this aim they have in the past made great sacrifices and are ever ready to make greater sacrifices."

2. "This is the considered view of this Conference that only that constitution for the future government of India would be acceptable to the people of India which is framed by the Indians themselves elected by means of adult franchise. The constitution should fully safeguard all the legitimate interests of the Muslims in accordance with the recommendations of the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly. The representatives of other communities or of an outside power would have no right to interfere in the determination of these safeguards."
3. "Whereas in the future constitution of India it would be essential, in order to ensure stability of government and preservation of security, that every citizen and community should feel satisfied, this Conference considers it necessary that a scheme of safeguards as regards vital matters mentioned below should be prepared to the satisfaction of the Muslims.

"This Conference appoints a board consisting of 27 persons. This board, after the fullest investigation, consultation and consideration, shall make its recommendations for submission to the next session of this Conference, so that the Conference may utilise the recommendations as a means of securing a permanent national settlement of the communal question. This recommendation should be submitted within two months. The matters referred to the board are the following :

1. The protection of Muslim culture, personal law and religious rights.
2. Political rights of the Muslims and their protection.
3. The formation of future constitution of India to be non-unitary and federal, with absolutely essential and unavoidable powers for the Federal Government.
4. The provision of safeguards for the economic, social

and cultural rights of Muslims and for their share in public services. . . .

"Since the safeguards of the communal rights of different communities will be determined in the constituent assembly referred to in the resolution which the Conference has passed, this Conference considers it necessary to declare that Muslim members of this constituent assembly will be elected by Muslims themselves."[1]

The report of the board envisaged in the third resolution never appeared. The reasons are unknown. Perhaps the *Satyagrah* launched by the Congress in 1940, the Cripps Mission and the "Quit India" movement of 1942 followed by a general arrest of nationalist leaders were responsible for this. Perhaps it was also due to the growing popularity of the League demand that the board considered it futile to recommend any alternative to the scheme of Pakistan. However, the Jam'iyat, perhaps left alone or having a greater sense of responsibility, came out with its own decision in 1942 known as the Jam'iyat Formula which ran as follows :

1. "Our object is complete independence.
2. "In a free India, Musalmāns and their religion and culture will be free. They will not accept a constitution which does not approve of these freedoms.
3. "We stand for the fullest and unrestricted autonomy of the provinces. The Centre will enjoy only those powers which the provinces, of their own accord, hand over to it and which concerns equally with all provinces.
4. "It is our considered opinion that a federation of autonomous provinces of India is essential. But a

[1] B. R. Ambedkar, 'Pakistan or the Partition of India', Bombay, 1946, pp. 192-94.

federation in which ninety million Muslims with a distinct culture of their own are left on the mercy of a numerical majority, will, in no case, be acceptable to them ; the Centre is to be formed on such principles that give a clear guarantee to the Muslims with regard to their religious, cultural and political freedom."[1]

The present writer has quoted the various resolutions and decisions *in extenso* in order to show the divergence of the different Muslim approaches to the solution of the communal problem as it stood in the early 1940's. There

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, ''Ulamā'-i-Ḥaqq ', vol. II, Delhi, 1948, pp. 164-65. See also ' Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' Kiyā Hay ' by the same author, Delhi, n.d., pp. 241-42.

Giving a tentative proposal for the structure of the Federal Government in so far as the cultural, religious and political safeguards for the Muslims were concerned, the Jam'īyat laid down the following suggestions :

1. The Federal Parliament should be composed on the basis of parity between the Hindus and the Muslims : for example, the proportion should be : Hindu seats 45 per cent, Muslim seats 45 per cent, and other minorities 10 per cent.
2. In the Federal Parliament, if the 2/3 majority of the Muslim members is of the opinion that a particular bill or proposal is prejudicial to their religious, cultural and political interests, then that bill or proposal will not be presented before or passed by the House.
3. There should be established a Supreme Court composed of equal number of Muslim and non-Muslim judges who will be appointed by a committee having equal number of representatives from the Muslim and non-Muslim provinces. This Supreme Court should be empowered to give final verdicts on problems arising out of disputes between the Centre and the provinces, between one province and the other or between two communities in the country. And also if, under the provision No. 2, the majority of the Federal Parliament differs from the opinion of the 2/3 majority of the Muslim members with regard to a bill being or not being opposed to the interests of the Muslims, the matter will be referred to the Supreme Court.
4. Any other proposal agreed by the parties concerned.

is no doubt that the Jam'iyat had always been serious in so far as the protection of the religious and cultural rights of the Muslims was concerned ; but it is also true that the Lahore Resolution forced them to clarify their position and speak in concrete terms not only for the Muslims' religious and cultural safeguards but also for their political freedom in terms of complete autonomy of the federating provinces. In view of the changed situation the Congress also passed a resolution[1] in favour of a loose federation with all residuary powers resting in the various units.

However, the main point of difference between the League and the Jam'iyat centred round the geographical and political unity of India. The League demand, as we have seen, was based mainly on two propositions : (1) Fear of a Hindu domination, in a federally United India, no matter how loose the proposed federation might be ; (2) Muslim ambition to carve out a destiny of their own according to their religious and cultural *ethos.* The League argued that the Muslims of India had taken to this drastic measure as the final solution of the age-old communal problem after they were forced by the narrow-mindedness of the Hindus to have no longer any faith in their professions of sincerity and big-brotherly assurances. The general approach of the League towards the Congress was :

[1] This resolution was passed by the Congress Working Committee on August 5, 1942, at Bombay, and in it was pointed out that the Congress was not "embarking on a mass struggle" to obtain power for itself. "Power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India." The Provisional Government will be "a composite Government representative of all the important sections of people of India" ; and the constitution to be drafted later on by the Constituent Assembly should be "a federal one with the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units and with residuary power resting in these units." (See Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 296 ; and also Michael Brecher, ' Nehru : A Political Biography ', Oxford University Press, London, 1959, p. 287.)

"It is no use saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body. A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to reflect the Hindu mind and support Hindu aspirations. The only difference between the Congress and the Hindu Maha Sabha is that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions while the Congress is politic and polite. Apart from this difference of fact, there is no other difference between the Congress and the Hindu Maha Sabha."[1]

Mr. Jinnāḥ declared in 1942 :

"Muslim India is fighting and struggling for survival and for its right to self-determination, whereas the Congress and other Hindu organisations are speeding to assume supremacy and domination over the Muslims as an All-India minority by establishing one central government over the whole of India, and thus to dominate and control even those zones where the Muslims are in a solid majority. . . ."[2]

The League, under his leadership, stood for "free India and free Islam."[3]

It would be superfluous to give all the resolutions passed by the League and all the statements given by its ' Qā'id ', for all of them contain the same theme as described above. The Deoband leadership,[4] through its public platform—the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind—refused to share the views and sentiments expressed by the League and its leaders. It had its own views regarding the future destiny of the

[1] Ambedkar, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[2] Maṭlūbul Ḥasan Sayyid, ' Mohammad Ali Jinnah : A Political Study ', Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1953, p. 477.

[3] Maṭlūbul Ḥasan Sayyid, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

[4] It is significant to note here that a small section of the Deoband School was against joining the Congress. Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānawī (1863-1943) was the chief spokesman of this group. Later Mawlānā

Indian Muslims and its misgivings about the far-sightedness of the League leadership.

The Jam'īyat never conceded the doctrine of two nations as propounded by the League. Since its very inception it stood for a "United Indian Nationalism" ('muttaḥidah qawmīyat'). This formed the very core of all the League-Jam'īyat differences. The Jam'īyat's stand on this fundamental and controversial point was fully explained by Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, one of its chief spokesmen and for years its president, in his 'Muttahidah Qawmīyat aur Islām' (Delhi, 1938) in the light of the Quranic verses and the Prophetic traditions. Again, in his presidential address at the annual session of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' at Jaunpur (U.P.) in June, 1940, he declared :

> "We, the inhabitants of India, in so far as we are Indians, have one thing in common and that is our Indianness which remains unchanged in spite of our religious and cultural differences. As the diversities in our appearances, individual qualities and personal traits and colour and stature do not affect our common humanness, similarly our religious and cultural differences do not interfere with our common associations with our homeland. Therefore, like the other 'millats' and non-Muslim religio-cultural groups, it is incumbent upon the Muslims to have concern with and struggle for the attainment of national interests and fight against

Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uthmānī (1887-1949), a well-known disciple of Shaikh-ul-Hind and an ''ālim' of good repute, who had been for years in the forefront of the Jam'īyat leadership, deflected from it with a few more Deobandī ''ālims' and became the first president of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Islām organized in 1946 with the blessings of Mr. Jinnāḥ in order to counteract the activities of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind. However, the bulk of the Dārul-'Ulūm and the Deoband School kept on following the lead of Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī and the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind in opposing the demand for Pakistan.

> the evils that hamper the country's progress and prosperity.... This duty which arises out of our common sharing in the happiness and misery of our motherland, is obligatory on all. Religious differences, in no case, serve as an impediment in the way of fulfilling this obligation. This is what I mean by the 'muttaḥidah qawmīyat'. The other meanings which the people are attributing to it are wrong and baseless. The Congress, having the same stand [as ours] has made provisions in its fundamentals for the protection of all religions, cultures and languages. The European conception of nationalism or the outlook of [certain] individual Congressmen regarding the different interpretations of the Congress fundamentals, is unacceptable to the Jam'īyat. It denounces it and is totally opposed to it."[1]

Out of this basic difference between the League and the Jam'īyat arose the latter's vehement opposition to the League's demand for the division of the country. Deoband became the citadel of this opposition as Aligarh, quite naturally, turned out to be the training centre of the 'mujāhidīn-i-Pākistān'. It is meaningful to note that the two major centres of Muslim education in India, representing, since their very beginning, the two different trends in the politico-intellectual life of the Indian Muslims, finally collided against each other in the moulding of the ultimate destiny of the Muslims in the Indian sub-continent. Deoband never succeeded in shaking off the suspicions it entertained about the pronounced cooperation of Aligarh with the British regime in India. No doubt, we have seen a section of the Aligarh movement revolting against the British authority. But it is also true that, in the final analysis, this turned out to be a temporary phase ; the party in power at Aligarh was always cautious in not taking any step which would antagonize their British masters.

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, ''Ulamā'-i-Ḥaqq'', vol. II, pp. 137-38.

This is why the Jam'iyat never appreciated the League politics which, it believed, was the product of and fed and nourished by the interests of British Imperialism. Even as late us 1945 when the Muslim League had also come in line with the nationalist organizations in demanding the freedom of the country, though stressing prior conditions before the British quit India, Mawlānā Madanī had doubts about the sincerity of the League leadership on the question of freedom. In answer to a letter by one Mawlawī Muḥammad Ismā'īl of Gūjar Khān (Dist. Rawalpindi), the Mawlānā quoted with approval the criticism of Shiblī on the *bona fides* of the League, saying :

> "The first foundation stone of the League was the Simla Deputation and whatever consitution may be given to it in the future the spirit of the Simla Deputation will continue in it. The main object of the Deputation, as it was made explicit, was whatever rights have been won by the Hindus as a result of their struggle of thirty years, the share of the Musalmāns in them must be fixed."[1]

The Mawlānā further wrote that the policy of the Muslim League during the war served the cause of the British Imperialism and the activities of the prominent Leaguers were contrary to their expressed interest in seeing India free from the foreign yoke.[2] He also expressed his suspicions about the interview which Mr. Jinnāḥ gave to the representative of the 'News Chronicle' of London on 29 February, 1944, and in which he was reported to have remarked that after India was divided the British authority, so far as armed forces and foreign affairs were concerned, would remain paramount until there was peace

[1] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Muslim Līg Kiyā Hay', Delhi, 1945, pp. 9-10 ; quoting from 'Ḥayāt-i-Shiblī' by Sayyid Sulaimān Nadwī, Dārul-Muṣannifīn, Azamgarh, 1943, p. 618.

[2] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15.

and harmony between the newly created states.[1] The Mawlānā concluded that the League appeared to seek British protection for the would-be Pakistan while the Jam'īyat was fighting for a complete withdrawal of British authority from the Indian sub-continent.[2] In short, the Jam'īyat, on the basis of the past records of the League, could never believe that it would ever take a bold stand against British Imperialism.[3]

The Jam'īyat also suspected a British design behind the idea of the partition of the country. Its plea was that Imperial Britain, after taking away political authority from the Muslims, was responsible for the untold misery, privation and degradation which the Muslims had to undergo throughout the last hundred years and more. It was the British government that had run down the Muslims, had destroyed their educational institutions, had replaced their laws with man-made laws and the 'qāḍīs' and 'muftīs' with non-Muslim judges in the Indian courts, and had deliberately kept them politically and economically backward.[4] Now why this change of heart on their part and why their deep concern for the well-being of the Muslim minority? It could not understand the anxiety of His

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 17; quoting from the 'Madīnah' of Bijnore, March 5, 1944. (cf. 'Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah', vol. II, collected and edited by Jamīluddīn Aḥmad, Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore; 1947, pp. 58-62.) Note that Dr. 'Abdul Laṭīf of Hyderabad who had a scheme of his own for the solution of the communal problem, reacted violently against this statement of Mr. Jinnāḥ and asked the Muslim Leaguers whether they would support such a scheme of Pakistan which meant a prolongation of the British authority on the Indian soil. (See Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Pākistān Kiyā Hay', part I, Delhi, n.d., pp. 23-24; quoting from the daily 'Ajmal', Bombay, March 6, 1944.)

[2] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[3] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Makātīb-i-Shaikh-ul-Islām', compiled by Sayyid Farīd al-Wāḥidī, Quwmī Kitābghar, Deoband, n.d., pp. 67-68. (Hereinafter we will refer to it as 'Makātīb'.)

[4] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Makātīb', pp. 59-60.

Majesty's Government expressed by the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Amery, in 1940, in the following words :

"It is true that they [the Congress] are numerically the largest single party in British India. But their claim...to speak for India is utterly denied by very important elements in India's complex national life. These other elements assert their right to be regarded not as mere numerical minorities but as separate constituent factors in any future Indian policy, entitled to be treated as such in any discussions for the shaping of India's future constitution.

"The foremost among these elements stands the great Muslim community, of ninety million strong and constitutes a majority both in the North-Western and North-Eastern India, but scattered as a minority over the whole sub-continent. In religious and social outlook, in historic tradition and culture, the difference between them and their Hindu fellow-countrymen goes as deep as, if not deeper than, any similar difference in Europe.... They will have nothing to do with a constitution framed by a Constituent Assembly elected by a majority vote in geographical constituencies."[1]

It based its suspicion about the proposed scheme for Pakistan as the product of British diplomacy on the following grounds :

1. Since the very beginning it had been the game of British Imperialism to rule its colonies by sowing the seed of division and discord among their people. It followed the same policy in India where the ground was more fertile for such a cultivation. With the gradual strengthening of her national movement grew the British anxiety to devise ways and means to divide her into two

[1] Maṭlūbul Ḥasan Sayyid, *op. cit.*, pp. 447-48.

parts thereby meaning to weaken her people and create sure opportunities for foreign political interference and economic penetration. The Jam'īyat leaders were apprehensive of these consequences. Its president, in reply to a letter written by one Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Ṣiddīq from Muẓaffargarh (Punjab) in 1946, wrote :

> "In view of the economic backwardness of the Muslim majority provinces...and the active resistance of an effective, well-organised and numerically strong minority, Pakistan will have to face difficult problems and will be required, in order to maintain itself, to seek the support of some foreign power. As a result, its economic life will have to be controlled by foreign governments and non-Pakistani capital. Moreover, due to the lack of its resources and further increase in its expenditure, it will not be able to defend itself independently...; nor will it be strong enough to give any effective assistance to Muslim countries. On the contrary, it will turn out to be a playground of political intrigues of England and Russia. The situation, finally, will give England a golden opportunity to take full advantage of Indo-Pak prejudices and rivalries and thus, in spite of the virtual termination of British rule in India, it will eventually come to dominate Pakistan and Hindustan again."[1]

2. In 1930 (?) Mr. Plowden, a British official in the United Provinces, wrote to someone in London a letter which leaked out to the Press and which suggested that there was only one solution to the Indian problem, viz., that India should be divided into two zones, Hindu and Muslim. Deploring the situation in India as one out of control because of the Indianization of the Civil Service, he grudgingly complained against the rising "Hindu"

[1] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Makātīb', pp. 52-53.

capitalism which was asserting itself in trade and commerce at the cost of British interests. He said that the only remedy against this disappointing situation was the division of the country; if the Hindus would be unwilling to have trade relations with the British, then Karachi would serve the same purpose as Bombay at that time.[1] Approximately at the same time Mr. J. Coatman, C.I.E., also expressed his opinion in favour of the division. The story has been narrated by Dr. Shawkatullāh Anṣārī in his 'Pakistan—The Problem of India' as follows:

> "In 1930-31 the Reforms were on the anvil and at the First and Second Round Table Conference the Muslims appeared committed to the establishment of an Indian Federation. J. Coatman, C.I.E., writing in 1932 at the time of the Third Round Table Conference, said, 'The creation of a strong, united India...is day by day being made impossible, and in its place it seems that there may be brought into being a powerful Muhammedan state in the North and West, with its eyes definitely turned away from India, towards the rest of the Muslim world of which it forms the fringe....'
>
> "The seed found a fertile soil in the minds of some young Muslims, who were opposed to the All-India Federation and believed that the safeguards which were being provided in the Constitution were useless, and 'our brave but voiceless nation is being crucified on the altar of Hindu nationalism.' In 1933 for the first time the Muslims, hitherto called a minority community, were called a 'nation' by a Punjabi Muslim, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali (an undergraduate of Cambridge), who gave the movement a shape and a form. He propounded the idea that the Punjab, N.W.F.P. (Afghan Provinces),

[1] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Pākistān Kiyā Hay', part I, Delhi, n.d., p. 15; quoting from the 'Madīnah', xx/59, August 21, 1931, p. 4.

> Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan should be formed into a separate Muslim state called Pakistan. This proposal was different from that of Dr. Iqbal in that while Dr. Iqbal proposed the amalgamation of those provinces into a single state forming a unit of the All-India Federation, Chaudhry Rahmat Ali proposed that these provinces should have an independent federation of their own....
>
> "It is significant that questions about Pakistan were asked at this Conference. It is still more significant that the initiative came from the British—they seem, from the record, to have pressed their questions while the Indian (Muslim) delegates seem uninterested and anxious to pass on to the next point.... Although in India no one had heard of or talked of Pakistan and the Muslim Delegation showed no interest in it, yet the Diehard Press and the Churchill-Lloyd group of the Conservative Party waxed eloquent over it and saw in it a suggestion of the gravest import with the result that questions were asked in the Houses of Parliament on several occasions." [1]

Rightly or wrongly, the Jam'iyat and the Deoband leadership which considered the British Imperialism the greatest enemy of Islam and its followers,[2] seriously suspected a British hand in the proposed scheme of the partition of the country and repeatedly warned the Muslims of the dangers involved in it. They also warned them that the scheme, if it materialized, would divide the Muslim community into three groups and would be more harmful to them than to any other community in the sub-continent ; it would be still more ruinous to that group of Muslims

[1] Rājendra Prasād, 'India Divided', Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay, 1947, pp. 206-207 ; quoting from 'Pakistan—The Problem of India' by Dr. Shawkatullāh Anṣārī, pp. 4-7.

[2] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Makātib', p. 59.

who would be left behind in the Hindu provinces as a smaller and less effective minority.[1]

It is true that the Lahore Resolution was vague in many a respect. It did not say anything about the body or the authority that was to frame the constitution. Probably it was to be made by the British Parliament. The nature of the contemplated constitution was also not defined. The actual territorial demarcation of the proposed states was also left untouched. But it was completely silent on the question of the ways and means to enforce the "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards" for the protection of minorities; and this was the point which bothered the Jam'īyat very much. Mr. Jinnāḥ never clarified this point and always insisted upon the acceptance of the principle of partition at first. The Congress was not prepared to accept it, while Mr. Jinnāḥ was equally unprepared to lay down the detailed plan. Under these circumstances, there was much cause for the gravest concern for the future plight of the Muslims who were going to be the residents of India. Extremely bewildered by the situation, the Jam'īyat warned the Muslims of the dangerous game the League was playing at a very high stake. Even as early as 1940 Mawlānā Muḥammad Sajjād of Bihar, one of the geniuses of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā', analysing the Lahore Resolution had remarked that there was nothing in it that could give the least satisfaction to the Muslims living in the Hindu provinces; the Resolution was mainly related to the Muslims of those areas where they were already in a majority. He had recorded his astonishment at the suggestion that the strength of the Muslim provinces would be a guarantee for the safeguards of the Muslims living

[1] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Khuṭbah-'i-Ṣadārat', delivered at the thirteenth session of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind at Lahore in March 1942, and published by the Office of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind Delhi, n.d., p. 43.

in the Hindu majority provinces.[1] The same year Mawlānā Madanī characterized the Pakistan movement as the "death-knell for the Muslims of the areas where they were in a minority."[2] In short, the Jam'īyat leaders were unable to understand the wisdom of the policy advocated by Mr. Jinnāḥ, viz., that "in order to liberate 7 crores of Muslims where they are in a majority he was willing to perform the last ceremony of martyrdom if necessary and let two crores[3] of Muslims be smashed."[4] They were also doubtful about the practicality of the idea embodied in his remark that "as a self-respecting people we in the Muslim minority provinces say boldly that we are prepared to undergo every suffering and sacrifice for the emancipation and liberation of our brethren in regions of Muslim majority[5]....*But the fact is that the creation of these independent states will be the surest guarantee for the fair treatment of the*

[1] Mawlānā Aḥmad Sa'īd, 'Khuṭbah-'i-Ṣadārat', presented at the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' Conference (Meerut Division), February, 1946, and published by Hamdard Press, Delhi, 1946, pp. 26-27 ; quoting from the 'Naqīb' (Patna), n.d.

[2] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, ''Ulamā'-i-Ḥaqq', vol II, p. 136.

[3] It is interesting to note that, as a result of the actual partition of the country in 1947, about 40 million Muslims emerged as the citizens of new India.

[4] Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, 'Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah', (5th ed.), vol. I, collected and edited by Jamīluddīn Aḥmad, Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1952, p. 271.

[5] Giving a footnote in his 'Islam in Modern History' (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, p. 272) to his remark in the text, "It is the Indian Muslims who have chiefly paid for the ambiguities of Pakistan. It is they who have suffered most for the impracticalities and absurdities," Dr. W. C. Smith says : "One must note the 'Qurbān' theory ; that the Indo-Muslims have gladly paid the price for Islam's flourishing in Pakistan. 'It is good that we suffer', they say in effect, 'in order that our brethren might be free.' This is legitimate enough, if it be sincere and not rationalization. However, the disillusionment has been bitter with the discovery, gradually spreading, that Islam in Pakistan, rather than flourishing, has become in large measure the plaything of hypocritical and ineffective politicians."

minorities."[1] [Italics are ours.] They knew well that by this remark Mr. Jinnāḥ was pointing to the "balance theory," but they had their own misgivings on this point. They thought that separation was not necessary and could not be a sure guarantee for inculcating a sense of responsibility in the majority towards the minorities; indeed unity provided a more favourable atmosphere for the growth of this kind of responsibility. What they considered implied in the remark was the sense of fear in the majority in one state of retaliation by another majority in the other state; in other words, minorities were to be doomed to remain as hostages in their respective states. They regarded this position not only as dubious but as foolish and mad.[2] Moreover, according to them, the very idea of maltreatment, meted out by a Muslim Government to a people who had done nothing wrong, was obnoxious and contrary to the tenets of the 'Sharī'ah'.[3] They further asked: what would happen "in case of breach of any of the mandatory safeguards?" Would Pakistan intervene, by show of force, to save the Muslims from the tyranny and oppression of the Hindus? Was this possible at any rate under the present circumstances?[4] And again, the main reason for the demand for Pakistan was the fear of the Hindu oppression of the Muslim minority in a united independent India; if the Hindu majority could be ruthless in perpetrating such atrocities as reported in the Pirpur Report when the Centre was controlled by a third power and when the Muslims were in a substantially effective minority, there was every likelihood that it would behave

[1] Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, 'Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah', vol. I, 5th ed., collected and edited by Jamīluddīn Aḥmad, Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1952, p. 267.

[2] Mawlānā Aḥmad Sa'īd, *op. cit.*, p. 28. [3] *Ibid.*

[4] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Khuṭbah-'i-Ṣadārat', delivered at the fourteenth session of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind at Saharanpur, May, 1945, and published by the Office of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind, Delhi, n.d., p. 39.

more ruthlessly when there would be a strong Hindu Centre and the Muslims would be a much smaller community.

The Deoband leadership opposed the demand for Pakistan also from the viewpoint of the difficulties its realization would involve in the missionary activities of the Muslims. As stated in the previous chapter, it was one of the objectives of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā' to propagate and spread Islam through peaceful missionary work. The atmosphere of hatred and antagonism that surrounded the Indian politics in the wake of the growing popularity of the League demand for a separate homeland, thought the 'ulamā', would hamper the progress of Islam as such and put great obstacles in the way of missionary work. Their contention was that Islam was a proselytizing religion and needed for its spread an atmosphere of love, peace and harmony. Since the very beginning they were alarmed at the spreading tide of communal hatred in the country and were trying their best to check it. They knew that it was not only the Muslims who were responsible for this sorry state of affairs; but they also believed in the mystic truth that "hatred ceaseth not by hatred but by love"; and it was incumbent upon the Muslims not to retaliate in anger. They must have patience and try to win the heart of their fellow-countrymen with a positive approach of love and friendship. Even as early as 1931 Mawlānā Madanī, writing to Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī Nadwī on this important topic and explaining the Brahmanical hatred against Islam—because of the latter's message of equality and fraternity—as a counter-measure to defend the closed Hindu society from succumbing to the all-embracing teachings of the Prophet of Islam, had said:

"You know that it is the Treaty of Ḥudaibīyah[1] which

[1] The Treaty of Ḥudaibīyah was concluded in the sixth year of the 'Hijrah'. "It is remarkable that although the Muslims had already

was a precursor of the conquest of Mecca and that of the whole of Arabia; and the very day the Treaty of Ḥudaibīyah was concluded the Quranic verse إِنَّا فَتَحْنَا (We have given thee victory....) was revealed. 'Umar was surprised at this revelation and said, 'Is this a victory, O Prophet of Allāh?' Good mutual relationships, a decrease in mutual hatred, a studying of the character and teachings of the Muslims and a removal from the hearts of stubbornness—it was these factors which attracted the dear sons of Quraish, made them Muslims and brought them from Mecca to Madinah after the Treaty of Ḥudaibīyah. Khālid ibn-i-Walīd, 'Amr ibn-al 'Āṣ and others—May God be pleased with them—became such devotees of Islam that the very being of Quraish was annihilated.

"In short, mutual relationships result in the removal of mutual hatred and bring people to the fold of Islam, while mutual hatred results in stubbornness in an overlooking of others' good points and constitutes an impediment in the progress of Islam. And Islam being a missionary religion, it is its duty, so far as possible, to absorb others in itself, not to reject them. This is why we should not hate our neighbouring peoples even if they hate us; if they call us unclean and impure

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been victorious in several battles, not one of those victories but a truce, apparently disadvantageous to the Muslims, is made the basis of the triumphant career of Islam. There is no doubt an indication in this (sūrah) that though war was forced on Islam and the Muslims had been victorious, yet its real triumph lay in its moral conquest, gained in Ḥudaibīyah. There was no fighting there, but a truce was concluded which, although not allowing the Muslims to retain any Muslim refugee from Mecca, nevertheless opened the way for people, by laying aside hostilities, to reflect on the beauties of Islam. The truce at Ḥudaibīyah was thus a moral victory, and regarded, as it is, as the basis of the future conquests of Islam." (See Mawlawī Muḥammad 'Alī, 'The Holy Qur-án', The "Islamic Review" Office, England, 1917, p. 981).

we should not do so; if they regard us as untouchables, we should not behave in such a way; and if they tyrannize over us, we should not be tyrannical and unjust towards them. Islam is a compassionate father and a kind mother. It is a well-wishing consul, a religion that attracts peoples and a sympathiser of humanity. It ill-behoves it to requite evil with evil; on the contrary, this constitutes the wall of Gog and Magog against Islam. 'Kufr' has never been just to Islam and the Quranic verse, إِنْ يَظْهَرُوا عَلَيْكُمْ لَا يَرْقُبُوا فِيكُمْ إِلًّا وَلَا ذِمَّةً (If they prevail against you, they would not pay regard in your case to ties of relationship, nor those of covenant) is an unimpeachable witness of this. But Islam never abandoned justice, equity and active goodness; nor was it appropriate for it to do so, even though the instinct of revenge wanted all this. And if some worldly kings have done any injustice or tyranny, it is they who are responsible for it for Islam does not tolerate any of this."[1]

We find the same theme in his speech delivered on 19 September, 1945, in Delhi and addressed particularly to the 'ulamā' on the occasion of the formation of the Āzād Muslim Parliamentary Board to fight the last constitutional battle against the demand for Pakistan in the general elections of 1945-46. He is reported to have said:

"At the termination of the Muslim rule there were about 25 million Muslims in India. Within a period of less than a century their number increased up to 100 million. The missionary work of the 'ulamā' has a great share in this increase. Compassion and kindness, justice and equity, mutual good relationships and service to mankind—these are the fundamental principles for the

[1] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Maktūbāt-i-Shaikh-ul-Islām', vol. I, compiled by Najmuddīn Iṣlāḥī, Maṭba' Ma'ārif, Azamgarh, 1952, pp. 157-58.

preaching of Islam. These principles, when acted upon, have led to the progress of Islam.

"The great object of an over-all spread of Islam in the whole of India cannot be realized by appealing to passions of hatred and antagonism. It is the non-Muslims who are the field of action for the 'tablīgh' of Islam and form the raw material for this splendid activity. To-day, by propagating hatred towards the Hindus, this field is being closed and this material wasted. It is contrary to the universal message of our great Prophet (Peace be upon him).

"Our object is to bridge the gulf of hatred which is being created by the protagonists of the scheme of Pakistan; we are opposed to the idea of limiting the right of missionary activities of Islam within any particular area. The Muslims have got a right in all the nooks and corners of India by virtue of the great struggle and grand sacrifices of their ancestors in this country. Now it is our duty to maintain that claim and try to widen its scope, instead of giving it up."[1]

Above all, Deoband was convinced that the western-educated League leadership was exploiting the fair name of Islam for the wordly gain of the Muslim vested interests which, knowing fully well that the ignorant Muslim masses could only be won over by appealing to their religious emotions, had given the slogan that in a united India Islam would be in danger. As indicated before, the Deoband conception of Islam was mainly in a legal form. It was traditional, orthodox and conservative. It could not accept any new interpretation of Islam. But it is also significant that the League leadership, mainly cut off from the Islamic past and educated in a different mould of intellectual traditions, failed to produce an Islamic ideology. There was nothing positive in its programme. The Muslim

[1] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, 'ʻUlamā'-i-Ḥaqq', vol. II, pp. 340-41.

League remained a negative movement through and through. Its responsible leaders always evaded all the basic questions put forward by their followers as well as opponents. Even Aligarh which can legitimately be called the intellectual arsenal of the movement, remained, till the last moment, confused about the kind of society that was going to be built up in Pakistan. Islamic democracy, Islamic socialism and the terms like these were frequently used, but what they meant by them was never elaborated. For this intellectual bankruptcy and ideological confusion Pakistan had subsequently to pay a very high price, in spite of the sincere efforts of some of its leaders to improve the situation.

Deoband was, however, certain that men like Mr. Jinnāḥ and Nawābzādah Liyāqat 'Alī Khāṉ, were incapable of building up an Islamic state in Pakistan. Neither their educational training nor their mental make-up was suited to strive for such a high ideal. Experiences had shown that they had no respect for the tenets of the 'Sharī'ah'. They spoke of the comprehensiveness of the Islamic law when they had to address the Muslims in order to win their support for their leadership; but in legislatures and in private life they did not care for its application. For example, the stand taken by Mr. Jinnāḥ on the Sharī'at Bill of 1935, moved by Ḥāfiẓ 'Abdullāh of Layallpur, was shocking to the 'Ulamā'.[1] As a result, the 'Ulamā' concluded that Pakistan would be a state based on the secular principles of western type of government and it would be no more different from the Kamalist Turkey.[2] This is why they were not prepared to sacrifice

[1] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī, 'Sharī'at Bil awr Līg', Office of the Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind, Delhi, n.d., pp. 5-9.

[2] Mawlānā Ḥusain Aḥmad Madanī wrote to one of his disciples in 1943 about the un-Islamic behaviour of the League leadership and said: "Are the Leaguers not, like Muṣṭafà Kamāl, Muslim only in name?" (See Madanī, 'Maktūbāt-i-Shaikh-ul-Islām', vol. I, p. 254.)

the Muslims of the Hindu majority provinces for a secular state[1] where the Swiss and the French legal codes were going to be applied or the 'Sharī'ah' was to be tampered with to meet the worldly requirements of a materialistic state. In 1940 Mawlānā Madanī, while presiding over the twelfth session of the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind at Jaunpur, remarked :

> "These days the Pakistan movement is very popular among the [Muslim] masses. If it means the establishment in the Muslim majority provinces of an Islamic state based on the Prophetic traditions and the commandments of Islam, viz. 'ḥudūd', 'qiṣāṣ' and others, then it is really a very noble cause and no Muslim will have any objection to it.' But the fact is that, under the present circumstances, ‹nobody can imagine the possibility of such a venture."[2]

Although there were leaders who, from the League platform, gave the impression that in Pakistan a sort of Islamic state based on the principles of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, would be established,[3] yet Mr. Jinnāḥ himself

[1] Ḥusain Aḥmad Madani, 'Khuṭbah-'i-Ṣadārat', Lahore, p. 43.

[2] Sayyid Muḥammad Miyāṇ, ''Ulamā'-i-Ḥaqq', vol. II, p. 136.

[3] On 9 November, 1945, Nawāb Ismā'īl Khān told his audience at Allahabad that the ideal objective of Muslim League was the achievement of Pakistan. It was its ambition to establish a state based on the holy 'Sharī'ah' and the political philosophy of Islam. (See Mawlānā Aḥmad Sa'īd, *op. cit.*, p. 19.) It is important to note that such utterances of responsible League leaders impressed a large number of 'ulamā' of different schools and also a small section of the Deobandī 'ulamā' led by Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uthmānī, and they not only supported the demand for Pakistan with full vigour but also many of them migrated to that cherished land in high hopes. Even Mawlānā Mawdūdī, for long an opponent of Muslim nationalism and the idea of separation and extremely critical of both the Jam'īyat and the League, went to Pakistan which he rationalized as the would-be laboratory for practical experiments in the religio-political philosophy of Islam. During the last twelve

seemed very clear about the problem in so far as the nature of the future constitution of Pakistan was concerned. It is true that there are some casual references in his various statements and speeches to Islam, the Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet ;[1] but it is also true that he never dreamt of making Pakistan a religious state.[2] He was certainly inspired by the Kamalist Revolution and, perhaps, aspired to make the same experiment in Pakistan as Muṣṭafā Kamāl had done in Turkey. In 1938 he exhorted the Muslims at Patna to be up and doing by remarking that in Kamāl Ataturk the Islamic world had lost a great hero. With the example of that great man in front of them as an inspiration, would the Muslims of India remain in quagmire ?[3] In March, 1948, replying to the speech made by the first Turkish ambassador to Pakistan, he said "the exploits of your leaders in many a historic field of battle, the progress of your Revolution, the rise and career of the great Ataturk, his revitalisation of your nation by his great statesmanship, courage and foresight—all these stirring events are well-known to the people of Pakistan."[4] On 11 August, 1947,

years in Pakistan we find a sharp conflict again between the 'ulamā' and the western-educated intelligentsia. India was divided but it did not mean the end of the conflict created by the dualism in the Muslim educational system in the pre-partition days.

[1] cf. Mr. Jinnāḥ's speech at the Frontier Muslim League Conference, Peshawar, 21 November, 1945, in ' Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah ', vol. II, pp. 436-45 ; and also ' Quaid-e-Azam Speaks ', Pak Publicity, Karachi, n.d., pp. 18, 24, 40, 78-79.

[2] Mr. Jinnāḥ, speaking at the Muslim University Union, Aligarh, on 2 November, 1941, said : "Telling them [the Hindus and the Sikhs] that it [Pakistan] would be a religious state excluding them from all power, is entirely untrue." (See ' Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah ', vol. I, p. 344.)

[3] Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnaḥ, ' Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah ', vol. I, p. 76.

[4] Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, ' Quaid-e-Azam Speaks ', Pak Publicity. Karachi, n.d., pp. 98-99

delivering his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, he declared:

> "You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State.... You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State."[1]

These remarks of Mr. Jinnāḥ have been quoted to give a glimpse of his ideas and intentions regarding the nature of the Pakistani State and Government. The 'ulamā' were aware of this and this is why, conservative and orthodox as they were, they were unwilling to support a scheme which they interpreted as being sheerly worldly and which meant, according to them, a very high price in terms of the future plight of Islam and the Muslims in divided India.

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

Conclusion

WE HAVE SEEN in the previous chapters how the traditionalist 'ulamā' reacted against the British penetration in India with all its consequences, political, cultural and religious ; we have also seen their anxiety and struggle to rehabilitate the past glory of Islam. We have studied their striving for the preservation of the legacy of Islam inherited from their medieval past. Their anxiety was genuine and their struggle justified ; but the verdict of history was against them. The British succeeded and with their political ascendancy arose problems which posed themselves as a deep crisis in Indian Islam. This crisis was manifold as it was the result of the impact of a new culture on an old dying system. There was only one man among those trained in the Old School, who almost succeeded in comprehending and guaging the depth of the new problems ; and that was Sir Sayyid who tried in his own way to meet the challenges of the new age. But a very important section of the old guards was reluctant to change the traditional mode of thinking. Yes, we, certainly, find a semi-conscious awareness on their part of the herald of a new era ; but their attention was fully absorbed in the great task of preserving and protecting the traditional Muslim culture. The leader of this section was Mawlānā Nānawtawī. Thus Sir Sayyid and Mawlānā Nānawtawī or, in other words, Aligarh and Deoband, in the final analysis, emerge as the champions of the new and the old respectively. It was really unfortunate for Indian Islam, as has been the case in almost all the Muslim countries, that no serious, conscious and

continuous attempt was made to produce a synthesis between the two. Aligarh and Deoband, during their tortuous intellectual journey, did produce two landmarks, Nadwat-ul-'Ulamā' (Lucknow). and Jāmi'ah Millīyah Islāmīyah (Delhi), but, in course of time, they were swept away by the two strong and different strands in their very *bona fides* ; in Nadwah the old, the conservative strand was stronger and in Jāmi'ah the new, the modern. None represented a harmonious synthesis. Therefore the conflict was never resolved. To the present writer this conflict in the very bases of the Muslim society in the modern period of India, has been a very serious factor in fragmenting it into two groups, not only in religious and cultural fields but also in political and economic matters. The cultural and political history of Muslim India after 1857 revolves around it and cannot be fully understood and appreciated unless approached from this angle. It is also extremely and equally important to note that exclusively Muslim and Islamic problems arising out of this basic factor, became more complicated because of the presence of a great Hindu majority in the sub-continent.

As indicated in the fourth chapter, Aligarh and Deoband finally emerged as the two rival camps in the momentous task of deciding the final destiny of Islam in a predominantly Hindu India. After 1940, when the attention of the majority of the Indian Muslims was focussed on the demand for Pakistan, these two centres of Muslim learning collided against each other, each accusing the other of doing fatal damage to the cause of Islam. Pakistan was, however, achieved and in its achievement one can read the triumph of Aligarh. But it is too early to pass any judgement on a point about which only future history can give its final verdict.

To an impartial observer, however, the most interesting phenomenon in the whole story is the equally emphatic claim by both the parties of having done whatever they did

in the interest of Islam and the Muslims. As we have seen, Deoband, from the very beginning, was the champion of preserving Islam and protecting the Muslim culture. Then why did it oppose the demand for a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims where they could preserve Islam as well as those cultural values which it epitomized as *the* Muslim culture, without any danger from any non-Muslim quarter to threaten these ? It is a big question, no doubt ; and to the best of his ability the writer has tried to give the right answer. The crux of its opposition lay in its traditional conception of Islam, and the leadership of the Pakistan movement being in the hands of the western-educated Muslims, it had sufficient reason to be alarmed at the future fate of its "Islam" in Pakistan. Moreover, it was quite clear from the very inception of the scheme of partition that it was not going to solve the Indian communal tangle. There would be millions of Muslims left behind in "Hindu" India. What would happen to them ? Would Islam be banished from the areas where the Muslims were in a minority ? Where would that Muslim culture which flourished in Delhi, Lucknow, Patna and Hyderabad go ? These were the questions which Deoband asked but to which it got no satisfactory answer from its rival. Then there was the question of leadership. The 'ulamā' thought that it was only they who could give the right lead to the Muslims. They had the comprehensive knowledge of the teachings of the Qur'ān while the League leadership was neither interested in them nor was it intellectually equipped to encompass Islamic teachings as a whole. On the other side, the moderns treated them as orthodox, conservative and entirely ignorant of the requirements of the modern complex life ; hence incapable of giving a correct lead to the Muslims. Thus there was no meeting ground and the gulf kept on widening.

Now, when India has been partitioned and Pakistan has come to stay, it can be safely concluded that "Indian" Islam

has embarked on a new career in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. The age-long conflict of the old and the new is still going on on both sides. If Pakistan succeeds, in the long run, to produce a new interpretation of Islam—an Islam that contains all the best and healthiest elements of its centuries-old historic traditions and also provides reasonably suitable answers to the challenges modernity poses today—then and, perhaps only then its existence and all the sufferings that the Muslims of India had to undergo in the wake of its birth, can be justified. For certainly in this very development would lie the strength of Pakistan as a Muslim power, the realization of Iqbal's dreams and the consolation for the Muslim citizens of new India. On the Indian side of the border, the challenges are equally serious and indeed, in view of the presence of a vast non-Muslim majority, much stronger than before 1947, they are more complex and hard pressing. Unlike the Pakistani Muslims, their destiny is tied up with their fellow-countrymen who have their own ambitions and aspirations. They are the citizens of an India where, under the impact of many diversified influences, great social and cultural changes are taking place. Now it is the test of the genius of the Indian Muslims how they emerge out of this difficult and confusing situation, maintaining their Islamic individuality as well as proving themselves as modern citizens of a democratic secular India. Is it not an irony of history that those who till yesterday were struggling for the establishment of an Islamic state (at least the general masses understood it so), have been left behind to reconcile themselves to a secular idea of government ? Not only this, but now it is in their own interest to participate with all the resources at their command to strengthen all democratic secular forces in India. These are challenging problems ; and the irony of the situation is that the state they created with their blood would be of no use in their difficulties ; on the other hand, it may, for a while, be a distracting and disturbing factor in their struggle for existence. However,

it is a fantastic conjecture to say that "in a hundred years, perhaps in a shorter time, the Muslim people may cease to exist"[1] in India. This is nothing but trying to seek a psychological satisfaction for the partition of the Indian sub-continent. The justification of the creation of Pakistan does not lie in the annihilation of forty million Muslims in India; its justification lies, as suggested above, in the flourishing in Pakistan of a balanced modern Islam worthy of a glorious past and capable of meeting the challenges of the twentieth century. That is the positive attitude which the Pakistani intellectuals should adopt. As for India, there is evidence that there will be Islam and there will be Muslims; and, let us hope, it will be Indian Islam and it will be Indian Muslims.

[1] Ishtiyāq Ḥusain Quraishī, "The Foundations of Pakistani Culture", 'The Muslim World', xliv/1, January, 1954.

Glossary

AHL-I-ḤADĪTH : An Indian Muslim group that owes its origin to the controversy that occupied the minds of some of the Indian 'Ulamā' in the first half of the nineteenth century with regard to the reasonableness of adopting without investigation the religious and legal interpretations of the individuals that belonged to different schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The controversy, though old, was for the first time explicitly raised on the Indian scene by Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd who, it is said, came under the influence of the Wahhabis during his pilgrimage to Mecca. On his return to India he presented himself as one unprepared to accept in matters of religion the obligation of any individual authority without investigating his reasons. His spiritual guide, Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd, thought that conditions prevailing at that time were not favourable for indulging in matters of secondary importance. After his death the controversy sharpened and consequently there emerged a group of people called 'Ahl-i-Ḥadīth' who rejected the 'taqlīd' (see 'Taqlīd' in this very section) of all the schools of 'fiqh' and upheld the cause of literal and consistent reference to and rigid and faithful conformity with the Prophetic traditions. In the second half of the nineteenth century, thanks to the academic status and powerful personalities of Nawāb Ṣiddīq Ḥasan and Sayyid Naẓīr Ḥusain Muḥaddith, their influence increased and they became an organized school worthy of being reckoned with.

BARELAWĪ SCHOOL : This is an offshoot of the Khairābādī School which drew inspiration from 'Allāmah Faẓl-i-Ḥaqq Khairābādī, a contemporary of Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd, with whom he differed regarding certain theological issues. The school is called Barelawī, because Mawlawi Aḥmad Raẓā Khān of Barelī (a town in U. P.), an 'ālim' of repute, organized and provided it with a violent stand against the Deoband School and others that refused to condemn Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd as 'kāfir' or the misled and stood for reform and rejuvenation of the Indian Muslim Community. It accepted the prevailing superstitions and corruptions and championed the cause of saint-worship and other accretions. In jurisprudence, like Deoband, it follows the 'Ḥanafī Maẓhab' and "allows no modern re-interpretation of the law." Politi-

cally, the school, as a whole, has been reactionary. It is still active and represents the most ignorant and morbid section of the Muslim community in India.

CHISHTĪYAH : One of the principal and most important mystic orders in India. A famous ṣūfī saint, Khwājah Abū Isḥāq (d. A.D. 940) founded it in Chisht from where it came to India in the wake of the Turkish invasion in the twelfth century. Khwājah Mu'īnuddīn Sijzī, whose tomb at Ajmēr attracts thousands of Hindus and Muslims every year, was its originator on the Indian soil. His spiritual attainment and that of his gifted successors, Shaikh Quṭbuddīn Bakhtiyār Kākī (d. A.D. 1235), Shaikh Farīduddīn of Ajodhan (1175-1265) and Sulṭān-ul-Awliyā Shaikh Niẓāmuddīn, lent it lustre and in course of time it developed and flourished to such an extent that even Chisht looked towards India for inspiration. As an organized spiritual movement the Chishtī order became very popular and, in spite of occasional lapses, has been throughout the centuries a living force in the Indian Muslims' religious life. The main cause behind its popularity and wide-spread influence was its catholocity of views, simplicity, toleration, a practical understanding of the Indian environment, emphasis on internal reforms rather than the formal external behaviour, complete indifference to the state and total disregard for the pomp of wordly life.

DĀR AL-ISLĀM : According to Muslim constitutional theory the world is divided into 'Dār al-Islām' (Abode of Islam), 'Dār al-Ḥarb' (Abode of War) and 'Dār al-Ṣulḥ' or 'Dār al-'Ahd' (Abode of Peace). Dār al-Islām "is that which is already under Muslim rule." 'Dār al-Ḥarb' "is that which is not, but which, actually or potentially, is a seat of war for Muslims until by conquest it is turned into 'Dār al-Islām'." (See the 'Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam', E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1953, pp. 68-9.) 'Dār al-Ṣulḥ' or 'Dār al-'Ahd' is that with which 'Dār al-Islām' has entered into agreement to maintain peace and the former has promised to remain "in tributary relationship to Islam." This is the constitutional position; but later the situation changed and adjustments had to be made. Now land, once 'Dār al-Islām', could be declared 'Dār al-Ḥarb' only if (1) the infidels wielded real authority and exercised it in such a way that the ordinances of Islam were abolished or retained according to their pleasure and (2) the Muslims and 'dhimmīs' enjoyed no protection any longer. Once in such a land it was incumbent upon Muslims to migrate to some Muslim land or, withdrawing themselves to an area not under the occupation of the infidel power, to make an organized and armed effort (jihād) to drive away the usurper. During

the British rule in India, however, there was a difference of opinion among the 'Ulamā' with regard to India as being 'Dār al-Islām' or 'Dār al-Ḥarb'. Some held the view that as the British were so powerful that they could impose their own legal decisions without any check or challenge, India was 'Dār al-Ḥarb' for the Muslims; while the others regarded it as 'Dār al-Islam' on the ground that the Muslims were free to observe the Islamic rituals and their personal law as embodied in the 'Sharī'ah'.

DHIMMĪ: Dhimmī is from 'Dhimmah' meaning covenant or obligation. In Muslim constitutional law the non-Muslim population of a country conquered by Muslims, if it does not embrace Islam and agrees to pay tax ('jizyah'), is termed as 'ahl al-dhimmah' or 'dhimmīs'. They are guaranteed, in turn, security of life and property, complete religious freedom and defence against others. They are exempt from any kind of military service: but if they voluntarily offer their services, no 'jizyah' is levied upon them. This is an obligation (dhimmah) which the Muslims have to fulfil. On the other hand, if there is any laxity on their part and they continue to exact the tax, they are charged with going beyond the limit fixed by God. and this is 'ẓulm'.

FARĀ'IḌ: The name given to the Muslim laws of inheritance. The jurists of Islam attached great importance to them and "were never tired of repeating the saying of the Prophet: Learn the laws of inheritance, and teach them to the people; for they are one half of useful knowledge." (Asaf A. A. Fyzee, 'Outlines of Muhammadan Law', Oxford University Press, 1955, p. 329, quoting from 'Sirājīyah', tr. A. Rumsey, Calcutta, 1890.) According to the Ḥanafī jurists there are three principal classes: (I) Quranic heirs ('aṣḥāb al-farā'iḍ'), (II) Agnatic heirs ('aṣabat') and (III) Uterine heirs (dhawū al-arḥām). To explain it further: "The properties of the deceased goes, in the first instance, to the Koranic Heirs, Class I. If the estate is not exhausted by them, or failing them, it goes to the Agnatic Heirs, Class II. And finally, in the absence of heirs of Class I and Class II, the property is distributed among the Uterine Heirs. Class III." (Asaf A. A. Fyzee, *op. cit.*, p. 336.) The whole science of the laws of inheritance is known as ''ilm al-farā'iḍ'.

FIQH: Literally the word means "knowledge", "Understanding", "Comprehension". It is, however, the name given to jurisprudence in Islam which covers all the aspects of the Muslims' collective and individual life. The laws that regulated the public and private life of the

Muslims were based on religion; the science of these laws came to be known as 'fiqh'. The origin and development of Muslim jurisprudence have a long and interesting history in course of which a number of schools of 'fiqh' arose and sometimes led to heated controversy. There are, however, four main schools known as 'Madhāhib' (Sing. 'Madhhab'), which were finally recognized and accepted by the Sunni branch of Islam. They are 'Ḥanafī', 'Shāfi'ī', 'Mālikī', and 'Ḥanbalī' known respectively after the names of the four Imams: (1) Imām Abū Ḥanīfah (700-67). (2) Muḥammad Bin Idrīs Al-Shāfi'ī (767-820), (3) Mālik Bin Anas (715-95) and Aḥmad Bin Ḥanbal (780-855). These four schools developed independently and differed in minor details, their approach in applying the sources and the colour that the local surroundings gave to their interpretation and method of codification. These schools have survived to the present day and prevail in different parts of the Muslim world. The Ḥanafī Maẓhab, which claims the loyalty of the greater part of the Muslim world, has been the dominant 'fiqh' in the Indo-Pak sub-continent.

'UṢŪL-I-FIQH

'Uṣūl is the plural of 'aṣl' which means "root", "Principle". "In the usual classification of Muslim Sciences, the ''Uṣūl-i-Fiqh' are generally defined as the methodology of Muslim jurisprudence, as the science of the proofs which lead to the establishment of legal standards in general." ('The Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam', p. 611). They are four: 'Qur'ān', 'Sunnah' (deeds, utterances and unspoken approval of Prophet Muḥammad), 'Ijmā'' (agreement of the people who, by virtue of knowledge, are entitled to form independent opinion) and 'Qiyās' (the deduction of legal prescriptions from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah by reasoning by analogy). Besides, there are two more methods of reasoning, 'istiḥsān' and 'istiṣlāḥ', that fall in the realm of 'Qiyās' and approximately mean the doctrine of "good and equity".

ḤADĪTH: Though the word literally means a communication or narrative, it has a technical meaning that applies to the copious record of deeds, utterances and unspoken approval of the Prophet of Islam and his companions. This was the Sunnah or the tradition which the Muslim community had to follow. The communication of these traditions was verbal and it required a high sense of honesty and integrity on the part of the narrators. With the expansion of Islam outside Arabia new situations arose, new ideas and institutions were borrowed and new customs and social influences had to be incorporated in the Muslim body-politic. However, the standard for the rule of conduct that

governed the Muslim community remained the same. Consequently, in order to meet the new situations and also the requirement of the interested factions that were growing fast, there arose the practice of fabricating false traditions and once the beginning was made, it could not be stopped. The result was that in course of time the number of forged traditions far exceeded the number of the authentic ones. It was really shocking. Even the authenticity of sound traditions became doubtful. Hence arose the need to examine the current traditions and sift the sound and correct from the weak, false and fabricated ones. Thus developed the science which is termed as ''ilm al-Ḥadīth' or ''Uṣūl-i-Ḥadīth'. The traditions were classified under various categories according to the nature of their 'isnād' (the chain of transmission), the authenticity of 'isnād', their being related to the Prophet and his companions and other considerations. The investigation and research that were involved in this stupendous task led to the development of the ''ilm al-rijāl' (science of the authorities and chain of transmitters of a 'ḥadīth') and a high standard of criticism of the authorities known as 'al-jarḥ wa'l-ta'dīl'. There were differences of opinion also among the scholars about minor details in this regard. But they were mostly based on sincerity of purpose and different persons or schools did their job with honesty and integrity. Then, in the ninth century when "a certain unanimity had been attained on all questions of law and doctrine and a definite opinion regarding the value of most traditions had been formed by the majority of Muslim scholars," ('The Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam', p. 119), a number of collections were prepared by scholars of distinction and repute called 'Muḥaddithīn'. They compiled their volumes with utmost care and deep devotion. They travelled far and wide and men like Bukhārī (d. 870) spent almost their whole lifetime in collecting and examining the traditions. Hundreds of thousands of weak and invented traditions were rejected by them. There were two types of collections: (1) Collections arranged according to 'isnād' and called 'musnad' and (2) collections arranged according to the subject matter and known as 'muṣannaf'. The 'Ṣiḥāḥ Sittah' (the six sound and reliable collections) belong to this 'muṣannaf' type and are generally recognized by the Sunni Muslims as the most authoritative. They are: (1) 'Bukhārī', (2) 'Muslim', (3) 'abū dā'ūd', (4) 'al-Tirmidhī', (5) 'al-Nasā'ī' and (6) 'Ibn Mājah'. The Shi'is, however, have their own collections based on another set of 'isnād'.

IJTIHĀD: The word means "exerting oneself to the utmost degree to attain an object," but technically its meaning is the utmost effort to understand the points of law (in Muslim jurisprudence) and form an

opinion. Traditionally, its true nature, "as understood from the discourse of scholars, is exhaustive endeavour in understanding the derivative principles of the Holy Canon Law by means of detailed arguments, their 'genera' being based on four departments : (1) The Holy Book, (2) The Example and Precept of the Prophet, (3) The consensus of Opinion of the Muslim community and (4) the Application of Analogy." (Shāh Walī-ullāh, ''Iqd al-jīd fī Aḥkām al-ijtihād wa al-Taqlīd ', Mujtabā'ī Press, Delhi, 1344 A.H., translation by M. D. Rahbar for the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal.) Actually, the gate of ' ijtihād ' is closed for centuries and the Muslim society has remained stagnant simply by refusing to accept that there have been challenges constantly posed by new situations. In recent times, however, there have been attempts, though on a very limited scale, to reconstruct religious thought in Islam.

NAQSHBANDĪYAH : It is one of the earliest mystic orders and owes its origin to the great ṣūfī saint Khwājah Aḥmad (d. 1166), popularly known as Ata Yasvi. He was succeeded by Khwājah 'Abdul Khāliq Ghajdawānī (d. 1179) who gave it "a distinct spiritual philosophy," and endeavoured to popularize it. Till then it was called the Order of the Khwājgān ; but later it came to be known as the Naqshabandī order after the name of Khwājah Bahā'uddīn Naqshband (d. 1388) who, out of the traditions of the first two Khwājahs, made the magnificent edifice of the order and gave it a solid foundation. Khwājah Naqshband laid much emphasis on the faithful observance of the ' Sunnah ' and declared that "whosoever refuses to follow my path places himself in danger." (cf. ' Nafaḥāt ul-Uns '.) To India it was brought by Khwājah Bāqī Billāh (d. 1603) who used to say : "I brought the holy seedling from Samarkand and Bukhara and implanted it on the blessed Indian soil." His gifted disciple, Shaikh Aḥmad (d. 1624) of Sirhind, consolidated and popularized it in this country and after him it came to be known as ' Silsilah-'i-Mujaddidyah-Naqshbandīyah '.

QĀDIRĪYAH : The Ṣūfī order that was perhaps the earliest but reached India in the middle of the fifteenth century. It was founded by Shaikh Muḥī'uddīn 'Abdul Qādir Gīlānī (1077-1166), "one of the most outstanding figures in the annals of Islamic mysticism. His sermons, collected in ' Al-Fatḥ-al-Rabbānī ' are, according to Prof. Margoliouth, ' some of the very best in Moslem literature : the spirit which they breathe is one of charity and philanthropy.' " (Khālīq Aḥmad Niẓāmī, ' Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India During the Thirteenth Century ', Muslim University, Aligarh, 1961, pp. 57-58.) The Shaikh

himself, in his own lifetime, gave it a firm spiritual foundation and sent his disciples to distant places to preach the spiritual gospel of Islam. The order was introduced in India by Shāh Ni'matullāh Qādirī and was popularized in the Mughal period by eminent persons like Makhdūm Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir Sānī and Shaikh 'Abdul Ḥaqq Muḥaddith.

SUHRAWARDĪYAH : A mystic order that flourished in India side by side with the Chishtīyah order. Shaikh 'Abdul Qāhir (1097-1168) of Suhraward founded it, but it gained prominence through the intellectual and spiritual endeavours of Shaikh Shihābuddīn Suhrawardy (d. 1234), a close relation of the founder. Many of his distinguished disciples came to India, among whom Shaikh Bahā'uddīn Zakarīyā (1182-1262) was the most influential personality and it was he who organized the order on a sound footing. He established his centre at Multan, a strategically significant area during those days, and gathered around him a number of tested disciples who carried the spiritual message of the order down to distant places in Sind. Unlike its counterpart, the Chishtīyah, the Suhrawardīyah order laid much emphasis on the formal side of religion and was not, in any way, indifferent towards a reasonable worldly life. The Suhrawardy Shaikhs did not look down upon politics as something which destroys the soul. They accumulated wealth and made a distinction between the common people and the select few. Perhaps, this is why that, unlike the Chishtīyah, its influence remained confined to a particular area.

TAQLĪD : Literally it means, "to hang something upon the neck or the shoulder," but in Muslim religious terminology its meaning is following an authority in words or deeds without investigating his reasons. Thus it stands as opposite to 'ijtihād'. It owes its origin to the formation of the juridical schools and their recognition by the world of Islam as the authoritative codifications of the Muslim 'Sharī'ah'. Now the Orthodox Muslim view was that unlimited 'ijtihād', could no longer be permitted and any laxity in this regard would lead to disintegration of the Muslim body-politic. There were reasons for this attitude : firstly, "definite conceptions had been formed about the 'mudjtahid' i.e., the person qualified for independent derivation of 'fikh' rules from the sources," ('The Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam', p. 563) ; and secondly, from the ninth century on, the ruling class had started giving more consideration to political interests of its own, neglecting religion and sometimes even ready to sacrifice the religious commandments at the altar of power politics. The piety of early Islam was gone and the idea of this-worldliness dominated the behaviour

of the court and its entourage of which a section of influential 'Ulamā' formed an important part. Now even the 'Ulamā' class, as a whole, could not be relied upon. No doubt, through all the centuries of decline and degeneration, Islamic history was never devoid of upright and conscientious men of learning and 'Ulamā' of piety and integrity ; yet they were few and most of them were of the opinion that the collective moral good of the community lay in ' taqlīd '.

Thus there was a general consensus of opinion, i.e. ' ijmā' ' about ' taqlīd '. Even the scholars could not be allowed to go beyond the bounds of the ' ijmā' '. They were also bound to ' taqlīd '. It was, however, expected from them that they would be fully aware of the correctness of the ' ijtihād ' of their ' mujtahids '. They were also free to choose one of the several ' mujtahids ' of the school they belonged to and also they could make a new choice from amongst the ' mujtahids ' of schools other than theirs. They were all called ' muqallids ' i.e. those who go by ' taqlīd '. In course of time it became more rigid and devoid of all toleration. People forgot the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and Islam came to be represented by the four recognized ' madhahib '. 'Ulemā' and laymen both participated in condemning all independent thinking. There were, however, occasional protests against this cult of ' taqlīd ' but beside the Ẓāhirīs, we find for the first time consistent emphasis on the rejection of ' taqlīd ' in its traditional form in Ibn Taimīyah and Ibn Qaiyyim who were Ḥanbalī and constantly referred "to the authorities of the 'good old times' (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ)." (' The Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam ', p. 564.) In recent times the wahhābīs and the modernists have equally championed the cause of ' ijtihād ', the former because of their having intellectual affinity with the two Ḥanbalīs mentioned before, and the latter because of their anxiety to meet the challenges of modernity.

WAHHABĪS : The Islamic community founded by Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-87) and called by its opponents as the "wahhābīyah". Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb was born in the Wādīye Ḥanīfah (Nejd) and his advent proved a turning point in Islamic history. During the course of his travels and studies he came under the influence of sufism which later he almost shook off and was attracted by the intellectual crusade of Ibn Taimīyah, 'a bitter enemy of innovations, [who had] attacked the cult of saints and pilgrimages to tombs." He regarded himself as a Sunni and followed the Ḥanablī school of ' fiqh ' as interpreted by Ibn Taimīyah ; so do his followers. That God is not only to be cherished and contemplated but is to be obeyed and His will to be acted upon is the crux of Ibn Taimīyah's arguments against the

philosophers, theologians and ṣūfīs. He was against 'taqlīd'. His call to return to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah and his emphasis on the right of 'ijtihād' were bold endevours in the face of the established religious practices and existing institutionalized religion. The same theme is found, of course, with a determination to implement, in the teachings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb. He did not preach any new religion, but he rejected many a thing. He "rejected the corruption and laxity of the contemporary decline. [He] rejected too the accommodations and cultural richness of the medieval empire. [He] rejected the introvert warmth and other-worldly piety of the mystic way. [He] rejected also the alien intellectualism not only of philosophy but of theology." (Wilfred C. Smith, 'Islam in Modern History', Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 42.) In all these rejections nobody can discern the rejection of even a single element of Islam ; and in 1815 the "principal learned men" of Cairo, after scrutinizing his treatises, had "declared unanimously that if such were the opinions of the Wahabys, they themselves belonged altogether to that creed." (Burckhardt, 'Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys' vol. II, Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley, 1831, pp. 112-13.) Then why so much opposition to it ? Perhaps, to some extent, the answer may be discovered in the socio-political environment that prevailed in Arabia and the regions that surrounded it, and, to some extent, in the fanaticism of the sect that went beyond the true spirit of Islamic toleration. There was much propaganda against them, the nature of which was mostly political. The Ottomans, who followed the 'Ḥanafī Maẓhab', were not so much concerned with their being quasi-Hanbalite or against 'taqlīd'. They saw in the expanding Wahhābī movement a challenge to their political domination and asked Muḥammad 'Alī of Egypt to suppress it. On the Indian scene the British adopted, more or less, the same attitude towards the growing influence of the movement launched by Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd and, keeping a watchful eye on its activities, organized a propaganda compaign dubbing it as inspired by the doctrines of the Arabian Wahhābīs. The reactionary elements in the Indian Muslim community and those who suspected and smelled a sort of Nejdi colouring in it, fell a prey to this political move of the British and declared its adherents as "Wahhābīs."

WALĪULLĀH : Shāh Walīullāh, the prodigious son of Shāh 'Abdur Raḥīm (1054/1644-1131/1718) who had collaborated in the preparation of 'Fatāwà 'Ālamgīrī', is counted among those few distinguished thinkers of the world of Islam whose contribution to Islamic learning is original and whose influence on the subsequent generations has been tremendous. Within the scope of the Islamic traditional sciences he

was versatile and wrote with almost equal competence on all religious subjects. His knowledge was comprehensive and his 'Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah' stands as a living testimony to his encyclopaedic knowledge and original thinking. Unlike Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, he accepted the medieval achievements including sufism but believed in rejuvenation and tried "to postulate an interpretation of Islam that would coalesce a purified sufism with a purified Sunnah." (W. C. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 45.) In 'fiqh' he was not rigid. He preferred the Ḥanafī School as he was inspired to believe in "its excellence and being more in accord with the celebrated Sunnah that were investigated, collected and compiled in the time of Bukhārī and his companions." (See his 'Fuyūḍ al-Ḥaramayn'.) Yet, flexible as he was, he would go so far as to "embrace and enliven all the four schools of" Sunni Islam. (Refer to his principle of 'taṭbīq'.)

Shāh Walīullāh's greatest and most important contribution was, however, his emphasis on achieving the true knowledge about the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth. In India, throughout the centuries of Muslim rule, 'fiqh' and the knowledge of 'fiqh' had been considered the most essential aspect of Islamic sciences. The Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth—the two primary sources of the 'Sharī ah' and the core of Islamic learning—had been neglected to such an extent that Indian Islam had become devoid of all vitality. Shāh Ṣāḥib revived a new interest in the Qur'ān by translating it into Persian. He also gave a new impetus to the efforts of Shaikh 'Abdul Ḥaqq Dihlawī (958/1551-1052/1642) in giving the science of the Ḥadīth its due place in the scheme of Islamic disciplines. These endevours, on his parts, had a revolutionizing influence on the minds of the Indian Muslims and in them as well as in those reform ideas to which his keen historical sense gave' a socio-political colouring, lay the foundation of those mevements that were to be typified by the religio-political awakening of the Indian Muslims in the nineteenth century and after.

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SELECTED VERSES OF MIRZA GHALIB :

Illustration by Colin David

Edited and translated by Sufia Sadullah

Mirza Ghalib (1794—1869) was born in Agra and in middle life was accepted in the Court of Delhi of the last of the Moghuls, Bahadur Shah Zafar.

Ghalib's Diwan (Poetical Works) is among the treasures of Urdu literature and was written at the time of the great renaissance of Urdu poetry of the eighteenth and nineteenth eentury.

The verses included in this volume have been chosen and translated by Sufia Sadullah and each verse is accompanied by an illustration drawn by Colin David.

Mrs. Sadullah in her preface to the SELECTED VERSES discusses the particular problems which face the translator of such an original and subtle genius as Ghalib.

Like other Urdu poets of this time Ghalib was influenced by Persian tradition. Mrs. Sadullah enables the reader to compare the individual characteristics of Ghalib with those of Momim, by including her translation of Momim's 'Do You Recollect ?' at the end of the volume.

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